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Abstract
Achieving cooperation in multi-agents systems (MAS) is a central issue.
This is even more important when all players pursue self-maximizing be-
haviors that may lead to the worst outcome for the community, rather
than collectively cooperating for a better result [63, 96]. In this regard,
coalitions have been shown to help self-interested agents to successfully
cooperate and coordinate in a mutually beneficial manner. The notion of
a coalition of individuals is a well-known area of interest in MAS, and has
proved to be useful in both real-world economic scenarios and multi-agent
systems.
Since in MAS agents are autonomous, this opens several issues that must
be tackled. First, when interacting with others an agent has to decide if
it cooperates or not, as well as how long cooperation must be sustained.
Moreover, it also has to decide whom to cooperate with. Finally, it also has
to choose if it wants to jointly act with other agents or whether changing
agents with whom it interacts. However, all the previous decisions on
how and when to cooperate depend on the conditions and the problem
characteristics, since cooperative mechanism may work better or worse
depending on several facts. For instance, we consider that the topology
in which agents interact and their model of interaction highly influences
the emergence of cooperation.
In this thesis we tackle the problem of maximizing cooperation for self-
interested agents using dynamic coalitions. In order to achieve this, we
provide decision making mechanisms for: (i) dynamic coalition formation;
(ii) the interaction both among agents and coalitions; and (iii) how agents
reconnect, i.e., rewire. Our mechanisms improve cooperation and respond
to different needs in different scenarios.

Resumen
Esta tesis se centra en mejorar la cooperacio´n en sistemas multi-agente (MAS),
que se componen de agentes que interaccionan entre ellos. Un agente puede ser una
entidad f´ısica o virtual que puede actuar, percibir su entorno (de manera parcial) y
comunicarse con otros, es auto´nomo y tiene capacidades para conseguir sus objetivos
[52]. En este tipo de sistemas, para una interaccio´n exitosa, los agentes necesitan
cooperar, coordinarse y negociar con los otros agentes, de manera similar a como
nosotros hacemos en nuestra vida cotidiana. Adema´s, de manera similar, cada uno
de estos agentes actu´a movido por diferentes metas y motivaciones [150]. Por estas
razones, los MAS no se centran so´lo en el comportamiento de los individuos, sino
tambie´n en el de la sociedad como un todo.
Conseguir cooperacio´n en sistemas multi-agente es un tema central. Esto es au´n
ma´s importante cuando los agentes tienen comportamientos para maximizar sus pro-
pios beneficios, lo que puede llevar a un peor resultado para toda la comunidad,
en vez de cooperar colectivamente para un mejor resultado [63, 96]. En los MAS,
ejemplos de estos dilemas sociales pueden ser observados en escenarios de asignacio´n
de espectro de frecuencia, equilibrado de cargas, congestio´n de paquetes/mensajes,
asignacio´n de ancho de banda, etc. De hecho, podemos pensar en un simple ejem-
plo donde tenemos varios individuos que comparten un ancho de banda comu´n para
descargar archivos. Si todos comparten de manera igualitaria el ancho de banda,
todos los agentes reciben inmediatamente sus archivos. Sin embargo, si uno de los
agentes trata de bajarse ego´ıstamente ma´s ficheros de los que deber´ıa, el ancho de
banda para el resto se decrementa, as´ı que el resto de agentes no reciben sus archivos.
Adema´s, cuando el resto de agentes se dan cuenta de que hay un agente actuando de
manera ego´ısta, ellos tambie´n intentara´n descargarse ma´s ficheros. De esa manera,
la red se congestionara´ para todos, resultando en que ninguno de los agentes recibe
los ficheros. As´ı vemos que las decisiones tomadas de manera ego´ısta pueden ser per-
judiciales a pesar de dar beneficios a corto plazo. Por esto, disen˜ar mecanismos que
promuevan la emergencia y mantenimiento de la cooperacio´n de agentes ego´ıstas se
ha convertido en un a´rea de intere´s en los MAS [45]. De hecho, el beneficio global de
una poblacio´n de agentes se puede mejorar si todos los agentes cooperan.
Entre los mu´ltiples escenarios posibles, esta tesis propone maximizar la coop-
eracio´n en los MAS compuestos por agentes ego´ıstas. Ya que los agentes en los MAS
son auto´nomos, esto abre varios problemas que deben ser resueltos. Primero, cuando
un agente interacciona con otros, este agente tiene que decidir si coopera o no, as´ı
como cua´nto tiempo se debe mantener la cooperacio´n. Adema´s, tambie´n tiene que
decidir con quie´n va a cooperar. Finalmente, tiene que decidir si quiere actuar conjun-
tamente con otros agentes o si quiere cambiar los agentes con los que interactu´a. Sin
embargo, todas las decisiones de co´mo y cua´ndo cooperar dependen de las condiciones
y de las caracter´ısticas del problema, ya que los mecanismos de cooperacio´n pueden
funcionar mejor o peor dependiendo de varios factores. De hecho, consideramos que
la topolog´ıa en la que los agentes interactu´an y su modelo de interaccio´n influyen en
gran manera en la emergencia de cooperacio´n.
Primero, hay varias maneras co´mo los agentes pueden estar dispuestos para in-
teractuar, i.e., la topolog´ıa de los agentes puede ser distinta en distintos escenarios.
Consideramos que la topolog´ıa de interaccio´n afecta enormemente en co´mo resolver
las cuestiones anteriores, y es importante ya que distintas topolog´ıas representan dis-
tintas situaciones de la vida real. De hecho, un agente no decidira´ de la misma manera
si puede interactuar con todos los agentes que lo rodean, o si so´lo puede interactuar
con los que esta´n cercanos en el espacio. Entonces, es interesante investigar mecanis-
mos para mejorar la cooperacio´n en diferentes tipos de topolog´ıas y co´mo afectan a
la emergencia de cooperacio´n.
Segundo, tambie´n el modelo de interaccio´n afecta enormemente a la emergencia de
cooperacio´n. Por ello, esto debe tenerse en cuenta tambie´n cuando se disen˜an mecan-
ismos de cooperacio´n. De hecho, hay tres escenarios que modelan situaciones de la
vida real. Primero, escenarios de so´lo cooperacio´n-deslealtad, i.e., escenarios donde
un agente so´lo debe decidir si coopera o no con otros agentes. Segundo, escenarios
donde un agente posee recursos. Esto es particularmente importante cuando consider-
amos escenarios reales donde los agentes poseen recursos con los que pueden negociar.
De hecho, en las entidades colaborativas sociales y econo´micas (como alianzas inter-
naciones, acuerdos de comercio o cooperacio´n entre corporaciones), el intercambio de
recursos juega un papel importante [72]. No so´lo en entornos sociales y econo´micos,
sino que tambie´n podemos considerar escenarios tecnolo´gicos, como redes de orde-
nadores que pueden compartir recursos, e.g., su CPU, ficheros, etc. Adema´s, en estos
escenarios de recursos, el intercambio puede ser uni o bidireccional, dependiendo de
si es una comercializacio´n o una donacio´n. Finalmente, un tercer modelo de inter-
cambio es uno en el que los agentes tienen capacidades para realizar tareas. En
varias aplicaciones de sistemas multi-agente, los agentes deben coordinarse de man-
era efectiva para resolver problemas, asignar tareas en una organizacio´n distribuida,
distribuir colectivamente conocimiento e informacio´n, y conseguir metas colectivas
[56]. De hecho, mantener la colaboracio´n en escenarios donde varios actores com-
piten para servir tareas que son creadas dina´micamente y cambian en el tiempo esta´
ganando importancia. Esta situacio´n puede encontrarse en varios escenarios, como
en el comercio internacional, pujas por contratos del gobierno o subastas continuas, y
nuevos escenarios basados en Internet, como ”crowdsourcing” [138]. Como un ejem-
plo representativo, ”crowdsourcing” ha emergido como un me´todo barato y eficiente
de obtener soluciones para tareas simples que son dif´ıciles para los ordenadores para
resolver pero posible para humanos. De hecho, los mercados de ”crowdsourcing” han
emergido como una herramienta para juntar a los solicitantes, que tienen tareas que
necesitan que sean realizadas, y los trabajadores, que quieren realizar tareas a cambio
de un pago.
Todo lo anterior motiva la meta de esta disertacio´n: el disen˜o de mecanismos para
maximizar la cooperacio´n para agentes ego´ıstas considerando las restricciones previas.
Para esto, proporcionamos mecanismos de decisio´n para: (i) formacio´n dina´mica de
coaliciones; (ii) la interaccio´n entre agentes y entre coaliciones; y (iii) co´mo los agentes
se reconectan. Nuestros mecanismos mejoran la cooperacio´n y responden a diferentes
necesidades en diferentes escenarios.
Como hemos mencionado antes, los agentes ego´ıstas pueden llevar al peor resultado
para la comunidad, en vez de cooperar colectivamente para un resultado mejor [63, 96].
En vez de eso, las decisiones de grupo (sociales) pueden resultar en una cooperacio´n
beneficial que se mantiene en el tiempo [130]. En este sentido, se ha mostrado que las
coaliciones ayudan a cooperar y coordinarse exitosamente de una manera mutuamente
beneficial. La nocio´n de una coalicio´n de individuos es un a´rea de intere´s en los
sistemas multi-agente. De hecho, la formacio´n de coaliciones [123, 131] es una de las
estrategias fundamentales en los MAS para establecer colaboraciones entre agentes,
cada uno con sus objetivos y propiedades individuales.
El disen˜o de coaliciones o´ptimas ser´ıa deseable, ya que obtendr´ıamos la coalicio´n
que trae el mayor beneficio. Sin embargo, cuando necesitamos formar coaliciones
en un entorno dina´mico, donde las condiciones cambian constantemente, como es el
caso en esta tesis, los agentes pueden querer o necesitar cambiar la coalicio´n a la que
pertenecen constantemente. En este caso, computar la coalicio´n o´ptima puede ser
inviable (porque la optimalidad esta´ restringida a un nu´mero pequen˜o de agentes)
o llevar ma´s tiempo que el tiempo de existencia de una coalicio´n. De esta manera,
la formacio´n de coaliciones o´ptimas tienen varios inconvenientes cuando se aplican
al mundo real. Primero, el tiempo que se necesita para formar coaliciones o´ptimas
impide su uso en sistemas multi-agente dina´micos donde los agentes tienen que decidir
en un tiempo limitado si es beneficial para ellos unirse. Segundo, el nu´mero de agentes
debe ser pequen˜o, ya que el nu´mero de estructuras para coaliciones (O(nn)) es tan
grande que no puede ser enumerado para ma´s que unos cuantos agentes [123]. En-
tonces, si nos centramos en un sistema con un gran nu´mero de agentes interactuando,
el coste computacional es tan alto que se hace imposible de calcular. Esto es por lo
que es necesario usar conocimiento de dominio y/o juegos matema´ticos con ciertas
restricciones y donde los agentes tienen determinadas caracter´ısticas para resolver
el problema de la formacio´n de coaliciones de una manera razonablemente eficiente.
Adema´s, la formacio´n de coaliciones esta´ticas no permite ninguna interferencia en el
proceso de formacio´n de las coaliciones. Por el contrario, los me´todos de formacio´n de
coaliciones dina´micas permite a los agentes formar coaliciones en entornos donde se
producen cambios frecuentemente. Esto es por lo que son particularmente adecuados
para entornos reales [79].
Por las razones mencionadas anteriormente, y ya que consideramos escenarios
dina´micos, hemos elegido usar coaliciones dina´micas. En esta tesis, consideramos dos
tipos de coaliciones: i) coaliciones con l´ıderes; y ii) coaliciones planas. La mayor
diferencia entre ellas es que en la primera hay un l´ıder que dicta el comportamiento
de la coalicio´n, cobrando tasas por ello. Por lo tanto, primero hemos desarrollado un
mecanismo para la emergencia de cooperacio´n usando l´ıderes. Sin embargo, el uso
de l´ıderes tiene varios inconvenientes: 1) el l´ıder de una coalicio´n impone su decisio´n
sobre los agentes de la coalicio´n; y 2) la distribucio´n de beneficios no es justa, ya que:
i) los l´ıderes reciben un pago que no distribuyen; y ii) los agentes en la frontera de
la coalicio´n (interactuando con los agentes externos) obtienen menor pago. Esto es
por lo que ma´s tarde, proponemos mecanismos que usan aprendizaje para permitir
la emergencia de cooperacio´n en coaliciones planas sin necesidad de l´ıderes, evitando
los inconvenientes anteriores. No so´lo eso, sino que al contrario que en la mayor´ıa
de los trabajos previos, tambie´n proveemos mecanismos que consideran la interaccio´n
entre distintas coaliciones, para mejorar el rendimiento de toda la poblacio´n. De
hecho, la manera en la que se forman las coaliciones, por que´ y co´mo los miembros de
una coalicio´n establecen cooperacio´n tambin debe ser considerado. Por ello, tambie´n
disen˜amos mecanismos para las interacciones entre ambos agentes y las coaliciones
que permitira´ la emergencia de la cooperacio´n.
Hay distintas topolog´ıas en las cuales los individuos pueden interactuar. Entre el-
las, encontramos las redes espaciales, i.e., redes donde la interaccio´n entre los agentes
esta´ localmente restringida a sus vecinos, que puede modelar algunos escenarios reales,
como vecindarios en edificios. Sin embargo, las redes complejas proveen una mod-
elo ma´s realista de las caracter´ısticas topolo´gicas encontradas en varias redes en la
naturaleza, sociales y tecnolo´gicas (e.g., redes sociales, Internet) [119, 149]. Adema´s,
es sabido que pueden influir la emergencia de la cooperacio´n [113]. Por esta razo´n,
en esta tesis proveemos mecanismos que permiten la emergencia de cooperacio´n con
distintos tipos de topolog´ıas, usando: redes espaciales y redes complejas.
Independientemente de la topolog´ıa, las redes pueden ser esta´ticas o dina´micas.
Las primeras representan el caso donde un agente no puede cambiar los agentes con
los que interactu´a (sus vecinos). Primero, consideramos esta situacio´n y proveemos
mecanismos para mejorar la cooperacio´n usando la formacio´n dina´mica de coaliciones
en topolog´ıas esta´ticas. Sin embargo, en la mayor´ıa de las situaciones de la vida real,
la topolog´ıa de la red cambia en respuesta al estado de la red y al reve´s, el estado
de la red cambia en respuesta a la topolog´ıa. Hay un creciente intere´s en juegos en
redes adaptativas y su influencia en la cooperacio´n, donde los agentes pueden mejorar
su topolog´ıa (ver [59] para una revisio´n), por ejemplo, cambiando los vecinos con los
que interactu´an. De hecho, la investigacio´n en juegos en topolog´ıas dina´micas ha
encontrado evidencias emp´ıricas mostrando que el cambio de vecinos (tambie´n cono-
cido como reconexio´n) lleva a un comportamiento cooperativo [54, 58, 118]. Incluso
si la reconexio´n y la formacio´n dina´mica de coaliciones usada independientemente
han mostrado ser exitosas en mejorar la cooperacio´n en MAS, ningu´n mecanismo
ha investigado los efectos sinerg´ısticos de usar la formacio´n de coaliciones dina´micas
junto a reconexio´n. Por ello, nosotros proporcionamos un mecanismos que usa ambos
conjuntamente, usando aprendizaje y reputacio´n, dependiendo de la asuncio´n de la
informacio´n que unos agentes tienen de otros.
Muchas aproximaciones de teor´ıa de juegos coevolucionarios han sido usados para
proveer un entorno para estudiar la cooperacio´n [110]. En esta tesis, para maximizar la
cooperacio´n dependiendo de las caracter´ısticas del problema, presentamos diferentes
modelos de interaccio´n que requieren diferentes mecanismos de cooperacio´n. Primero,
usamos el entorno teore´tico del Dilema del Prisionero Iterado (IPD) [14], que modela
el dilema en la interaccio´n de dos individuos (jugadores) que tendr´ıan ma´s beneficios
si los dos cooperasen que si los dos fuesen desleales, siendo vulnerables a la explotacio´n
por los que son desleales [15]. Esto ha sido especialmente u´til para entender el rol de
las interacciones locales y el mantenimiento de la cooperacio´n [84, 100, 126]. Por lo
tanto, primero tenemos que proporcionar mecanismos que mejoren la emergencia de
la cooperacio´n en escenarios con agentes cooperativos-desleales. Sin embargo, incluso
si el IPD es u´til para modelar problemas en varios dominios, este juego puede no ser
completo cuando consideramos escenarios reales donde los agentes tienen recursos.
As´ı que para modelar mejor la realidad, estamos interesados en un escenario donde
los agentes no pueden solo cooperar o ser desleales, sino tambin en otros juegos
de la teor´ıa de juegos, que modelan el intercambio de recursos como el Possesor-
Trader [155] o tambie´n el juego de la donacio´n [99]. Adema´s, co´mo los miembros
de una coalicio´n establecen cooperacio´n es importante cuando modelamos entornos
interconectados de hoy en d´ıa. Finalmente, tambie´n consideramos escenarios reales
donde los agentes tienen que conseguir objetivos que no pueden conseguir por ellos
mismos. Sin embargo, el trabajo previo en este campo se enfoca principalmente en
formar una u´nica coalicio´n para cada tarea. En este caso, no consideran la situacio´n
ma´s realista donde hay varias coaliciones compitiendo para proveer el mismo servicio.
Este tipo de escenario puede encontrarse en entornos como el comercio internacional o
las subastas continuas. Por esta razo´n, en esta tesis tambie´n tratamos la adaptacio´n de
la distribucio´n de las coaliciones en un entorno de asignacio´n de tareas dina´micamente.
Por todo los dicho anteriormente, dividimos esta tesis en 3 grandes contribuciones,
que se resumen a continuacio´n.
En el Cap´ıtulo 3, investigamos la formacio´n dina´mica de coaliciones en topolog´ıas
esta´ticas para mejorar la cooperacio´n. Es importante darse cuenta que en este
cap´ıtulo, incluso si las coaliciones cambian a lo largo del tiempo, la topolog´ıa de inter-
accio´n, i.e., co´mo esta´n conectados los agentes para interactuar, permanece esta´tica.
As´ı que proporcionamos a los agentes y las coaliciones mecanismos que permiten la
emergencia de cooperacio´n, en escenarios donde usamos el Dilema del Prisionero It-
erado (IPD) como modelo de interaccio´n. Proponemos mecanismos con dos tipos
distintos de coaliciones: i) coaliciones con l´ıderes; y ii) coaliciones planas. La prin-
cipal diferencia entre estos es que en el primero, el l´ıder dicta el comportamiento
de la coalicio´n, cobrando impuestos por ello, mientras que en el segundo, todos los
miembros de la coalicio´n deciden el comportamiento y dividen las ganancias. As´ı que
primero proponemos un mecanismo de emergencia de coaliciones eficiente, distribuido
y ligero, usando l´ıderes. Hemos visto que con este mecanismo los agentes mantienen la
cooperacio´n en el tiempo a cambio de unos impuestos bajos, que se acuerdan entre los
propios agentes (incrementando sus beneficios totales). Sin embargo, incluso si usar
coaliciones con l´ıderes permite que emerja cooperacio´n, el uso de l´ıderes tiene varios
inconvenientes. Primero, una coalicio´n debe pagarle al l´ıder. Segundo, el l´ıder impone
el comportamiento para toda la coalicio´n, sin tener en cuenta informacio´n u´til que los
agentes podr´ıan usar en beneficio de todos los miembros de la coalicio´n. Para evitar
estos inconvenientes, ma´s tarde nos centramos en formar coaliciones planas, i.e., coa-
liciones sin l´ıderes. Proponemos el uso de aprendizaje reforzado junto con coaliciones
planas para conseguir cooperacio´n sin necesidad del l´ıderes. En esta parte, tambie´n
comparamos la cooperacio´n entre coaliciones esta´ticas y dina´micas. Observamos que
la tasa de cooperacio´n es mayor en el segundo caso. La razo´n es que las coaliciones
dina´micas se adaptan mejor a la dinamicidad del juego. De hecho, las coaliciones
dina´micas son estructuras mucho ma´s flexibles que emergen y se adaptan so´lo en-
tre aquellos agentes que hubiesen experimentado cooperacio´n como algo beneficial en
el pasado. En general, nuestros experimentos confirman que nuestros mecanismos
permiten la emergencia de cooperacio´n en redes espaciales y complejas, evitando la
pe´rdida de ganancia por pagar impuestos al l´ıder.
En el Cap´ıtulo 3 consideramos que los agentes interactu´an en una topolog´ıa
esta´tica. Sin embargo, en la mayor parte de situaciones reales, la topolog´ıa de la
red cambia en respuesta al estado de la red, y viceversa. De hecho, la investigacio´n
en juegos con topolog´ıa dina´mica ha encontrado evidencias emp´ıricas mostrando que
el cambios de enlaces (reconexio´n) lleva a comportamiento cooperativo [54, 58, 118].
Sin embargo, incluso si el cambio de enlaces y la formacio´n dina´mica de coaliciones
usados independientemente han mostrado que mejoran la cooperacio´n en los MAS,
no ha habido ningu´n intento previo en investigar los efectos sinerg´ısticos de usar con-
juntamente formacio´n dina´mica de coaliciones y cambio de enlaces. Por esto, en el
Cap´ıtulo 4 presentamos dos mecanismos de cooperacio´n para ayudar a los agentes
auto-interesados a establecer y mantener una cooperacio´n exitosa usando coaliciones
dina´micas y cambio de enlaces. Adema´s, incluso si el IPD ha sido u´til para mode-
lar situaciones donde los agentes ten´ıan que decidir si cooperar o ser desleales, este
juego puede no ser suficiente si queremos modelar escenarios de hoy en d´ıa donde
los agentes tambie´n poseen recursos. Por eso, en el Cap´ıtulo 4 presentamos dos
mecanismos basados en: (1) un modelo de interaccio´n que incluye el intercambio de
recursos (bidireccional o unidireccional); (2) un mecanismo de formacio´n dina´mica
de coaliciones que permite a los agentes decidir si se unen o dejan coaliciones (sin la
intervencio´n del l´ıder); y (3) una estrategia de cambio de pareja basado en las experi-
encias previas. En general, confirmamos experimentalmente que nuestros mecanismos
s´ı mejoran la cooperacio´n. Sus beneficios parten del hecho de que el cambio de en-
laces tiene efectos positivos cuando se combina con la formacio´n de coaliciones. La
razo´n es que ya que los agentes pueden cambiar a sus vecinos, pueden elegir tambie´n
conectarse a los agentes que proveyesen con mayores beneficios y unirse a coaliciones
mayores para ser ma´s efectivos contra comportamientos no cooperativos.
Por u´ltimo, las coaliciones no son so´lo necesarias para mejorar la cooperacio´n y/o
actuar ma´s eficientemente con respecto a agentes independientes [133], sino que son
tambie´n beneficiales cuando hay tareas complejas que no pueden ser realizadas por
un u´nico agente. Por esto, en el Cap´ıtulo 5 construimos un mecanismo que podr´ıa
ser empleado en escenarios reales, por ejemplo, en ”crowsourcing”, ”coworking”, etc.,
donde consideramos tareas complejas que deben ser realizadas por grupos de agentes.
Entonces, con el objetivo de proporcionar calidad y cantidad de tareas completadas,
mientras que modelamos un escenario realista, introducimos un mecanismo de de-
cisio´n que permite a los agentes en un entorno competitivo a auto´nomamente per-
mitir y mantener coaliciones. Primero, nuestro mecanismo permite a una coalicio´n:
(i) conseguir el equipo ma´s confiable de agentes para servir una determinada tarea,
basa´ndose en la reputacio´n de los agentes; y (ii) decidir si la coalicio´n se debe man-
tener o deshacer porque ya no es beneficiosa. Segundo, nuestro mecanismo permite a
los agentes decidir si quieren seguir siendo parte de una coalicio´n, o si quieren unirse
a otra. Proporcionamos evidencias emp´ıricas mostrando que cuando los agentes em-
plean nuestro mecanismo, es posible mantener altos niveles de satisfaccio´n del cliente
(en te´rminos de porcentaje de tareas servidas a tiempo). De hecho, mostramos que
con nuestro mecanismo: (i) las coaliciones exhiben alta elasticidad; y (ii) las coali-
ciones y los agentes se adaptan exitosamente a una variacio´n de la distribucio´n de las
tareas entrantes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
This thesis focuses on improving cooperation in Multi-agent Systems (MAS), that are
composed of agents that interact among each other. An agent can be a physical or
virtual entity that can act, perceive its environment (in a partial way) and commu-
nicate with others, is autonomous and has skills to achieve its goals [52]. In this kind
of systems, in order to successfully interact, agents require the ability to cooperate,
coordinate and negotiate with the others, similarly to the way that we do in our
everyday lives. Also similarly, each of these agents acts moved by different goals and
motivations [150]. For these reasons, MAS does not focus only in the behavior of the
individuals, but also the society as a whole.
Achieving cooperation in multi-agents systems (MAS) is a central issue. This is
even more important when all players pursue self-maximizing behaviors that may lead
to the worst outcome for the community, rather than collectively cooperating for a
better result [63, 96]. In MAS, examples of these social dilemmas can be often ob-
served in frequency spectrum assignation, load balancing, packet/message congestion,
bandwidth allocation, etc. For instance, we can think about a simple example where
we have many individuals that share a common bandwidth to download files. If they
all equally share the bandwidth, all agents promptly receive their files. However, if
one of the agents selfishly tries to download more files than it should, the bandwidth
for the rest is decreased, thus the other agents do not receive their files. Moreover,
when the rest of agents realize there is an agent acting selfishly, they will also start
trying to download more. Therefore, the network will congest for all of them, resulting
this in none of the agents receiving files. Thus individual (self-interested) decisions
may become detrimental despite eventually delivering short-term benefits. Therefore,
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designing mechanisms that promote the emergence and maintenance of cooperation
for self-interested agents has become a major area of interest in MAS [45]. In fact,
the global benefit of an agent population is deemed to improve if all agents cooperate.
Among the multiple frameworks, this thesis proposes to maximize cooperation in
MAS composed of self interested agents. Since agents are autonomous, this opens
several issues that must be tackled. First, when interacting with others an agent has
to decide if it cooperates or not, as well as how long cooperation must be sustained.
Moreover, it also has to decide whom to cooperate with. Finally, it has to choose if
it wants to jointly act with other agents or whether changing agents with whom it
interacts. However, all the previous decisions on how and when to cooperate depend
on the conditions and the problem characteristics, since cooperative mechanism may
work better or worse depending on several facts. For instance, we consider that the
topology in which agents interact and their model of interaction highly influences the
emergence of cooperation.
Firstly, there are several ways how agents may be deployed to interact, i.e., agents
topology may be different in different scenarios. We consider that the interaction
topology greatly affects how to solve previous issues, and it is important since different
types of topologies represent different real life situations. In fact, an agent will not
decide the same way if it can interact with all the other agents that surround it, or if
it can only interact with the ones that are close in space, or when each agent is only
connected to some others. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate mechanisms to
improve cooperation in different types of topologies and how they affect the emergence
of cooperation.
Secondly, also the model of interaction greatly affects the emergence of cooper-
ation. Therefore this must also be taken into account when designing cooperation
mechanisms. In fact, there are three scenarios that model nowadays real world situa-
tions. Firstly, only cooperative-defective scenarios, i.e., scenarios where an agent may
only decide if it cooperates or not with other agents. Secondly, an agent may be in
an scenario where it owns resources. This is particularly important when considering
actual-world scenarios where agents own resources that they can trade. In fact, re-
garding social and economic collaborating entities (as international alliances, trading
agreements, or cooperation among corporations), resource exchange plays an impor-
tant role [72]. Not only in social and economic environments, but we can also consider
technological scenarios, as networks of computers that may share their resources, e.g.,
its CPU, files, etc. Moreover, in this resource-based scenarios exchange of resources
may be bidirectional or unidirectional, depending on if there is an trading or a dona-
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tion. Finally, a third model of interaction is the one where agents have capabilities to
perform tasks. In many applications of multi-agent systems, agents must coordinate
effectively in order to solve problems, allocate tasks across a distributed organization,
collectively distribute knowledge and information, and achieve collective goals [56].
In fact, supporting collaboration in scenarios where several actors compete to service
tasks that are dynamically created and change over time is becoming increasingly im-
portant. This situation can be found in several scenarios, as international commerce,
bidding for government contracts or continuous auctions, and new Internet-based sce-
narios, as crowdsourcing [138]. As a representative example, crowdsourcing [138] has
emerged as a cheap and efficient method of obtaining solutions to simple tasks that
are difficult for computers to solve but possible for humans. In fact, crowdsourcing
markets have emerged as a tool for bringing together requesters, who have tasks they
need accomplished, and workers, who are willing to perform these tasks in a timely
manner in exchange for payment.
All the previous motivates the main goal of this dissertation: the design of mech-
anisms to maximize cooperation for self-interested agents considering previous con-
straints. In the next section, we present our contributions to tackle these problems.
1.2 Contributions
In this thesis we tackle the problem of maximizing cooperation for self-interested
agents using dynamic coalitions. In order to achieve this, we provide decision making
mechanisms for: (i) dynamic coalition formation; (ii) the interaction both among
agents and coalitions; and (iii) how agents reconnect, i.e., change their links. Our
mechanisms cope with improving of cooperation and respond to different needs in
different scenarios.
Players that pursue self-maximizing behaviors may lead to the worst outcome for
the community, rather than collectively cooperating for a better result [63, 96]. In-
stead, group (social) decisions can result in a mutually beneficial cooperation that
holds over time [130]. Coalitions have been shown to help self-interested agents to suc-
cessfully cooperate and coordinate in a mutually beneficial manner. The notion of a
coalition of individuals is a well-known area of interest in multi-agent systems (MAS),
and has proved to be useful in both real-world economic scenarios and multi-agent
systems. In fact, forming coalitions [123, 131] is one of the fundamental approaches
in multi-agent systems for establishing collaborations among agents, each with indi-
vidual objectives and properties.
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The design of optimal coalitions would be desirable, since we would obtain the
coalition that brings the maximum benefit. However, when we need to form coalitions
in a dynamic environment, where conditions constantly change, as it is the case in
this dissertation, agents may constantly want or need to change the coalition they
belong to. In this case, computing the optimal coalition may be either infeasible
(because optimality is constrained to a very small number of agents) or take longer
than the time of existence of a coalition. Thus optimal coalition formation has several
drawbacks when applied to the real world. First, the time needed to find the optimal
coalition prevents its use in a dynamic multi-agent system where agents have to decide
if it is beneficial for them to join in a small amount of time. Second, the number of
agents involved has to be small, since the number of coalition structures (O(nn))
is so large that it cannot be enumerated for more than a few agents [123]. Thus,
if we focus on a system where we have a large number of agents interacting, the
computational cost is so high that it makes it impossible to compute. This is why
it is necessary to use domain knowledge and/or mathematical games with certain
constraints and where agents have particular characteristics to solve the problem of
coalition formation in a reasonable efficient way. Moreover, static coalition formation
does not allow for any interference with the running coalition formation process. On
the contrary, dynamic coalition formation methods allows agents to form coalitions
where changes in environment may be frequent. This is why they are particularly
well suited for real world domains [79].
For the reasons mentioned above, and since we consider dynamic scenarios, we
have chosen to use dynamic coalitions. In this thesis, we consider two different types
of coalitions: i) coalitions with leaders; and ii) flat coalitions. The main difference
between them is that in the former, there is a leader that dictates the behavior of the
coalition, charging taxes for it. Therefore, we have firstly developed a mechanism for
cooperation emergence using leaders. However, using leaders has several drawbacks,
namely: 1) a coalition leader imposes her decision on the agents in the coalition to
maximize cooperation; and 2) the payoff distribution is unfair, since: (i) leaders re-
ceive a payoff that they do not distribute; and (ii) the agents in the frontier of the
coalition (interacting with agents outside of the coalition) obtains less payoff. This is
why later we propose decision making mechanisms that use learning to allow cooper-
ation to emerge in flat coalitions without leaders, avoiding the previously mentioned
shortcomings. Not only that, but, differing to most of previous work, we also pro-
vide mechanisms that consider the interaction among coalitions, in order to improve
the overall population performance. In fact, besides the way coalitions are formed,
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why and how members of a coalition establish cooperation must also be considered.
Thus there we also design decision making mechanisms both for agents and coalitions
interactions that will allow cooperation to emerge.
There are different topologies in which individuals may interact. Among them,
we may find spatial networks, i.e., networks where the interaction between agents is
locally restricted to their neighbors, that model some realistic scenarios, as a building
neighborhood. However, complex networks provide a more realistic model of the
topological features found in many nature, social and technological networks (e.g.,
social networks, the Internet, ecological populations) [119, 149]. Furthermore, it is
known that they can influence emergence of cooperation [113]. For this reason, in this
thesis we provide mechanisms that allow the emergence of cooperation in different
types of topologies, namely: spatial networks and complex networks.
Independently of the topology, networks can be static and dynamic. The first ones
represent the case where an agent cannot change the agents with whom it interacts
(neighbors). We firstly consider this situation and present mechanisms to improve
cooperation using dynamic coalition formation in static topologies. However, in most
real-world situations, the topology of the network changes in response to the state
of the network and the other way around, namely the state of the network changes
in response to the topology. There is an increasing interest in games on adaptive
networks and its influence in cooperation, where agents may improve their topol-
ogy (see [59] for a review), for example by changing the neighbors with whom they
interact. In fact, research on games on dynamic topologies has found empirical evi-
dence showing that partner switching (also known as rewiring) leads to cooperative
behavior [54, 58, 118]. Even if rewiring and dynamic coalition formation used in-
dependently have proved successful to improve cooperation in MAS, there has been
no previous attempts to investigate the synergistic effects of using dynamic coalition
formation together with rewiring. We provide a synergistic dynamic coalition forma-
tion and rewiring mechanisms using both learning and reputation, depending on the
assumption of having information about other agents.
Several coevolutionary game theory approaches have been used to provide a frame-
work to study cooperation [110]. In this thesis, in order to maximize cooperation
depending on the characteristics of the problem, we present different models of in-
teraction that require different cooperation mechanisms. Firstly, we use the Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) theoretical framework [14], which embodies the dilemma
of two interacting individuals (players) who are better off mutually cooperating than
mutually defecting, being vulnerable to exploitation by one who defects [15]. This has
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been specially useful for understanding the role of local interactions and the mainte-
nance of cooperation [84, 100, 126]. Thus firstly we provide mechanisms that enhance
the emergence of cooperation in scenarios with cooperative-defective agents. How-
ever, even if the IPD is useful to model problems in several domains, this game may
not be complete when considering actual-world scenarios where agents own resources
that they can trade. In fact, regarding social and economic collaborating entities
(as international alliances, trading agreements, or cooperation among corporations),
resource trading plays an important role [72]. Not only in social and economic envi-
ronments, but we can also consider technological scenarios, as networks of computers
that may share their resources, e.g., its CPU, files, etc. Thus to better model reality,
we are interested in a scenario where agents cannot only cooperate or defect, like
in the classical IPD, but where they can also own resources. Other game theoretic
approaches, as for instance the Possesor-Trader [155] or also the donation game [99],
model better those scenarios. Moreover, how the members of a coalition establish co-
operation is important when modeling nowadays interconnected world, where agents
own resources that they can trade. Therefore, we present mechanisms to improve
cooperation, both using dynamic coalition formation and partner switching (rewiring
from now on) in scenarios where agents own resources. To the best of our knowledge,
no coalition-based mechanism in the literature has captured the concepts of ownership
and trade or donation of resources. Finally, we also consider more real world domains
where agents have to accomplish goals they cannot do by themselves, thus they need
to group in order to achieve collective goals. However, previous works on dynamic
coalition formation mainly focus on supporting the formation of a single coalition for
each task. Thus, they do not consider the bigger picture (and more realistic situa-
tion), where there are several coalitions competing to provide the same service. This
type of scenario can be found in environments as international commerce, bidding
for government contracts or continuous auctions. For this reason, in this thesis we
also address the adaptation of the coalition distribution in a dynamic task allocation
environment.
1.3 Guide to the Thesis
The remaining of this dissertation is organised as follows
Chapter 2. Related work. We present a review of works related to ours.
Chapter 3: Dynamic coalition formation over static topologies. We firstly
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develop a mechanism for dynamic coalition formation, agents and coalition interaction
strategies to achieve cooperation in static topologies, both grid and complex networks.
We do this in two different types of coalitions: i) coalitions with leaders (Section 3.3);
and ii) flat coalitions (Section 3.4). In this chapter, we focus on a cooperation-
defection model of interaction. The material contained in this chapter has been
published in:
• A. Peleteiro, J. Burguillo, and A. Bazzan. How coalitions enhance cooperation
in the IPD over complex networks. In Third Brazilian Workshop on Social
Simulation (BWSS), pages 68-74, 2012.
• N. Salazar, J. A. Rodr´ıguez-Aguilar, J. L. Arcos, A. Peleteiro, and J. C. Burguillo-
Rial. Emerging cooperation on complex networks. In the 10th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2, AA-
MAS ’11, pages 669-676, Richland, SC, 2011.
• A. Bazzan, A. Peleteiro, and J. Burguillo. Learning to cooperate in the Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma by means of social attachments. J. Braz. Comp. Soc.,
17(3):163-174, 2011.
• A. Peleteiro, J. Burguillo, and A. Bazzan. Emerging Cooperation in the Spa-
tial IPD with Reinforcement Learning and Coalitions. In Intelligent Decision
Systems in Large- Scale Distributed Environments. Volume 362 of Studies in
Computational Intelligence Series, pages 187-206. Springer, 2011
Chapter 4: Dynamic coalition formation in dynamic topologies with re-
sources. We present mechanisms to improve cooperation, both using dynamic coali-
tion formation and partner switching (rewiring from now on) in scenarios where agents
own resources. To the best of our knowledge, no coalition-based mechanism in the lit-
erature has captured the concepts of ownership and trade of resources. The material
contained in this chapter has been published in:
• Ana Peleteiro, J. C. Burguillo, Josep Ll. Arcos, Juan A. Rodr´ıguez-Aguilar.
Fostering cooperation through dynamic coalition formation and partner switch-
ing. ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems 9, 1, Article 1
(March 2014), 31 pages. DOI=10.1145/2567928
• Ana Peleteiro, J. C. Burguillo, Siang Yew Chong. Exploring Indirect Reciprocity
in Complex Networks using Coalitions and Rewiring. International Conference
7
on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Sytems (AAMAS 2014, Paris, France)
(accepted for publication)
• J.C. Burguillo and A. Peleteiro. Ownership and trade in spatial evolutionary
memetic games. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Par-
allel Problem Solving from Nature: Part I, PPSN’10, pages 455-464, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2010. Springer-Verlag. ISBN 3-642-15843-9, 978-3-642-15843-8.
Chapter 5: Dynamic coalition formation to support collaboration in com-
petitive environments. We present a mechanism that allows agents in a com-
petitive environment to autonomously enact and sustain coalitions. We do so in a
scenario where agents may face the problem of solving tasks that are composed of
subtasks that cannot be solved by them individually. The material contained in this
chapter will be submitted to:
• Ana Peleteiro, J. C. Burguillo, Michael Luck, Josep Ll. Arcos, Juan A. Rodr´ıguez-
Aguilar. Using reputation and adaptive coalitions to support collaboration in
competitive environments. Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence,
2014 (submitted)
Chapter 6 Finally, we draw conclusions and discuss future lines of research.
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Chapter 2
Related work
2.1 Introduction
Individual decisions (self-interested), besides providing only momentary benefits, are
detrimental if many agents take them. Instead, group decisions (social) can result in
a mutually beneficial cooperation that holds over time [130]. Coalitions have been
widely used in multi agent systems [122, 130, 135], as they enable agents to accomplish
goals they are unable to accomplish independently. This is why coalition formation
has attracted the attention of researchers for several years.
In the following sections we present a review of coalitions related work in the
literature. We begin with a brief review of static coalition formation, which is followed
by related work on dynamic coalition formation.
2.2 Static coalition formation
Coalition formation is a process where agents come together to achieve a goal or
to increase their performance. Static coalition formation aims at forming the best
possible coalition, considering there is not dynamic environment where a change in
the coalition would be necessary at any point. Thus the problem to solve is how
to form an optimal coalition, but without the need to adapt it. However, this is
challenging since the number of potential coalitions increases when increasing the
number of agents, since the problem is exponential.
In the following subsections, we present two different approaches to tackle the
coalition formation problem. Firstly, optimization approaches, which mainly focus
on finding an optimal coalition, i.e. tackling the CSG problem. Secondly, game
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theoretic approaches, because they have implications and uses in many real-world
domains, including those involving automated agents, electronic commerce, auctions,
and general resource allocation scenarios.
2.2.1 Optimisation approaches
One of the main problems in coalition formation is the coalition structure generation
(CSG). It has been shown to be NP-complete, and existing algorithms cannot generate
solutions within a reasonable time for even moderate numbers of agents. Thus to find
an optimal coalition can become intractable since all possible shapes of coalitions
depend exponentially on the number of agents.
There are several algorithms trying to tackle the CSG problem, and according
to [114], they can be classified in three main categories: dynamic programming
(DP) [114, 129], heuristics [133] and anytime optimal algorithms [116, 123].
i. In dynamic programming, the basic idea is to break the optimization problem
into subproblems that can be resolved recursively. It guarantees that an optimal
coalition can be found in O(3n) steps, being n the number of agents.
ii. Heuristics returns ”good” solutions in less time, but provides no guarantees on
the quality of the solution, meaning this that the solution may be arbitrarily
worse than the optimal, and even if the optimal is found, there is no way to
prove it.
iii. Anytime optimal algorithms guarantee a first solution within a bound from the
optimal and improve that solution after by evaluating more of the search space
and establishing progressively better bounds until optimality is reached. How-
ever, in worst case the time search goes to O(nn).
Each of those approaches has its advantages over the others, and this led re-
searchers to try to develop new approaches combining their best characteristics. To
get the best of DP and anytime algorithms, Rahwan et al. [115] combine the state-
of-the-art dynamic programming [114] and state-of-the-art anytime algorithm [116]
on CSG, and develop the IDP-IP hybrid algorithm, which outperforms the time con-
vergence of the former ones. However, the approach presented in [115] has some
limitations, that are identified and solved in [117]. This work provides a new IDP-
IP* algorithm that outperforms IDP-IP.
All the previous algorithms that find an optimal solution to the CSG problem,
i.e., DP and anytime algorithms, are centralized. This means that they assume the
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existence of a center that has access to all the expected outcomes of the coalition
(coalition values) and carries out all the calculations. These leads to a single point of
failure and performance bottleneck. To address this issue, Michalak et al. [91] develop
a decentralized algorithm that efficiently distributes the computations among agents
and returns an optimal solution, making the system more robust and reducing the
time of processing.
As finding the optimal partition of agents set by checking the whole space may be
too expensive in terms of time and computation, several other approaches have been
proposed to try to reduce the search space and provide faster solutions.
Shrot et al. [137] re-examine the computational complexity of the different coali-
tion formation problems when assuming that the number of different agent types is
fixed, i.e., their contributions and utility are the same in identical situation, contrary
to the general case, where each of the agents is assumed to belong to a different type.
The authors show that many of the problems that were proved hard under a general
case are polynomial when the number of agent types is fixed. Another option to
reduce the search space is to avoid redundant computation, as in Voice et al. [145],
where they consider coalition formation problems for agents with an underlying syn-
ergistic graph, thus where not all the coalitions are feasible. The authors propose
two algorithms, D-SlyCE and DyCE, that enumerate all feasible coalitions in a dis-
tributed fashion and the optimal feasible coalition structure respectively, providing
both feasible coalitions in less time than the state-of-the-art algorithms.
Other solutions to reduce the search space to find the optimal or semi-optimal
coalition include the use of Evolutionary Algorithms (EA) ([60]), that generate solu-
tions to optimization problems using techniques inspired by natural evolution. Within
EA, Genetic Algorithms (GA), that perform heuristic search that mimics the process
of natural evolution, are commonly used in optimization problems. Yang et al. [153]
develop a GA-based algorithm for coalition structure formation which aims at achiev-
ing goals of high performance, scalability, and fast convergence rate simultaneously.
Not only how coalitions are formed, but also how they are maintained is a topic of
interest. Identifying sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of stability
in coalition formation has been an active area of research. According to d’Aspremont
[43], a coalition is considered to be stable if none of its members has an incentive
to withdraw (this is known as internal stability) and none of the non-members has
an incentive to participate in the coalition (this is known as external stability). The
stability of coalitions and its formation depends on the rules of coalition formation
proposed [156], since different models with different formation rules have been pro-
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posed in the past. For example, Bloch [27] examines an infinite-horizon coalition
unanimity game in which a coalition is formed if and only if all potential members
agree to form the coalition. Contrary, Yi et al. [157] investigate the open membership
game in which non-members can join an existing coalition without the permission
of the existing members. To study how non-members union (externalities) affects
coalition stability, Yi [156] presents an analysis of the stability of the grand coali-
tion under different membership rules, also taking into account how external entities
can affect the coalitions. More recently, Haeringer et al. [61] study the stability of
coalition structures in non-cooperative and cooperative frameworks, from a economic
point of view. The authors examine two concepts of stability: Tiebout-stability and
C-stability. In the former, individuals are free to leave and to enter any coalition,
without the consentment of the other players, but only individual decisions are al-
lowed. In the later, group decisions are allowed and the free exit assumption still
holds. With this, the authors study the stability of coalition structures when a fixed
decision scheme is imposed on coalitions. Caparro´s et al. [36] also address stability
but in a non-cooperative environment. The authors use the concept of stability intro-
duced by d’Aspremont [43] and study the existence and enlargement conditions for
coalitions with heterogeneous agents, i.e., how the addition of a new agent affects sta-
bility. Finally, Konishi et al. [81] propose an alternate dynamic approach to stability
of coalition structures, which they call the equilibrium process of coalition formation
(EPCF).
2.2.2 Game theoretic approaches
One of the goals when forming coalitions is to improve the cooperation among agents.
To address this issue, game theory approaches have been widely used, since it has
implications and uses for many real-world domains, including those involving auto-
mated agents, electronic commerce, auctions, and general resource allocation scenar-
ios. Thus, as a result of the desire to embed game theoretic principles into agent
systems, computational aspects of game theory have been extensively studied in re-
cent years [19].
Game theory can be divided in two branches: non cooperative [47, 93] and coop-
erative game theory [74, 103]. Non cooperative games assume that each participant
acts independently, without collaboration or communication with the others. The
player chooses its strategy for its own benefit. This has many applications as re-
source allocation [62] and congestion control [8], among others.
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In cooperative game theory the selection of actions or decisions is done collectively
by all agents and with full trust [48]. These games have been widely explored in dif-
ferent disciplines such as economics or political science. Within them, we find some
coalition games, in which a set of players seek to form cooperative groups to improve
their performance. Saad et al. [121] present state-of-the-art research from game the-
ory and communications, that addresses the major opportunities and challenges in
applying coalitional cooperative games to the understanding and designing of modern
communication systems, with emphasis on both new analytical techniques and novel
application scenarios. These games have been used to solve several problems such
as to improve content sharing in a cooperative mobile social networks [97], among
others.
One static and theoretical view of coalition formation concerns hedonic games,
which are a rich and versatile class of coalition formation games which also encapsulate
various stable matching scenarios. The main focus in hedonic games has been on
notions of stability for coalition structures such as Nash stability, individual stability,
contractual individual stability, or core stability and characterizing conditions under
which the set of stable partitions is guaranteed to be non-empty [18]. In these games,
the preference of players over coalition depends only on coalition composition, i.e.,
based on who is in a coalition. Some examples of hedonic behavior could be social
clubs, groups, faculties, teams and societies, among others [28].
Hedonic games were initiated by Banerjee et al. [20], and Bogomolnaia et al. [28].
The first proved that if a hedonic game satisfies the called weak top condition, then
the coalition structure core is not empty. The second formalized Nash stability and
individual stability in the context of hedonic games, as well as presenting a num-
ber of sufficient conditions for the existence of various stability concepts. Burani et
al. [30] provide sufficient conditions for the existence of stable coalitional structures
in a purely hedonic game, as well as describing the conditions for the existence of
core stable and Nash stable solutions. Sung et al. [142] presented a taxonomy of sta-
bility concepts, suggesting an unified look to the stability concepts and its possible
deviations (coalitional or individual deviations). Elkind et al. [49] introduce a repre-
sentation scheme for hedonic games called hedonic coalition nets. This representation
scheme is based on the marginal contribution nets formalism, which was developed
by Ieong et al. [69]. More recently, Karakaya et al. [75] propose a new stability notion
under free exit-free entry membership rights in a coalition, referred to as strong Nash
stability, is introduced which is stronger than both core and Nash stabilities studied
earlier in the literature. Using that concept, Aziz et al. [17] prove three different
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results in which natural restrictions on the player preferences guarantee the existence
of stable partitions where stability is strong Nash stability or its generalization or
variant.
Although traditional models in coalition formation assume that each agent partic-
ipates in exactly one coalition, it is common that in real-life one agent can participate
in various groups and perform one task in each of them. Moreover, if agents can only
belong to a coalition, it can result in a waste of resources and/or capabilities.
Overlapping coalition formation (OCF) games are cooperative games where play-
ers can simultaneously participate in several coalitions. Using this game, Shehory et
al. [132] present an anytime algorithm that provides suboptimal results. The authors
apply this algorithm and concepts from operations research with autonomous agents
and distributed computing systems methods for iterative formation of an overlap-
ping coalition. As a result, these overlapping coalitions may increase their benefits
compared to disjoint coalitions.
Moreover, stability in overlapping coalitions is a more delicate issue than in non-
overlapping, since if an agent withdraws all or some coalitions (it is a deviator), it
must be decided which is its payoff from the coalitions that have not been harmed by
this deviation. Chalkiadakis et al. [37, 38] propose models for overlapping coalition
formation that allow to handle and reason about stability of overlapping coalition
structures. The authors do it in an environment where agents may be self-interested,
contrary to [132], where they were considered to be cooperative. Concretely, in [38]
Chalkiadakis et al. introduce three stability concepts for OCF games: conservative,
refined and optimistic. These concepts are introduced to try to deal with the issue on
how to treat deviators in overlapping coalitions. Encompassing the concepts consid-
ered in [38] as well as a wide variety of alternative stability concepts, Yair et al. [152]
propose a unified framework for the study of stability in OCF. The authors show that
the three core concepts proposed in [38] can be viewed as special cases of their model,
which includes the notion of an arbitrator, that is an external party that determines
payoff to deviators.
Bachrach et al. [19] propose the coalitional skill games (CSGs), a simple model
of cooperation among agents to find the optimal coalition structure to improve gains
when each agent performs a task. This is a restricted form of coalitional game, where
each agent has a set of skills that are required to complete various tasks. In other type
of games, the coalitional resource games (CRG), each agent has a set of resources. In
order to achieve a set of goals a coalition has to count on the agents that possess the
necessary resources. Wooldridge et al. [151] investigate and classify the computational
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complexity of a number of natural decision problems for CRGs
2.3 Dynamic coalition formation (DCF)
Most previous works in literature aim at finding the optimal coalition. However,
when we need to form coalitions in a dynamic environment, where agents constantly
may want to change the coalition they belong to, computing the optimal coalition
may be either infeasible (because optimality is constrained to a very small number
of agents) or take longer than the time of existence of a coalition. The focus in this
thesis is not to find an optimal coalition, or to study the stability of a coalition, thus
the contributions introduced in Sect. 2.2 may not be useful.
Optimal coalition formation has several drawbacks when applied to the real world.
First, the time needed to find the optimal coalition prevents its use in a dynamic
multi-agent system where agents have to decide if it is beneficial for them to join
in a small amount of time. Second, the number of agents involved has to be small,
since the number of coalition structures (O(nn)) is so large that it cannot be enu-
merated for more than a few agents [123]. Thus, if we focus on a system where we
have a large number of agents interacting, the computational cost is so high that it
makes it impossible to compute. This is why it is necessary to use domain knowledge
and/or mathematical games with certain constraints and where agents have particu-
lar characteristics to solve the problem of coalition formation in a reasonable efficient
way. Moreover, static coalition formation does not allow for any interference with
the running coalition formation process. On the contrary, dynamic coalition forma-
tion methods allows agents to form coalitions where changes in environment may be
frequent. This is why they are particularly well suited for real world domains, e.g.,
ubiquitous and mobile computing [79].
2.3.1 DCF over static topologies
To form dynamic coalitions to improve cooperation, there is a need to find decen-
tralized procedures that allow self-interested agents to negotiate the formation of
coalitions and division of coalition payoffs. In real world scenarios, it may happen
that agents are selfish and only focused on improving their own performance, while if
they were cooperative, the whole system performance would improve. To model this
situation, non-cooperative games, where agents are selfish, have been used to study
coalition formation and its dynamics. Along this line, the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
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(IPD) game has been widely used in modelling various social and economic phenom-
ena, as well as the emergence of cooperation. Contrary to the classic Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD), where defecting is the dominant strategy, in repeated games where
the total number of rounds is random or unknown, sustained cooperation strategies
may emerge [11].
The IPD with coalitions has been firstly used in spatial scenarios, where agents
play in a grid scenario, interacting only with the closest neighbours. In this scenario,
Seo et al. [127] study the emergence of cooperative coalitions in N-player Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma (NIPD), focusing on how the local interaction between agents
affects the evolution of the game. The authors conclude that the more localized the
interaction is, the easier is to evolve cooperation. Moreover, to improve their pre-
vious results, in [128] Seo et al. use the IPD to study coalition emergence in a
co-evolutionary learning environment. In this case, they assign to each agent a confi-
dence that specifies how well each is dealing with her opponents. This confidence is
adapted through evolutionary learning, basing coalition behaviour on most confident
agents. With this, the authors found that adaptative confidences can improve coali-
tion performance, and deal with different opponents. Nguyen et al. [95] use the spatial
version of the IPD to model one environmental coalition formation problem. In their
work, the authors study how specifying different weights for agents, which determine
how powerful they are, and allowing them to decide if taking their own decisions or
follow more powerful agents, influences coalition formation and cooperation.
Burguillo [33] adopts Axelrods dynamic coalition formation [16] model to help
agents, on grid topologies, cooperate when using a spatial version of the PD. In his
approach, agents may play isolated or join coalitions ruled by leaders. Each leader
defines the behaviour of the agents belonging to her coalition and charges them with
taxes. Using memetic strategies, Burguillo obtained emerging cooperative coalitions.
However, in Burguillo’s work: (i) the coalition strategies employed cannot accomplish
full cooperation in complex networks; and (ii) the mechanism employed by leaders to
tax agents is unfair for the population as a whole.
Although the leader coalition-based mechanisms described in [16, 33] confirm that
coalitions indeed facilitate cooperation between self-interested agents, there is still
room for improvement. Firstly, in those leader-based approaches, a coalition leader
must be paid by the agents belonging to the coalition. This penalises the utility
that an agent can obtain from participating in a coalition. Furthermore, a coalition
leader imposes her decision on the agents in the coalition to maximise cooperation.
By imposing the coalition’s strategy, the leader does not take into account valuable
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information that agents could use for the benefit of all the members of the coalition,
not only the leader. Moreover, the payoff distribution is unfair, since: (i) leaders
receive a payoff that they do not distribute; and (ii) the agents in the frontier of the
coalition (interacting with agents outside of the coalition) obtains less payoff. In order
to avoid the mentioned shortcomings, flat coalitions could be used, namely coalitions
without leaders that: (i) democratically decide their behaviours; and (ii) share profits
without applying taxes.
In some works (as in [33]) the authors assume that agents behave cooperatively
within a coalition. However, assuming cooperation is too restrictive. When agents
group, they must decide how to behave with in-group and out-group agents. In
this line, Fu et al. [55] propose a mathematical framework for the evolution of in-
group favoritism, where different agents may use different strategies with agents in
its group or outside of it, updating its behavior depending on the payoff. The authors
determine under which conditions in-group cooperation emerges, and when out-group
cooperation may be beneficial, using a mutation-selection process.
Finally, Gracia-La´zaro et al. [57] present an interesting paper where they study
cooperation using humans that play the IPD. Their results suggest that population
structure has little relevance as a cooperation promoter or inhibitor among humans.
This contradicts previous literature on multi-agent systems (e.g., [10]), where it is
stated that the topology where agents interact and its characteristics indeed influences
cooperation. It is also contrary to some of our results that show that cooperation is
influenced by the topology. However, we must consider that humans also may act
in ways that are even less predictable and seemingly irrational than agents [138].
Moreover, in their approach the authors do not allow humans to join into coalitions.
2.3.2 DCF coalitions with resources
Apart from how coalitions are formed, how the members of a coalition establish coop-
eration is an important issue. This is even more important when modelling nowadays
interconnected world, where agents own resources that they can trade. Indeed, social
and economical trading agreements or cooperation play an important role in our soci-
ety. This is why we are interested in the scenario where agents cannot only cooperate
or defect, like in the classical IPD, but where they can also own tradable resources.
From an economical point of view, Yee [155] develops an evolutionary game model
of property ownership and trade. Based on an evolutionarily model of animal ter-
ritoriality, the author models human property ownership theoretically, showing that
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trading is evolutionary preferred over permanent ownership without trade.
Based on that work, Burguillo et al. [31] perform a study of the extended IPD-
Possessor-Trader model. The authors present how evolutionary forces allow the emer-
gence of different types of strategies using a spatial scenario. However, their work
studies a grid and static scenario, which may not represent real world dynamic and
complex topologies among agents and where no coalitions can be formed. Moreover,
in such model, agents play independently, i.e., they cannot join coalitions to improve
cooperation.
The works presented previously are an example of bidirectional resource exchange,
i.e., both payers receive or give something. However, we may think about other ex-
change, where one player gets something, but the other does not immediately. We can
see a donation game as a good example of this type of unidirectional exchanges. The
donation game is used to show how the mechanism of indirect reciprocity operates
using players’ reputation to promote cooperation [99]. Unlike the case of direct reci-
procity, whereby any altruistic act of helping to another player is returned, in indirect
reciprocity the altruistic act of helping others is perceived by the community as help-
ful, providing good reputation, and receiving help in return by other players. Indirect
reciprocity is also associated with interactions having short encounters (e.g., one-shot
interactions) whereby the effects of direct reciprocity on the interaction outcome are
minimized.
2.3.3 DCF over dynamic topologies
Previous approaches focused on static networks. However, in most real-world situ-
ations, the topology of the network changes in response to the state of the network
and the other way around, namely the state of the network changes in response to
the topology. In fact, there is an increasing interest in games on adaptative networks
and its influence in cooperation, where agents may improve their topology (see [59]
for a review), for example by changing the neighbours with whom they interact.
Zimmerman et al. [161] present a model where agents play the IPD, they imitate
the strategy of their neighbours and where they are allowed to rewire their neighbours
under certain fixed restrictions. Their model of cooperation with network plasticity
(rewiring and adaptation) leads to the emergence of role differentiation in the dynam-
ics of social networks. Continuing their work, Eguiluz et al. [46] focus on how possible
dynamical mechanisms achieve a small world connectivity, also by allowing to imitate
strategies and to change links to its neighbours. In their work, an agent randomly
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changes its links if the best neighbor is a defector. Different agents end up playing
different social roles, where the roles emerge from the self-organizing dynamics of the
complex system.
Pacheco et al. [104] provide a model which incorporates decisions of individuals
when establishing new links or giving up existing ones, by evaluating the productivity
of their links. Their model provides a simple analytical pathway towards understand-
ing how self-interested individuals may actually end up cooperating. The authors
show that a selective choice of new links (favouring assortative mixing between co-
operators) associated with fast rewiring dynamics may provide the means to achieve
long term cooperation. Fu et al. [54] propose a model of coevolutionary prisoner’s
dilemma that allows agents to either adjust their strategies or switch their defective
partners. The authors show that partner switching is effective to stabilise cooper-
ation. However, they also find that depending on the game parameter, there is an
optimal tendency of switching adverse partnerships that maximizes the fraction of
cooperators in the population. In [53], Fu et al. focus on the effect of reputation on
an individual’s partner switching problem in a network. The authors show that: i)
when reputation is absent in partner-switching processes, cooperation is much less
favored than that of the reputation involved, thus using their mechanism, coopera-
tion can prevail; and ii) an increasing tendency of switching to partners’ partners is
more likely to lead to a higher level of cooperation. Although in a different realm
(the investigation of tag-based coordination), Griffiths et al. [58] show that partner
switching (rewiring in their terms) can help increase coordination resilience in the
face of malicious behaviour. Along this line, in this paper using individual decisions
on how to add or remove/replace a link is used to improve cooperation and avoid
defective behaviour. Fehl et al. [50] compare cooperative behaviour in multiple but
independent repeated games between participants in static and dynamic networks. In
the dynamic ones, participants could break their links after each social interaction. As
predicted, the authors found higher levels of cooperation in dynamic networks. More-
over, they show that allowing link-breaking behaviour leads to substantial network
clustering, and that those clusters are formed primarily by cooperators.
From another perspective, Szolnoki et al. [144] present a coevolutionary process
that models the generic formation of new links and deletion of existing links that
happens for example in humans societies as a consequence of ongoing socialization,
change of lifestyle or death. Using their model the authors study the evolution of
cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game where agents start placed on a random
network. They present a coevolutionary rule that evokes the spontaneous emergence
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of a powerful multilevel selection mechanism, which despite the sustained random
topology of the evolving network, maintains cooperation across the whole span of
defection temptation values.
Finally, Rand et al. [118] present a work where they study the effects of link
reciprocity (rewiring) using humans interacting in a complex network topology. The
authors present experimental evidence of the power of using strategic link formation
and dissolution, and the network modiffcation it entails, to stabilize cooperation in
sizable groups. Some of their results coincide with the ones we have obtained in
similar experiments with MAS along this thesis. However, in their experiments, the
authors find that the network structure has influence provided the network is dynamic
and the dynamism is at least 30%. Moreover, subjects’s cooperation is not affected
by whether others made new links with them.
All previous works use rewiring in order to improve cooperation among agents.
However, to the best of our knowledge, no mechanism in the literature has investigated
whether putting together dynamic coalition formation with partner switching show
positive synergies that lead to increase even further cooperation.
2.3.4 DCF for task allocation
In multi-agent systems, agents may face the problem of solving tasks that are com-
posed of subtasks that cannot be solved by them individually. However, groups of
agents are not only necessary when tasks cannot be performed by a single agent, but
it may also be beneficial when groups perform more efficiently with respect to the
single agents [133]. Thus, given a set of agents and a set of tasks, the problem is de-
ciding how to form coalitions to solve tasks maximizing the total profit [85]. Ideally,
a coalition formation mechanism would allow agents not only to form coalitions for
joint task execution, but also to arrive at a coalition configuration which is optimal
(in terms of utility maximization), stable, and fair [82]. However, as we explained in
previous sections, the computational complexity required for such solutions is expo-
nential [123]. Moreover, in most real-world scenarios we do not need coalitions to be
optimal, but suboptimal and formed in a dynamic manner.
As argued in [9, 78, 123, 131, 133], task allocation via coalition formation follows a
three step process: i) generating the coalition structures; ii) selecting which structure
will be adopted, and iii) distributing gain between agents.
It is hard to specify one general framework for coalition formation definition.
This is why most work tries to solve the coalition formation problem in a concrete
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environment that establishes certain constraints. However, in [9], Amgoud provides a
unified formal framework for constructing those coalitions structures. Her framework
returns three semantics of coalition structures: the basic, which returns an unique
coalition structure; and two different refinements of the basic, the stable and the
preferred, that may return several coalition structures at a time. This framework is
general enough to capture different propositions made in the literature.
Task allocation coalition formation problems can be studied in a cooperative or a
non-cooperative environment. Coalition formation in cooperative environments has
been studied in different works, as in [133, 134]. In those works, Shehory et al.
assume that information about other agents can be known or communicated. Also
in a cooperative environment, Lau et al. [85] propose classification for the coalition
formation problem, based on three driving factors: task demands, the quantity of
service that is demanded; resource constraints, i.e., whether the resources are limited
or unlimited; and objective function, which is the profit obtained from serving a
task. The authors explore the runtime complexity and propose algorithms for each
category.
Zheng et al. [160] present an approach where, differing to previous ones, each agent
can participate in coalitions for different tasks. The authors develop several efficient
and effective greedy hillclimbing strategies for determining both which agents belong
to the coalition for each task and when the coalition should start executing to achieve
the goal. On a non-cooperative environment, Aknine et al. [6] propose two methods
for coalition formation, where agents cannot exchange their knowledge, differing to
cooperative multi-agents systems. Abdallah et al. [1] propose to use an underlying
organization to guide the coalition formation process, using Q-learning with neural
nets to optimize decisions made locally by agents in the organizations. This underly-
ing organization can be viewed as a search tree, that is modified depending on model
environment and agent population to achieve the best performance.
However, previous approaches do not consider how coalitions can be maintained
over time in the face of change once they are formed. Klush et al. [79] develop a
dynamic coalition formation scheme (DCF-S) in an environment where agents have
goals they cannot accomplish by themselves. Their dynamic mechanism helps agents
react to changes in their set of goals and in the agent society. In their DCF-S scheme,
the authors use leaders for each coalition (CLAs). Each of them concurrently simu-
lates, selects, and negotiates coalitions, each of which is able to accomplish one of its
goals with an acceptable ratio between estimated risk of failure and individual profit.
Soh et al. [140] present a scenario where agents are not completely cooperative, but
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cautiously cooperative, i.e., they are not always willing to help, only in the case that
they obtain a benefit from it. The authors use learning mechanisms at several levels
to improve the quality of the coalition formation process in a dynamic, noisy, and
time constrained domain. Moreover, the agent that initiates a coalition has the re-
sponsibility of overseeing and managing the formation process. Ye et al. [154] propose
a dynamic coalition formation mechanism, incorporated with self-organisation, in a
structured agent network. Based on self-organisation principles, their mechanism en-
ables agents to dynamically adjust their degrees of involvement in different coalitions
and to join new coalitions at any time. The authors consider that the own agents are
the ones that form the coalitions. However, all agents have a limited view of their
neighbors.
Several studies have emphasized the importance of the social structure of multi-
agent systems and the impact that network structure has on organizational perfor-
mance, since network structures have a dramatic effect on distributed agent systems.
In this context, Gaston et al. [56] develop a distributed, on-line network adaptation
mechanisms for discovering effective network structures for team formation. Through
the design and application of two different strategies, the authors show that very
different mechanisms can lead to efficient network structures.
However, previous works on dynamic coalition formation mainly focus on support-
ing the formation of a single coalition for a each task. Thus, they do not consider the
bigger picture (and more realistic situation), where there are several coalitions com-
peting to provide the same service. This type of scenario can be found in environments
as international commerce, bidding for government contracts or continuous auctions.
Me´rida-Campos et al. [88] explore this environments and focus on iterative games,
where several coalitions compete to be assigned a tasks in several rounds. The au-
thors present a dynamic coalition formation mechanism where coalitions must adapt
at each time step in order to be competitive. However, with their mechanism, agents
use a pre-established strategy for joining or abandoning partners. Moreover, there
is adaptability regarding coalition composition, but the authors do not specifically
address the adaptation of the coalition distribution.
With the same idea, i.e., having adaptive coalitions that compete to be assigned
a tasks, Me´rida-Campos et al. [89, 90] focus on the effects of heterogeneous tasks
on an heterogeneous population of agents, namely: competitive and conservative.
The authors investigate how agents in a heterogeneous population cluster together
across multiple coalition formation episodes and varying tasks. They observe that
the competitive strategy outperforms the conservative
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2.3.5 DCF for crowdsourcing
Related to dynamic task allocation, over the past decade, crowdsourcing has emerged
as a cheap and efficient method of obtaining solutions to simple tasks that are difficult
for computers to solve but possible for humans. In fact, crowdsourcing markets bring
together requesters, who have tasks they need accomplished, and workers, who are
willing to perform these tasks in a timely manner in exchange for payment. Thus
crowdsourcing has appeared as a new application domain for online decision mak-
ing algorithms, opening up a rich and exciting problem space in which the relevant
problem formulations vary significantly along multiple modeling dimensions [138].
This popularity of crowdsourcing markets has led to both empirical and theoretical
research on the design of algorithms to optimize various aspects of these markets,
such as the assignment of tasks and pricing. Not only that, but researchers have
taken an interest in modeling and analyzing the problem of online decision making
in crowdsourcing markets.
There are several examples of crowdsourcing platforms, such as Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk, that focus on small microtasks, e.g., filling out a survey, with small pay-
ments; or other platforms, as oDesk, that focus on larger jobs like designing websites,
for significantly larger payments. However, most platforms share the common feature
of repeated interaction.
There has been recent empirical or applied research projects aimed at developing
online decision making algorithms that work well in practice on existing crowdsourcing
platforms [39, 71]. However, these are are useful to apply only in their specific domain.
In a more theoretical scope, Slivkings et al. [138] present a detailed and up-to-date
reflection on the modeling issues that inhibit theoretical research on repeated decision
making in crowdsourcing. For this, we base this section in their paper. The authors
point out that despite the vast scope of work in crowdsourcing, it brings several
domain-specific challenges that require novel solutions. They remark that to address
these challenges in a principled way, one would like to formulate a unified collection of
well-defined algorithmic questions with well-specified objectives, allowing researchers
to propose novel solutions and techniques that can be easily compared, leading to
a deeper understanding of the underlying issues. However, it appears very difficult
to capture all of the pertinent aspects of crowdsourcing in a coherent model. As a
result, many of the existing theoretical papers on crowdsourcing propose their own
new models. This makes it difficult to compare techniques across papers, and leads
to uncertainty about which parameters or features matter most when designing new
platforms or algorithms.
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Given the previous, Slivkings et al. [138] propose specific directions to tackle
the design of a crowd sourcing model: adaptive task assignment, dynamic procure-
ment, repeated principal-agent problem, reputation systems, and the exploration-
exploitation tradeoff. In this thesis, we are mainly focused on the first, i.e., how to
assign tasks to workers with the goal of maximizing the quality and quantity of com-
pleted tasks subject to budget constraints. In this task assignment problem, strategic
issues are ignored in order to gain analytical tractability. In fact, the model typically
does not touch on the way in which prices are set, and does not include workers’
strategic responses to these prices. In the most common variant of this problem,
workers arrive online and the requester must assign a task (or sequence of tasks) to
each new worker as she arrives. Karger et al. [76, 77] introduced one such model
for classification tasks and proposed a non-adaptive assignment algorithm based on
random graph generation along with a message-passing inference algorithm inspired
by belief propagation for inferring the correct solution to each task. They proved
that their technique is order-optimal in terms of budget when each worker finds all
tasks equally difficult. Other models of this form, as in Ho et al. [64, 65] where the
authors show that adaptive task assignment yields an improvement over non-adaptive
assignment when the pool of available workers and set of tasks are diverse.
However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the previous approaches uses
coalitions to model the problem, but they focus on individually assigning the tasks.
What is more, they do not consider that different groups may apply for the project,
thus compete among them.
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Chapter 3
Dynamic coalition formation over
static topologies
3.1 Introduction
Game theory [25] provides useful mathematical tools to understand the possible
strategies that self-interested agents may follow when choosing a course of action.
The context of cooperative games and cooperation evolution has been extensively
studied seeking general theoretical frameworks like the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) [15].
In his seminal work, Axelrod has shown that cooperation can emerge in a society of
individuals with selfish motivations. This has been specially useful for understanding
the role of local interactions and the maintenance of cooperation [84, 100, 126].
The IPD game has been applied to a variety of disciplines: economy, biology,
artificial intelligence, social sciences, e-commerce, etc. As an example for applying
game theory and PD models we may cite Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems [51], for instance
BitTorrent [6] considers the popular Tit-for-Tat strategy [15]. In P2P, and many
other complex systems, appears one of the main problems concerning sustainability
denoted by the Tragedy of Commons [16]. This problem arises when people, villages,
states or P2P nodes generally defect and the system suffers a collapse since there is
no mechanism to enforce collective rewards, and every member shows an exclusively
selfish behaviour and general defection. As a result we may notice a reduction of
biodiversity, overpopulation, war, and many other social problems.
In order to avoid previous shortcomings, the notion of a coalition of individuals
has been studied by the game theory community for decades, and has proved to
be useful in both real-world economic scenarios and multi-agent systems. In fact,
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coalition formation [123, 131] is one of the fundamental approaches in multi-agent
systems for establishing collaborations among agents, each with individual objectives
and properties.
In this chapter, using the IPD to model a non-cooperative scenario, we investi-
gate dynamic coalition formation over static topologies to improve cooperation. It is
important to note that in this chapter, even if coalitions may change over time, the
interaction topology, i.e., how agents are connected to interact, remains static. Thus
we provide agents and coalitions with decision making mechanisms that endow the
emergence of cooperation. We propose mechanisms in two different types of coali-
tions: i) coalitions with leaders (Section 3.3); and ii) flat coalitions (Section 3.4). The
main difference between them is that in the former there is a leader that dictates
the behavior of the coalition, charging taxes for it. Thus in the first, we design a
mechanism to emerge and sustain full and profitable cooperation, via a single super-
coalition, but with a low collaboration cost (tax). However, using leaders has several
drawbacks, namely: 1) a coalition leader imposes her decision on the agents in the
coalition to maximise cooperation; and 2) the payoff distribution is unfair, since: (i)
leaders receive a payoff that they do not distribute; and (ii) the agents in the frontier
of the coalition (interacting with agents outside of the coalition) obtains less payoff.
That is why in the later, we further investigate and propose decision making mech-
anisms that use learning to allow cooperation to emerge in flat coalitions without
leaders, avoiding the previously mentioned shortcomings.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we present some
background for a better understanding of the chapter. Next, Section 3.3 focus on dy-
namic coalition formation with leaders. In Section 3.4 we focus on dynamic coalition
formation with flat coalitions. Finally, in Section 3.5 we present the conclusions and
future work.
3.2 Background
In this section we introduce background that will be necessary for a better under-
standing of the following sections.
3.2.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game is an abstraction of some kinds of social situa-
tions. It models a general situation in which two individuals have to decide, in an
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isolated way, whether to cooperate or to defect. The payoff however stem from the
joint decision. The game is so formulated that mutual cooperation yields the highest
joint payoff, but there is a high incentive for individual defection. Obviously, it is just
a proxy for abstract investigations. Nevertheless, it is useful as it serves as a kind
of benchmark that allows comparisons to be made. In fact, the PD game has been
applied to a huge variety of disciplines: economy, biology, artificial intelligence, social
sciences, e-commerce, etc.
The PD is described as follows. Two suspects of a crime (agents or players) are
questioned separately (no communication between them) over their involvement on a
crime. They have a simple choice, either to remain silent – i.e., cooperate (C) – or to
confess a criminal action made by both of them (thereby implicating the other) – i.e.,
to defect (D). Thus this game is metaphor for acting in a socially responsible way (C)
or according to self-interest (D), which is harmful to both agents. To see why this
is so, consider the payoff matrix shown in Table 4.1. It represents the payoff (also
known as utility or reward) a player obtains depending on its own action and on the
opponent’s one. This matrix is common-knowledge i.e., both agents know it. In this
matrix, T means the temptation to defect, R is the reward for mutual cooperation,
P is the punishment for mutual defection, and S is the sucker’s payoff. To be defined
as a PD, the game must respect the following constraints: T > R > P > S and
2R > T + S.
T > R > P > S
2R > T + S (3.1)
Player Aj Cooperates Player Aj Defects
Player Ai Cooperates R, R S, T
Player Ai Defects T, S P, P
Table 3.1: General Prisoner’s Dilemma Matrix
Given these constraints, in the one-shot PD, the optimal action for both agents
is to select D because there is a risk of ending up with S if selecting C when the
opponent selects D. Choosing D ensures the highest payoff for any agent no matter
what the opponent does. In fact it is easy to show that mutual defection (DD) is
the unique Nash equilibrium in this game. These happen even when collectively
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speaking, mutual cooperation would do better though. For instance, if R = 3, T = 5,
P = 1, and S = 0, mutual cooperation has the social utility of 6, whereas all other
combinations of actions are worse off.
In practice, agents often encounter each other more than once. This is modeled
as is a variant of PD, which is the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) [15], in which
the game is played repeatedly. In it, the players can punish their opponents for
previous non-cooperative behavior, remembering their opponent previous action and
adapting their strategy. Game Theory shows that the optimal action if both players
know that they are going to play exactly N times is to defect, i.e., it is the Nash
equilibrium of the game [26]. However, when players play an indefinite or random
number of times, cooperation can emerge as a game equilibrium. This was verified in
a computer tournament [15], in which the winner was the strategy called Tit-for-Tat
(TFT): it begins cooperating and then repeats the previous action of the opponent.
It is cooperative but retaliates defection, returning to cooperation after the opponent
cooperates. It must be noted that this strategy poses a burden for resource-bounded
agents because it assumes that they are able to remember past encounters and are
able to compute relatively sophisticated strategies, especially in the case of some more
complex extensions of TFT.
3.2.2 Reinforcement learning algorithms
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a field of Machine Learning, in which the goal of the
agent is to maximize the long-term reward. The problem which RL tries to solve is
which action the agent ought take in a concrete environment.
Usually, RL problems in which there is only one agent are modeled as Markov
Decision Processes (MDPs). These are described by a set of states, S, a set of
actions, A, a reward function R(s, ac) → R, and a probabilistic state transition
function T (s, ac, s′) → [0, 1]. At each time step t, an experience tuple 〈s, ac, s′, r〉
denotes the fact that the agent was in state s ∈ S, performed action ac ∈ Ac and
ended up in s′ ∈ S with reward r. We drop the index t here.
Given an MDP, the goal is to learn a policy pi∗, which is a mapping from states
to actions such that the expected value of the sum of the discounted future reward
is maximized. In the following sections we explain two well-known reinforcement
learning algorithms: learning automata and Q-learning.
28
3. Dynamic coalition formation over static topologies
3.2.2.1 Learning Automata (LA)
Learning Automata (LA) algorithm [83] is a simple and well studied type of rein-
forcement learning technique. LA considers the individual history and selects its
next action depending on its experience and payoffs. We use the LR−I scheme [83] as
defined in Eq. 4.1, where α ∈ [0, 1].
The LR−I scheme is defined as following:
paci = paci + α(1− paci)
∀j 6=i : pacj = pacj(1− α)
(3.2)
In these equations, α is a (small) learning factor. The first equation is used to
reinforce the action chosen if it performed better than its alternatives in the considered
state. At the same time, we apply the second equation to the other actions, decreasing
its probability. In the next round, the agent will choose its new strategy using the
updated probabilities.
3.2.2.2 Q-Learning (QL)
Q-learning is a popular model-free RL algorithm, which is useful when agents do not
have a model of the state transition function T . Q-Learning works by estimating
state–action values, the Q-values, which are numerical estimators of quality for a
given pair of state and action. More precisely, a Q-value Q(s, ac) represents the
maximum discounted sum of future rewards an agent can expect to receive if it starts
in s, chooses action a and then continues to follow an optimal policy. The Q-Learning
algorithm approximates Q(s, ac) as the agent acts in a given environment. The update
rule for each experience tuple 〈s, ac, s′, r〉 is as in Eq. 3.3, where α is the learning
rate and γ is the discount for future rewards. If all pairs state–action are visited
infinitely often, then Q-learning is guaranteed to converge to the correct Q-values
with probability one [147].
Q(s, ac)← Q(s, ac) + α (r + γ maxac′ Q(s′, ac′)−Q(s, ac)) (3.3)
Q-Learning is a model-free technique popular in RL exactly because it does not
require that the agent have access to information about how the environment works.
QL works by estimating values for pairs state–action (the Q-values), which are nu-
merical estimators of quality for a given pair of state and action. More precisely, a
Q-value Q(s, ac) represents the maximum discounted sum of future rewards an agent
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Figure 3.1: Cell agent (A) and two neighborhoods: first with 4 cells A1,. . . ,A4, and
second with 8 cells A1,. . . ,A8
can expect to receive if it starts in state s, chooses action a and then continues to
follow an optimal policy.
3.2.3 Interaction topologies
In this section we describe the interaction topologies in which agents play, namely
two: grid and social networks.
3.2.3.1 Grid topology
For the spatial distribution of the cells we consider a two-dimensional square lattice
consisting of N nodes, in which each cell is ruled by an agent (Figure 3.1).
If we let every node in the system to interact with the remaining (N-1) nodes, we
have a panmictic population, i.e., a population where all the individuals are potential
partners. However, in many real contexts like geography, biology, MANETs or social
networks, each node interacts mainly with a set of local neighbors. Thus in a grid
topology, each agent Ai interacts only with the m closest agents (in evolutionary
game theory this is called a m-person game). Thus, we consider that each cell agent
Ai interacts only with the agents in its neighborhood. Figure 3.1 shows a cell agent
A and two possible neighborhoods, which are defined depending on the distance that
a cell is allowed to use to play with other cells. In this chapter we consider these
two possible neighborhoods: 4-neighbors or 8-neighbors. Note that we will note grid
topology also as spatial topology.
3.2.3.2 Social networks
We have chosen two types of network topologies: small-world and scale-free. Both
small-world and scale-free networks provide realistic models of the topological features
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found in many nature, social, and technological networks [105, 119, 149].
Small-world: Small-world networks model real world complex systems such as
neural networks, food webs, scientific-collaboration networks, and computer net-
works [80]. These networks are characterised by the small-world phenomenon, in
which nodes have small neighbourhoods, and yet it is possible to reach any other
node in a small number of hops. This type of networks is highly-clustered, namely
they have a high clustering coefficient. Recall that the clustering coefficient is a mea-
sure of degree to which nodes in a graph tend to cluster together. Thus, small-world
networks tend to contain cliques, and near-cliques, meaning sub-networks that have
connections between almost any pair of nodes within them. Formally, we note a
small-world network as W k;pN , where N is the number of nodes, k stands for the aver-
age connectivity (the average size of a node’s neighbourhood), and p is the rewiring
probability. We used the Watts & Strogatz model [148] to generate these networks.
Scale-free: Scale-free networks model real-world networks like the world-wide
web [3], the Internet, and some biological networks [94]. These networks are charac-
terized by having a few nodes acting as highly-connected hubs, while the rest of them
have a low connectivity degree. Unlike small-world networks, scale-free networks are
low-clustered networks. Formally we note a scale-free network as Sk;−γN , where N is
the number of nodes, and the probability that a node in the network connects with
k other nodes is roughly proportional to k−γ, namely P (k) ∼ k−γ. We employed the
Barabasi-Albert algorithm [119] to generate scale-free networks.
3.3 Coalition-based mechanisms with leaders
Coalition-based mechanisms have their roots in the seminal work of Axelrod intro-
duced in [16] (chapter 6). Axelrod proposes a tribute/tax model that allows agents
to achieve cooperation when forming coalitions around some emerging leaders. To
maintain coalitions, leaders charge their agents some tribute/tax in favor of some
benefit (e.g., guaranteed cooperation, protection against cheaters). This is a clear
example of the known tradeoff between the benefits vs. the costs of collaboration
(e.g., taxes) [73]. Therefore, Axelrod’s mechanism is based on a dynamic coalition
formation model together with a tax model.
Axelrod’s model has been successfully adopted to help agents, on grid topologies,
cooperate when using a spatial version on the PD. Burguillo [34] presents a frame-
work for a memetic analysis of coalition formation considering the spatial prisoner’s
dilemma. In his approach, agents may play isolated or join coalitions ruled by leaders.
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Each leader defines the behaviour of the agents belonging to her coalition and charges
them with taxes. Using memetic strategies, Burguillo obtained emerging cooperative
coalitions. However, whether cooperation is still possible on actual-world topologies
via a tribute/tax model, such as the one described by Axelrod [16], remained unex-
plored. Complex networks provide a more realistic model of the topological features
found in many nature, social and technological networks (e.g. social networks, the
Internet, ecological populations) [7, 148]. Furthermore, it is known that they can
influence emergence [112].
Thus there is a need to design a mechanism to emerge and sustain full and prof-
itable cooperation, via a single super-coalition, but with a low collaboration cost
(tax). Specially, since we found that: a) the coalition strategies employed by [34]
cannot accomplish full cooperation on complex network topologies; and b) that the
notion of tribute (having leader agents setting taxes) is unfair for the population as
a whole. Therefore, with our approach: i) a set of coalition strategies that promote
a profitable cooperation on complex networks emerges; and ii) our consensus mecha-
nism allows coalition members themselves (instead of leaders) to reach a convention
over the fair price to pay to be part of a coalition. Thus, unlike Axelrod’s model,
agents in our approach are no longer subject to leader extortion. Overall, this results
in an approach fair and profitable for all agents.
3.3.1 The base approach
In this section we summarize the model for coalition formation that we extend. The
model is thoroughly described in [34], and it is based on Axelrod’s model for the
emergence of political actors described in [16]. The main motivation of the Axelrod’s
model in [16] is to promote cooperation by increasing the organization level of a multi-
agent system. This is accomplished through the emergence of some leading agents that
command coalitions of previously independent agents. Each agent within a coalition
cooperates with its leader agent. Moreover, the leader also imposes the strategic
behavior to follow against members and non-members of the coalition. Consequently,
notice that the emergence of a single coalition guarantees full cooperation between
all agents.
The model in [34] considers an agent population using a grid as its interaction
topology. The interaction between agents is modeled as an n-person game, i.e. n
agents interacting simultaneously, where each game is a spatial version of the Iter-
ated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) [100] that takes into account each agent’s number of
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Agent j
C D
Agent i
C (3,3) (0,5)
D (5,0) (1,1)
Table 3.2: Prisoner’s Dilemma Payoff Matrix
neighbors. Every agent must decide whether to behave as a defector or cooperator
during each round of the game, and they are payed according to the payoff matrix
depicted in Table 3.2. Therefore, in an attempt to maximize their individual payoffs,
agents must also decide whether to join or leave a coalition, or switch to another one.
To summarize, the model is composed of: (1) a role model describing the roles each
agent may take on (independent, coalition member, and leader); (2) a game-based
interaction model describing how agents interact (spatial IPD); (3) a collection of
interaction strategies for the roles that agents play; and (4) a collection of coalition
strategies for the roles that agents play.
Now we turn our attention to the actual coalition strategies employed by agents to
decide whether to join, leave, or switch coalitions. These decisions mainly depend on
the agents’ payoffs when compared with their neighbors, and on their commitments.
The notion of commitment, introduced in [16], reinforces cooperation between agents
with previous cooperative interactions. In what follows, we abstract the coalition
strategies presented in [34] as a collection of qualitative, role-based strategies:
Independent agent decision-making
1. Join coalition (worst agents). If my payoff is the worst in my neighborhood
then join my best (payoff-wise) neighbor’s coalition (request to form one if
needed).
2. Join coalition (moderate agents). If my payoff is average in my neighborhood
and I am committed to my best neighbor then join its coalition (request to
form one if needed).
Coalition member decision-making
3. Leave coalition (isolated agents). If I am isolated (connection wise) from my
coalition then leave it.
4. Strengthen coalition (satisfied agents). If my payoff is good then increase my
commitment with my leader.
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5. Coalition switch (worst agents). If my payoff is the worst in my neighborhood
and the agent with the best payoff in my neighborhood is not my leader then
switch to the best agent coalition.
6. Coalition switch (unsatisfied agents). If the agent with the best payoff in my
neighborhood is not my leader and I have some commitment with this best
agent then switch to its coalition.
7. Leave coalition (unsatisfied agents). If my commitment to the leader is low
and the agent with the best payoff in my neighborhood is not my leader and
this best agent is independent then leave my coalition.
The strategies above allow agents to decide how to behave with respect to coali-
tions. Firstly, only independent agents that are not obtaining good payoffs consider
joining a coalition (strategies 1 and 2). Secondly, an agent obtaining good payoffs in
its coalition, strengthens its commitment to the leader (strategy 4). Otherwise, an
agent that performs poorly switches from its current coalition (strategy 5), whereas
an agent that does not perform poorly but is unhappy with its leader may also either
switch coalition (strategy 6) or simply leave the coalition (strategy 7) looking for
potentially better coalitions.
Moreover, the model allows some exploration regarding interaction and coalition
strategies by the introduction of a mutation probability. Mutation may randomly
change either the action that independent agents choose to play during interactions,
the decisions of agents regarding whether to leave a coalition or not, and the taxes
charged by leaders. Therefore, mutation adds exploration to the strategic behavior
of independent agents, coalition members, and leaders.
As stated above, the approach proposed in [34] was successful in helping agents
achieve full cooperation (or close to it) on grids. However, grid or grid-like topologies
may not model the connectivity/topology that a MAS application may find in a more
realistic environment (e.g. P2P, social networks). Thus experiments in following
sections focus on small-world and scale-free networks since these type of networks
are the ones that best model the most common networks appearing in societies and
nature.
3.3.1.1 Experimental settings
The settings described in this section are also those that will be employed in the
rest of this section (unless otherwise indicated). Each experiment consisted of 50
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discrete event simulations, each one running up to 20000 time steps (ticks). Each
simulation ran with 1000 agents over either a small-world or scale-free underlying
topology. Moreover, all the metrics of the simulations were aggregated using the
inter-quartile mean (IQM). The experiments used a mutation probability of 0.05 (the
same reported in [34]).
In all simulations, interaction topologies were generated by setting the following
parameters: W 10,0.11000 in small-world networks and S
10,−3
1000 in scale-free networks. The
clustering coefficients of the topologies are high (0.492) and low (0.056) respectively.
Notice that a new interaction topology is generated per simulation.
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Figure 3.2: Coalitions in small-world topologies
3.3.1.2 Experimental Results
The purpose of first experiments was to determine whether or not the base approach
is influenced by the underlying topology. To analyze the results we observed : i) the
number of coalitions and independent agents (the closer to a single super-coalition,
the higher the cooperation); ii) each agents’ payoff with respect to its maximum
payoff (the cooperation reward × the number of neighbors) and taxes; and iii) the
topology of the leaders’ neighborhoods. In general, the experiments showed that
the behavior of the base coalition formation algorithm is strongly dependent on the
network topology as we discuss next.
Small-World. Firstly, we observed that in MAS with a small-world connectivity (see
figure 3.2), multiple coalitions emerged (∼ 60). This fragmented population is quite
a contrast with respect to the grid results, where a single coalition emerged given
enough time. Moreover, Figure 3.2 also shows that, at any given time step, around
5% of the population remains independent. However, the ceaseless spikes exhibited
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by the plots of both agents in coalitions and independent agents, indicate that agents
are continuously leaving and joining coalitions. In other words, coalitions are rather
unstable because their members continuously change.
With respect to the payoffs, Figure 3.4 shows that the average payoff of an agent
in a coalition is significantly low (∼ 20 % of the maximum). Specially when compared
with the ∼ 99% (of the maximum) obtained in the grid simulations (in [34]). The
reasons behind this lower payoff are two-fold: 1) a fragmented population; and 2)
very high taxes imposed by leaders. The former means that as a result of multiple
coalitions and independent agents, it is very likely for agents in a coalition to interact
(play) with agents outside their coalition (for which their strategy is an automatic
defect). The latter occurs because leaders are not pushed to decrease their taxes.
In particular, leaders charge their coalition members a ∼ 44% of their total payoffs.
That fact that agents settle on paying such high taxes greatly differs from the results
obtained on grids, where low tax values (< 1% of the total payoff) were reached.
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Figure 3.3: Coalitions in scale-free.
Scale-free. The results over scale-free topologies (depicted in figure 3.3) show
that agents promptly gravitate towards a single leader, thus forming a single super-
coalition. However, not all agents join the coalition (∼ 18% of the population, namely
∼ 180 agents, remain independent). Moreover, figure 3.3 exhibits the same kind of
instability exhibited by the small-world case (illustrated by the ceaseless spikes).
Interestingly, agents on this topology receive a higher payoff (∼ 50% of the max-
imum payoff) than on small-world topologies, but still far from the 99% obtained in
grids . This occurs because a highly populated single coalition amounts to a very high
level of cooperation (i.e. ∼ 80% of the agents cooperate with each other). Nonethe-
less, once again, like in the small-world case, the agents in the coalition also pay very
high taxes (∼ 44% of their total payoff).
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Moreover, an in-depth analysis of the simulations showed that the agents that
became leaders had an interesting characteristic in common. They tend to be the
agents with higher connectivity (i.e. they have more neighbors). Hence, the hubs (in
particular the highly connected ones, although not necessarily the most connected
ones) usually emerge as leaders. Consequently, this is also the reason why a single
leader can emerge, since the considerable high number of neighbors that hub agents
have with respect to the rest of agents (∼20 vs. ∼150) puts them in an excellent
influence position. Moreover, the relatively low number of hub agents means that
only a few agents compete between themselves to become a leader, thus it is easier
for one of them to dominate others.
In contrast, the neighborhoods under small-world topologies are very similar 1
(on average each agent has ∼ 10 neighbors) and thus all agents have more or less the
same level of influence. Hence, this explains why multiple coalitions coexist (agents
start with similar levels of influence).
Overall, the main drawbacks of the base model are: its sensitivity towards the
topology and the coalitions’ instability. The first one may be solved by analyzing
and revising the base decision making logic (i.e. the coalition strategies), whereas
the second issue is harder. The instability exhibited by coalitions mainly occurs
because the high mutation (0.05) prompts the agents to leave their coalitions (as
stated above). However, for large coalitions to appear, high mutation is necessary
on both grid (as argued in [34]) and complex network topologies. In other words,
mutation is both detrimental and crucial for the coalition formation process. Hence,
adjusting mutation is challenging when we want to minimize the instability without
affecting coalition emergence.
These results contradict Gracia-La´zaro et al. [57] study on cooperation using
humans that play the IPD. Their results suggest that population structure has little
relevance as a cooperation promoter or inhibitor among humans. This is contrary
to our results, that show that cooperation is influenced by the topology. It also
contradicts previous literature on multi-agent systems, where it is stated that the
topology where agents interact and its characteristics indeed influences cooperation
[10]. However, we must consider that humans also may act in ways that are even less
predictable and seemingly irrational than agents [138]. Moreover, in their approach
the authors do not allow humans to join into coalitions.
In the next section we focus on improving cooperation mainly by solving or min-
imizing the above-mentioned drawbacks.
1because of the small-world phenomenon, see [148]
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Figure 3.4: Non-leader (in coalition+independent) agents average payoff.
3.3.2 Improving Cooperation
The aim of this section is to study how to maximize cooperation amongst agents (and
consequently improving their payoffs). To that end, the base approach needs to be
revised and extended to address the drawbacks identified in the previous section.
Specifically, along this section we focus on: a) achieving full cooperation by emerg-
ing a single super-coalition (avoiding a fragmented population); b) sustaining the
single coalition through time by minimizing coalition instability; and c) lowering the
taxes needed to maintain the coalition. Moreover, all of these needs to occur re-
gardless of the underlying topology. However, notice that although a single coalition
promotes cooperation and is beneficial for the agents’ payoffs, a single leader becomes
a potential single-point of failure, making the MAS vulnerable. Therefore, we also
commit to an additional objective: d) the promptly re-emergence of a coalition if the
leader fails.
3.3.2.1 Topology Influence
The experimental results in Section 3.3.1.2 showed that the base coalition formation
approach is considerably sensitive to the MAS underlying topology. In particular,
we observed that the topology influences the structure of coalitions (fragmented pop-
ulation vs. single coalition). However, the topology also influences other aspects
of emergence, i.e. the emergence time. Hence, the purpose of this subsection is to
perform a sensitivity analysis of the decision making process (described in subsection
3.3.1) with respect to the topology.
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Influence on Coalition Structures
The most noticeable topological effect observed during the previous experiments was
the fragmented population. Specifically, in small-world topologies agents form mul-
tiple, different coalitions, which are detrimental to their total payoffs. Therefore, in
what follows we aim to promote the emergence of a single coalition.
To understand why multiple coalitions emerged instead of a single one, we must
first explain how we expected the base approach to behave. Initially, regardless of
the topology, agents organize in small coalitions. Then, agents were expected to leave
their coalitions in favor of independence or better coalitions if their payoffs were not
sufficient. In other words, by continuously joining and leaving coalitions, agents were
expected to incrementally move towards larger coalitions (under the principle that the
larger the coalition the higher the payoff) until only a single one remained. However,
as the experiments demonstrated in subsection 3.3.1.2, this behavior does not occur
on small-world topologies. Hence, the join and/or leave coalition strategies do not
behave as needed.
We determined that the shortcoming stems from join coalition strategies instead
of leave coalition strategies. Our reasoning is that because of high mutation some
agents will always leave their coalitions, thus the fault occurs when they (re-)join
them. That is to say, in small-world topologies the join strategies are not moving the
agents towards a larger coalition, and instead they keep the population fragmented.
Specifically, this occurs because the combination of the small-world’s inherent high
clustering, the commitment notion, and join coalition strategy 2, prompt each agent to
rejoin the coalition they just left (i.e. most agents never truly leave their coalitions).
We re-ran the experiments to verify if the join coalition strategy 2 truly halts
the emergence of a single coalition. As expected, we confirmed that without this
strategy, agents on small-world topologies are capable of emerging a single super-
coalition. Moreover, interestingly enough we found that agents in the single coalition
have the additional advantage of paying a significantly low tax (∼5% of the agent’s
total payoff instead of ∼44%). The reason behind such low taxes is very reasonable.
The fact that every agent can potentially become a leader (as discussed in section
3.3.1.2) drives a fierce competition between leaders to charge lower taxes (akin to a
price war). Overall, low taxes translate onto higher payoffs for coalition agents (∼90
% of the maximum), which is our main objective. Nonetheless, the instability of
coalitions is still present and is accountable in lower average payoff obtained by the
non-leader agents when compared to the coalition agents (see Figure 3.4).
Nevertheless, the removal of join coalition strategy 2 is detrimental to scale-free
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topologies. Because of the highly connected hubs in scale-free networks, a single
coalition promptly emerges. However, the low clustering of scale-free networks causes
agents that recently became independent to remain independent for longer periods of
time. This considerably increases the coalition’s instability (around one third of the
agents are independent at any given point in time). Basically, without a strategy to
force agents into a coalition (such as join coalition strategy 2), the number of agents
leaving a coalition is higher than the number of agents joining one. In other words,
scale-free suffers the full-blown effect of mutation.
To summarize, we reaffirmed the fact that the effect of the coalition decision
making process varies depending on the network topology. However, since agents
are not capable of identifying the underlying topology where they interact, creating
specific strategies for each topology is unrealistic. Nonetheless, when join strategy 2
is removed, coalition emergence is relatively similar in both small-world and scale-
free, since only single coalition emerges. This is important because now only one
drawback remains for both topologies: instability (although to a much higher degree
in scale-free). Therefore, the remaining objective is to minimize instability, which is
the focus of subsection 3.3.3.
Influence on emergence time
In the previous subsection we determined that a single coalition can emerge regardless
of the topology. However, we did not mention that the time required for this single
coalition emergence varies depending on the topology. In particular, we observed that
agents in small-world require a longer time to group up unto a single coalition (4000
time steps) with respect to the agents on scale-free (< 500 time steps). This time
disparity is once again a product of the strong influence that hub agents have over
the rest of agents. Thus, in this section we aim to speed-up the coalition emergence
process on both topologies.
In the base approach, the switch and leave coalition strategies (3,5,6, and 7) are
expected to improve coalition emergence time, since they prompt agents to leave their
coalitions in search for better ones. However, the leave strategies targeting unsatisfied
agents (6 and 7) are hardly ever employed. Therefore, we propose to replace them
with the by far more aggressive disband coalition strategy. With this strategy, leaders
of unprofitable coalitions may disband their coalitions and free multiple unsatisfied
agents in just a single time step. This can be regarded as the dual of strategies 6 and
7, since instead of each agent leaving its leader, the leader leaves all its agents.
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Algorithm 1 CoalitionDecisionMaking
if (myRole = INDEPENDENT ) then
/∗ Strategy 1 ∗/
joinCoalitionWhenWorst(best neighbor);
if (myRole = COALITION MEMBER) then
/∗ Strategy 3 ∗/
leaveCoalitionWhenIsolated();
/∗ Strategy 5 ∗/
switchCoalitionWhenWorst(best neighbor);
if (myRole = LEADER) then
/∗ Strategy 8 ∗/
disbandCoalitionWhenBad();
mutation(pmutation);
8. Disband coalition (unsatisfied leader). If I am a leader and I am not satisfied
with my payoff then disband my coalition.
Algorithm 1, stands for the resulting coalition decision making process. Notice
that after removing the join and leave strategies (strategies 2,6, and 7), none of
the remaining strategies employ the notion of commitment employed in Axelrod’s
tribute model [16]. Thus, the strengthen coalition strategy (strategy 4) was also
removed. That is to say, commitment between agents is not actually needed for
coalition emergence. We re-ran the simulations to verify the speed-up provided by
algorithm 1.
The results showed that by employing the disband strategy a single coalition
emerges ∼ 12.5 % faster (than when employing strategies 6 and 7) in a small-world
topology. Moreover, it speeds up the emergence on scale-free by ∼ 50%.
Overall, we have simplified the agents’ coalition decision making algorithm. There-
fore, we can now turn our attention to our remaining drawback: coalition instability.
3.3.3 A consensus mechanism for stable coalitions
After Section 3.3.2.1 the only issue remaining that prevents full cooperation is coali-
tion instability. Therefore, in what follows we propose to extend the coalition forma-
tion approach (in algorithm 1) to endow it with capabilities to minimize instability.
However, to accomplish this we must first understand exactly what we are trying to
minimize.
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Algorithm 2 The new coalition formation algorithm employed by each agent
1: interactWithNeighbors();
2: if (myRole 6= LEADER) then
3: spread(〈[tax,prebellion],payoff〉,pspreading);
4: [tax,prebellion]←select(spreadings);
5: innovate([tax,prebellion],pinnovation);
6: coalitionDecisionMaking();
7: if (myRole = COALITION MEMBER) & (tax¡leader.getTax()) then
8: leaveCoalition(prebellion);
3.3.3.1 Rebellion vs. mutation
Along this section we have found that mutation is both a nuisance and a crucial
factor for the coalition formation process. However, when analyzing its effects, we
realized that the “mutation” employed by the base approach is actually a merge of two
different concepts: classic mutation (a random change in the agents’ properties) and
rebellion. The former, has been well studied in the literature [92] and affects agents’
actions to play and/or the taxes to charge, whereas the latter is the probability of
an agent to become a rebel (leaving its coalition). Thus, in the base approach when
mutation occurs in an agent, it randomly changes its actions and taxes, and it prompts
the agent to leave its coalition (if applicable). That is to say, both random changes
and rebellion occur concurrently. Nonetheless, rebellion (achieved by mutation in
previous experiments) is the actual factor that is crucial for the coalition formation
process. Hence, it must be treated as a separate entity if we want to minimize the
instability resulting from it.
The importance of a rebellion capability is not hard to understand. We have
discussed before that larger and stronger coalitions emerge when agents leave their
current one to join others. However, the leave or switch coalition strategies do not
activate that frequently, and it is actually the rebellion probability the factor that
often drives agents to leave their coalitions. This is akin to the not always logical
real-life rebellion, e.g. humans may rebel from a social group without actually know-
ing if there is something better somewhere else. However, as the instability in all
previous experiments shows, continuous/constant rebellion is detrimental to agent
coalitions. Thus, we propose that, to minimize instability, agents need to adjust their
rebelliousness according to their needs (e.g. their payoffs).
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3.3.3.2 The consensus mechanism
Rebellion is necessary during the coalition formation process. Nonetheless, it induces
instability once a single coalition emerges. Therefore, agent rebelliousness needs to
be controlled by the agents themselves accordingly (i.e. only rebel when necessary).
Not only that, since agents are distributed entities, rebellion must be controlled dis-
tributedly.
However, if we intend for rebellion to only occur when necessary, we firstly require
to give rebellion a motive within the agent, i.e. why should an agent rebel? That
is to say, rebellion needs to be dependent on some other property or characteristic
of the agents. In the coalition formation process, dissatisfaction with respect to the
taxes to pay provides a very logical and reasonable motive for rebellion. Therefore,
we propose that an agent may only rebel once its coalition leader is charging more
taxes than what the agent is willing to pay. Nevertheless, in both the base approach
and in algorithm 1 the agents pay the taxes that the leader charges unconditionally.
Hence, to relate taxes and rebellion the agents need to have the notion of how much
they are willing to pay, i.e. a tax threshold. Moreover, like the rebellion probability,
this tax threshold should also be decided by the agents themselves.
In human culture rebellion often occurs as a social movement. Individuals are
more likely to rebel if their peers are rebelling, or are more likely to be satisfied with
their taxes if their neighbors are satisfied. In other words, rebellion can be regarded
as a collective decision. To that end we propose to employ a collective adaptive
approach to reach a consensus about the rebellion probability and tax threshold.
This proposed collective approach, inspired on the social contagion phenomenon [35],
is designed to collectively emerge conventions/consensus about properties common to
the agents of a MAS. Under this approach agents with good properties (ones that help
them improve their payoffs) are more likely to spread them to other agents. For the
coalition formation scenario, agents attempt to spread their rebellion probability and
tax threshold. For instance, an agent spreading that its tax threshold and rebellion
resulted in a high payoff, is likely to persuade other agents to adopt that threshold
and rebellion.
Algorithm 2 outlines to the coalition formation algorithm designed to achieve full
cooperation and closely maximize the individual agents’ payoff on complex networks.
The consensus mechanism is included in lines 2-6. Each non-leader agent firstly
attempts to spread, with probability pspreading, its rebellion and tax threshold using its
payoff as an evaluation metric. This is followed by each agent having to decide which
of all the incoming spreadings to take (line 4). In our case, an agents always takes
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the incoming spreading with highest payoff (elitist selection). Finally, the rebellion
probability and threshold are randomly changed with probability pinnovation (line 5).
3.3.3.3 Sustaining cooperation
To evaluate the new capacity embedded into the agents, we ran experiments using
a moderated spreading probability (0.2) and a low innovation rate (8 × 10−4). Ad-
ditionally, the rebellion probability and tax threshold take on values in the range
(0,1).
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Figure 3.5: Coalition evolution with consensus on small-world topologies.
In general, the experimental results showed that with algorithm 2 most agents in
the MAS receive high payoffs. Specifically, for both topologies a stable single super
coalition emerges with a leader that charges low taxes.
The experiments on small-world topologies (depicted in Figure 3.5) show that
initially (less than 50 time steps) agents arrange themselves in different coalitions
(∼ 80), which promptly start to disappear into a single coalition. Specifically, the
single leader emerges in just ∼ 1100 time steps, and around time step 2000 most
agents (∼ 99.5%) are already part of the single super-coalition. In other words,
a single stable coalition arises such that, almost no agent leaves (very low number),
and where agents have a high payoff (∼ 93% of the maximum, as shown in figure 3.4).
Moreover, the time needed to emerge such coalition is faster than before (∼ 60% faster,
see subsection 3.3.2.1). These results are achieved through the emergence of low tax
values (∼ 2.5% of the total payoff) together with an extremely high rebellious capacity
(∼ 55%). This combination translates to the lemma: “low taxes or rebellion!”, which
the leaders are forced to comply.
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Figure 3.6: Coalition evolution with consensus on scale-free topologies.
Regarding scale-free topologies (see figure 3.6), a single coalition is achieved faster
than before (in less than 200 time steps vs. ∼ 300). What is more, the coalition now
is completely stable (very unusual for an agent to leave it) and the taxes (∼20% of
the agent’s total payoff) are lower than when employing the base approach or just
algorithm 1 (∼ 44% in both cases). When comparing with small-world, observe that
the process is similar (an initial peak in the number of coalitions that then decreases
into a single coalition) but much faster (10 times faster).
Finally, although full cooperation is closely achieved, it comes with an associated
cost: extra communication. The spreadings sent by agents represent additional mes-
sages. Nonetheless, to emerge a single coalition each agent in a scale-free topology
needs to send only ∼ 4 messages, while an agent in a small-world topology needs ∼
40 messages.
3.4 Flat coalition-based mechanisms
Although the coalition leader-based mechanisms described in [34] and in previous sec-
tion [122] confirm that coalitions indeed facilitate cooperation between self-interested
agents, there is still room for improvement. Firstly, in those two approaches, a coali-
tion leader must be paid by the agents belonging to the coalition. This penalizes
the utility that an agent can obtain from participating in a coalition. Furthermore,
a coalition leader imposes her decision on the agents in the coalition to maximize
cooperation. By imposing the coalition’s strategy, the leader does not take into ac-
count valuable information that agents could use for the benefit of all the members of
the coalition, not only the leader. Moreover, the payoff distribution is unfair, since:
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(i) leaders receive a payoff that they do not distribute; and (ii) the agents in the
frontier of the coalition (interacting with agents outside of the coalition) obtains less
payoff. In order to avoid the mentioned shortcomings, in this section, we focus on
flat coalitions, namely coalitions without leaders that: (i) democratically decide their
behaviors; and (ii) share profits without applying taxes.
Some works have used learning algorithms to address coalition formation and
behavior decisions, since these algorithms allow agents to modify their behaviour
depending on their past experiences. Thus instead of having a leader determining
behavior, agents learn, from their previous experience, which is the best strategy. In
a sense, reinforcement learning (RL) can be seen as a way to break the effects of
that determinism criticized by [67], because one may design learners with different
sensing capabilities, with different action selection strategies, and/or with different
ways to store their utility estimates, as proposed by Sandholm and Crites [124].
However, RL causes an agent to learn an individually optimal policy meaning that its
behavior is a best response to the strategies of the other players. Hence, ultimately
it is expected that all agents converge to mutual defection since this is the best
possible response in the IPD. The excessive concern with learning Nash equilibria in
multi-agent encounters has been criticized, e.g., in [136, 141]. Shoham and colleagues
single out some problems due to focusing on what they call the “Bellman heritage”.
According to these authors, it seems that most of the research so far has focused on
the play to which agents converge, not on the payoff agents obtain.
This is particularly the case regarding the use of RL in the IPD. Indeed, results
reported in [124] were not encouraging: “clear cooperation seldom emerged in exper-
iments with two learners even though the discount factor was set high to stimulate
cooperation” [124]. Although in some situation agents need not to seek cooperation,
in the IPD in particular, the payoff matrix is so formulated that mutual cooperation
leads to the highest payoff for the society. In the present section we assume that
agents seek to maximize this reward.
In the work of [124] another sensitive issue arises: only a two-player IPD game is
considered, in which both players are aware of the joint actions. This assumes full
and reliable communication among these two agents. If such approach is extended to
a scenario with dozens or hundreds of agents, the outcome is likely to degrade.
Therefore, further investigations around the RL approach by [124] are necessary
in order to find out whether or not agents can learn to cooperate. To the best
of our knowledge, there has been no further attempt to address the n-player IPD
game using RL, especially tackling emergence of cooperation. In [146] IPD is used,
46
3. Dynamic coalition formation over static topologies
but the aim there is to analyze the dynamics of multi-agent learning in multi-state
problems. Therefore they have modified the IPD game which is then represented by
two payoff matrices (two states). In this modified game the Nash equilibria in both
states are neither mutual defection nor mutual cooperation. Thus comparisons to
other approaches are not straightforward. Moreover, their approach works for two-
player games only. In other works they state that if agents are equipped with some
kind of behavior that we shall denote here as social attachment. These attachments
may be spatial relationships (e.g. [100]), small-world (e.g. [2]), or emotions towards
group attachments (e.g. [24]). The reason for this claim is that such approaches have
proved to improve cooperation, though in none of these cases learning was used.
The aim in this section is to investigate whether the use of reinforcement learning
techniques and coalition formation enhances the emergence and maintenance of co-
operation, when compared to the behavior of individual agents in a defection-prone
environment. We do so by considering flat coalitions where all agents take part in the
coalition behavior decision, avoiding the need of having a leader. Thus we propose
decision making both for agents and coalitions in order to endow the emergence of
cooperation. In the first part of this section (Section 3.4.1), we use a grid as the
interaction topology for agents. In this part, we propose two approaches to couple
coalitions and RL: static coalitions and dynamic coalitions. The former is based on
grouping agents in a pre-existing organizational structure that does not change. On it
we consider that agents belonging to each coalition only use common information and
supervised learning. In the latter, the structure of the coalitions themselves emerges
and changes out of the agents’s interactions. Moreover, agents in the same coalition
act as a unit, i.e., they agree on how to play. Finally, in the second part of this section
(Section 3.4.2), we study the effects of our dynamic coalition formation in a social
topology, introducing some improvements to our previous approach in order to make
it more realistic.
3.4.1 Coalition formation with RL in a grid topology
As mentioned in the introduction, our aim is to investigate whether cooperation is
enhanced when using flat coalitions where agents learn using reinforcement learning.
In Section 3.2.1 we have seen that mutual cooperation is not a Nash equilibrium in
this game and thus is related to suboptimal individual convergence. We believe that
the exploration made by the agents has to be biased towards joint actions that yield
higher social payoff. In the IPD this means mutual cooperation.
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Given this, we consider three different formalisms: static coalitions, dynamic coali-
tions, and for comparison purposes, agents that just play and learn individually. Fol-
lowing the terminology proposed by Claus and Boutilier in [42], we call these agents
independent learners (henceforth IL’s).
In all cases, we use the spatial configuration proposed by [100] (a set N of agents
placed on a square lattice), and Q-learning as learning method. The three formalisms
are detailed in the next subsections.
3.4.1.1 Independent Learners and the IPD
In our model, an n-agent IPD game is a tuple (N,S,A,R) where:
• N = {1, ..., j, ...n} is the set of agents
• S = ×Sj is the discrete state space (each Sj corresponds to the set of states of
an agent j)
• Ac = ×Acj is the discrete action space (each Acj corresponds to the set of
actions of an agent j)
• Rj is the reward function (Rj determines the payoff for agent j as rj : S1 ×
. . . Sn × Ac1 × . . .× Acn → R)
• T is the transition probability map (set of probability distributions over the
state and action spaces).
For the specific case discussed here, the set of actions and respective payoffs (re-
wards) are as in Table 3.1 and agents play the IPD game with m other agents (neigh-
bors) at each time step. The state is given by the payoff matrix.
As mentioned, IL’s interact and learn by using Q-learning in an independent way.
Hence, the main parameters are: the learning rate α, and the discount rate γ.
For action selection we use ε-greedy: the agent selects the action with highest
Q-value with probability 1− ε, and explores selecting an action randomly with prob-
ability ε. Depending on the action selected by each pair of agents, a reward is given
to the agent, and the Q-value for the particular pair (s, ac) is updated (Eq. 3.3). In
practice this means that each agent plays m two-person games as it is common in n-
person spatial IPD. Each agent updates its Q-table considering the rewards received
by playing with the m interacting neighbors. This is formalized in Algorithm 3.
As discussed before, individual learning is not efficient in the IPD (see also re-
sults presented in Section 3.4.1.4). Hence the next two sections discuss alternatives,
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Algorithm 3 Individual learning
1: for all j ∈ N do
2: initialize Q-values, list of neighbors
3: while not time out do
4: for all j ∈ N do
5: when in state sj, select a random action with probability ε or greedy action
with probability 1− ε
6: for all k in neighborhood of j do
7: play aj against ak
8: receive reward
9: update Qj . // Eq. 3.3
10: end while
starting with the one based on a static coalitions (Section 3.4.1.2), and ending with
dynamic coalitions (Section 3.4.1.3).
3.4.1.2 Static coalitions and supervised learning
The first approach for biasing exploration towards a socially higher reward is to use
external agents to give recommendations to agents in a group, i.e., using supervised
learning. This has been used successfully by [23, 158, 159] in completely different
domains, leading to more efficient equilibrium selection.
The idea is to have two sets of agents: recommendors and low-level agents. The
former recommends a group of the latter. Low-level agents behave basically as ILs
(Section 3.4.1.1), unless they are given recommendations that regard action selection.
This way a low-level agent Lj plays the IPD game repeatedly with m other neighbors.
We stress that these neighbors are not necessarily those that belong to Lj’s group, i.e.,
Lj’s interactions transcend its own group. Each low-level agent Lj only communicate
with its recommendor, it is not even necessary that Lj knows it belongs to a group.
Note that even with this recommendors, coalitions are still flat, since recommendors
only give recommendations, but they do not impose any behavior. Moreover, contrary
to the dynamic coalition mechanism, which will be explain in next section, coalitions
here are fixed and predefined before hand. Moreover, agents in a group only share
information provided by the recommender, but they do not coordinate to act, they
do it independently.
As illustration we refer to Figure 3.7 in which low-level agents are divided in groups
(α1, ..., α4, β1, ..., β4, γ1, ..., γ4, δ1, ..., δ4) that get recommendations by 4 recommendors
(α, β, γ, δ). In this figure, an arrow indicates that the two agents sharing it play
49
3. Dynamic coalition formation over static topologies
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
α β
γ δ
Figure 3.7: Two-level organization: 16 agents (α1, ..., β1, ..., δ4) in the lower level,
recommended by α, β, γ, and δ in the second level; Full-line boxes mean agents with
whom α4 is interacting; White boxes mean defection (D).
the IPD. This however does not mean that they communicate explicitly as non-
communication between players is one of the assumptions underlying the IPD. Notice
that despite the fact that a group exists (e.g. α1, ..., α4), each of these members
have interactions outside the groups (e.g. α4 also interacts with β3). Conversely, α4
does not interact with α1. This is a real-world situation that makes the game more
complex and the MARL more difficult. For instance in an organization, interactions
not only occur inside a department; they also happen among agents from different
departments. Otherwise coordination would be much simpler.
The supervised learning works as in algorithms 4 to 6, which are explained next1.
Before, we remark that recommendors do not actually play the game thus they are
not included in the set N of low-level agents. In fact, recommendors must be seen as
facilitators or tutors that will observe the local agents’ in their groups from a broader
perspective, and eventually recommend actions to them. This recommendation is
based on a group perspective, in opposition to the purely local perspective of low-
level agents.
Besides the parameters already used by the IL, others that are now necessary are:
the set of low-level agents N = L = {L1, ..., Ln}; the set S = {S1, ...} of recommendor
agents; the threshold τ (explained below); ∆ind (time period during which each Lj
1We drop the initialization steps as they are the same as in Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 4 Individual learning stage (stage 1)
1: while t ≤ ∆ind do
2: for all Lj ∈ L do
3: state sj
4: select a random action with probability ε or greedy action with probability
1− ε
5: receive reward obtained by playing against each m-th neighbor
6: update Qindj m times . // Eq. 3.3
7: for all Si ∈ S do
8: observe state, action, and reward for each Lj
9: compute the average reward r (among Lj’s)
10: if tuple < ~a,~s, r > not yet in the base of cases then
11: add tuple < ~a,~s, r >
12: else
13: if r > rold then
14: replace by tuple < ~a,~s, r >
15: end while
learns and acts independently, updating the Q-table Qindj ); ∆tut (time period during
which each Si prescribes an action to each Lj in its group based on cases observed
so far); and ∆crit (time period during which each Lj can act independently or follow
the recommendation of the recommendor). These time periods are henceforth called
stages 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
Stage 1 is described in Algorithm 4. During ∆ind time steps, the N low-level
agents play the IPD as IL’s and their recommendors only observe them. Each Lj ∈
N learns a policy; each recommendor Si observes its low-level agents and records
information to a base of cases. This information consists of joint states, joint actions,
and rewards. Thus this base is composed by the tuples 〈~s,~a, r〉 where r is averaged
over all supervised agents. The case that has yielded the highest r so far is kept in
the base (line 13 of Algorithm 4).
The second stage (Algorithm 5) takes further ∆tut time steps. In this stage, each
Si: i) observes the joint state of its low-level agents; ii) retrieves ~a
t for which r is
the highest. It is important to note that in any case the local Q-tables continue to
be updated. The main difference to stage 1 is that at stage 2, low-level agents are
committed to the action prescribed by the recommendor, even when the expected
reward is not as good as the computed Q-values.
In the third stage (which takes ∆crit steps, as in Algorithm 6), low-level agents
need not follow the prescribed action. Rather, after comparing the expected reward
51
3. Dynamic coalition formation over static topologies
Algorithm 5 Tutoring stage (stage 2)
1: while ∆ind < t ≤ ∆ind + ∆tut do
2: for all Si ∈ S do
3: communicate with recommendor at upper level; get similar cases; add to
case base
4: given ~s, find ~a in case base for which r is highest; communicate apj to each
Lj . where a
p
j is action prescribed by the recommendor for this agent
5: for all Lj ∈ L do
6: perform action apj communicated by recommendor . or follow local policy
if recommendor has not prescribed any action
7: receive reward obtained by playing against each m-th neighbor
8: update Qindj m times . Eq. 3.3
9: for all Si ∈ S do
10: observe state, action, and reward for each Lj
11: compute the average reward (among Lj’s) r
12: if tuple < ~a,~s, r > not yet in case base then
13: add tuple < ~a,~s, r >
14: else
15: if r > rold then
16: replace by tuple < ~a,~s, r >
17: end while
r that was communicated by the recommendor, with the locally computed Q-value
for this particular prescribed action, each agent may select the action associated with
its local policy. This means that the low-level agent will only select the prescribed
action if this is at least as good as the expected Q-value (here considering a tolerance
factor τ as in line 7 in Algorithm 6). No matter whether the low-level agents do follow
the prescription or not, the recommendor is able to observe actions and rewards, and
update its base of cases.
3.4.1.3 Dynamic coalitions
The approach presented in the previous subsection has two drawbacks: i) groups must
be given a priori and do not change; and ii) we need agents that can observe others
interactions and that provide with extra information.
One issue that has attracted many attention in multi-agent systems is how to
partition or organize a multi-agent system in an effective way. Several approaches
to this exist in the multi-agent systems literature but here we focus on coalition
formation because it is a well-established approach from game theory, having solid
mathematical grounds. Unfortunately, partitioning agents in coalitions that lead to
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Algorithm 6 Critique stage (stage 3)
1: while ∆ind + ∆tut < t ≤ ∆ind + ∆tut + ∆crit do
2: for all Si ∈ S do
3: given ~st, find ~at in case base for which r is maximal; communicate apj to
each LJ plus expected reward r
4: for all Lj ∈ L do
5: . compare Qindj and r
e:
6: if r × (1 + τ) > Qindj then
7: perform apj against each m-th neighbor . where a
p
j is action prescribed
by the recommendor for this agent
8: receive reward
9: update Qindj m times
10: else
11: perform aindj against each m-th neighbor . where a
ind
j is ε-greedy
selected following local policymulti-agent
12: receive reward
13: update Qindj m times
14: for all Si ∈ S do
15: observe state, action, and reward for each Lj
16: compute the average reward (among Lj’s) r
17: if tuple < ~a,~s, r > not yet in case base then
18: add tuple < ~a,~s, r >
19: else
20: if r > rold then
21: replace by tuple < ~a,~s, r >
22: end while
an efficient utility is not a trivial problem. In the general case, the number of coalition
structures (O(|N ||N |)) is so large that it cannot be enumerated for more than a few
agents [125]. Therefore, it is necessary to use domain knowledge and/or games with
particular structures and where agents have particular characteristics (e.g., they form
a network in which the neighborhood plays a role) to solve the problem of coalition
formation in a reasonable efficient way. For example, coalitions among neighbors
make sense and help them to collect a much higher payoff. In the spatial IPD game,
only coalitions among neighboring agents are initially formed. Thus the number of
coalition structures is manageable (it is much smaller than |N ||N |). This does not
mean that coalitions are restricted to four or five agents. Rather, they may grow as
agents in the initially formed coalitions may propose to their immediate neighbors to
join and so forth.
These facts have motivated our second approach for achieving a socially higher
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reward in the IPD, namely the dynamic formation of coalitions of cooperators. A
preliminary version of this approach was tested with positive results in [107, 109],
where the focus was to compare Q-learning and learning automata [83] techniques.
The coalitional approach is also based on IL’s. These however have here a different
set of actions to choose from. Instead of just selecting C or D as described in the
two previous subsections, now actions are to act as IL and play C, to act as IL and
play D, and to be in a coalition or not. Agents may leave the coalition whenever they
want, thus becoming an IL.
When belonging to a coalition, an agent cooperates with other members of the
coalition, thus it plays C. The action to be played with non-members (outsiders) is
decided collectively, by means of a voting process. Hereby each agent votes to play
the action which is the best according to its own individual Q-table. Each vote is
weighted by its Q-value. This has the same effect as if the whole coalition would
keep a Q-table with the sum of Q-values over all its agents, followed by a greedy
action selection. Again, this is used only when playing against outsiders. Inside a
coalition, the agent does not have to decide which is the action against its coalition
mates, as it is assumed that they all cooperate. This assumption is a reasonable one
because since actions are public inside the coalition, non-cooperators would be seen
as someone betraying their coalition members. This would cause the “black sheep”
to be expelled from the coalition and suffer retaliation (D) in future plays.
Although this procedure is simple, it has been used in a similar way in, e.g., [68].
In this particular case however every agent locally chooses the action yielding the
maximum value, and from these maximum values, the action corresponding to the
highest value is chosen.
In our case each agent decides which is the best action to take, based on the
local policy (Q-value). After the agents have individually done that, they vote and
the action that receives more votes is the one that the coalition is going to perform.
Algorithm 7 indicates how the learning proceeds.
3.4.1.4 Experiments
For each of the formalisms introduced in previous sections we have run experiments
using the same payoff matrix and spatial configuration. The results of these experi-
ments are presented and analyzed next.
Table 3.3 summarizes the parameters used and their values. A star indicates that
values were varied and are then reported in the appropriate section. We indicate
some parameters that are specific of the recommendation-based method (light grey).
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Algorithm 7 Coalition learning
1: for all Lj ∈ N do
2: initialize Q-values, list of neighbors
3: while not time out do
4: when in state sj, select greedy action aj with probability 1 − ε or a random
action with probability ε
5: if Lj’s selected action is to be in coalition then
6: join coalition
7: play C with coalition members
8: vote to select how to play with outsiders
9: play winner action with outsiders
10: else
11: play as IL
12: receive reward and update Q-values (m times) (Eq. 3.3)
13: end while
The others were used in the three variants.
We have performed experiments with two different grid sizes: 4× 4 and 24× 24.
This way, N = 16 and N = 576 respectively. This aimed at demonstrating that
the pattern remains, no matter the number of agents. The values T, R, S, and P
for the payoff matrix (Table 4.1) are given in Table 3.3 and are commonly used in
experiments regarding the IPD.
All experiments were repeated 100 times and the simulations run for 100 time
steps or 100 action selections. Although we do not show error bars in the resulting
plots, the standard deviations are at most 20% for the grid of size 4 and less than 5%
in the case of the grid size 24.
To demonstrate that IL’s perform poorly because they end up learning the Nash
equilibrium and thus converging to mutual defection, we have run the first series of
experiments changing N and also ε. Unless noted, we give results for ε = 0.3 but
note that the pattern of mutual defection does not change significantly. In fact the
exploration rate cannot prevent this behavior, as already noticed in [124].
In Figure 3.8 and we Figure 3.9 depict how the average reward changes along time,
using over all N = 16 and N = 576, respectively. As we said, mutual cooperation
would lead to an average reward of R = 3, while mutual defection leads to average
reward of P = 1. In Figure 3.8, observing the learning curve for the IL’s (marked by
circles) we notice that the value of this reward at step 100 is above 1. This happens
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Parameter Description Value
T temptation to defect 5
R reward for mutual cooperation 3
S sucker’s payoff 0
P punishment for mutual defection 1
N = |L| number of agents ∗
m nb. neighbors 4
α learning coefficient 0.5
γ discount rate 0
ε greedy action selection ∗
g size of group 4
∆ind stage 1 50
∆tut stage 2 10
∆crit stage 3 40
τ intolerance factor ∗
Table 3.3: Parameters and their values
due to the exploration that agents still perform as ε was not decreased with time (no
annealing). This means that on average half of the ε×N agents were cooperating by
chance, which yields a payoff of T = 5 to the opponent, thus slightly increasing the
average reward.
The approach based on recommendation improves this picture (plots marked with
squares) but not to the extent that was verified in other games and scenarios (e.g.
[23] and in another attempt using coordination games). The reason is that recom-
mendation is more efficient to guide agents to equilibrium selection when more than
one exists. In coordination games for instance, where two or more equilibria exist, the
bias imposed by the recommendor can guide agents to a more efficient selection as the
recommendor is able to record good coordinated actions (and recommend them later),
while avoiding the recording of miscoordinations, which are then not recommended.
In the IPD the problem is that the recommendors observe few mutual coopera-
tions1, recommend them but, once the supervised agents select C and are defected,
they tend to reject this recommendation in the future.
This is exactly what is seen in Figure 3.8, looking at the curve marked with
squares. During stage 1 (first ∆ind = 50 time steps), the behavior is the same as for
the IL’s already discussed. During this time the recommendors eventually record good
cases occurred in the group they supervise. For the next ∆tut = 10 steps these good
cases are recommended, low-level agents must select such actions (this is mandatory
1The tendency to observe full mutual cooperation in the group decreases with the increase in
the group size.
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Figure 3.8: Grid 4x4: Average reward along time, for independent learners, super-
vised learning, and coalition-based learning (τ = 0).
in stage 2), but the reward achieved is not high enough to drive individual agents
away from a higher expected payoff associated with defection. Hence, once this period
is over (around t = 60), low-level agents tend to refuse recommendations. We have
performed simulations with various values for τ but no tolerance level is able to keep
agents from defecting.
The same discussion is valid for N = 576 (Figure 3.9). Besides the curve for
ε = 0.3, the curve for ε = 0.1 is also shown as it has led higher rewards in stage 1,
when less agents explore. Hence, some mutual cooperation remains for a longer time.
recommendors are able to observe better cases and recommend them thus improving
the cooperation level. A similar behavior is not observed for small N since here, the
influence of a single defection is much higher than when N is big.
The lesson taken from this set of experiments is that recommendation improves
the picture over the IL but not as much as it would be desired, namely a value closer
to R.
The approach using dynamic coalition (coalition), as expected, is more efficient
as it explores the flexibility of the emergence of groups that indeed are willing to
cooperate because this has proven good in the past (otherwise the ε-greedy action
selection would not lead agents to cooperate). Comparing this variant to the one
based on recommendation the differences are clear. In the latter, if an agent is
willing to cooperate but happens to be in a ”bad“ group (regarding behavior), it
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Figure 3.9: Grid 24x24: Average reward along time, for independent learners, su-
pervised learning, and coalition-based learning (τ = 0).
will learn to defect on the neighbors as well. However, the coalition is a much more
flexible structure that emerges only among those that have experienced cooperation
as rewarding in the past and thus want to continue following this action.
In both Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9, one sees that the dynamic coalition approach
ends up rewarding the collectivity. It starts with the worst performance among the
three approaches (curves marked with diamonds) because agents are exploring the
possibilities (and they have more actions to explore). But it establishes itself as
supportive of cooperation. Moreover this happens relatively early (around time step
30). From this point on, the number of agents belonging to coalitions increase and
so the average reward. The fact that this average reward does not fully reaches the
value of R = 3 (it falls 0.5 short), is explained by two issues. First, experimentation
is still performed (with probability ε); second, clusters of defections establish that are
difficult to break.
Figure 3.10 shows the number of agents in coalition and the number of coopera-
tors along time for the grid 24 × 24. Towards the end of the simulation almost all
cooperators belong to coalitions. Therefore the difference between the total number
of agents (576) and the cooperators (both in coalitions and acting independently)
corresponds to the number of defectors. These are few as it can be observed.
As future work, we plan to use other algorithms, to include different kind of agents
in the game and to apply the coalition formation to other more complex and realistic
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Figure 3.10: Grid 24x24: Number of cooperators and number of agents that form
coalitions, along time.
scenarios.
3.4.2 Dynamic coalition formation with RL over complex
networks
As we said, grid topologies may not model nowadays interconnected world. It has
been argued that complex networks provide a more realistic model of the topological
features found in many nature, social and technological networks [7, 106] (i.e. com-
puter networks, social networks). Therefore, complex networks provide actual-world
topologies where we can evaluate if the coalition formation results exhibited on the
grid topology hold. Hence, in this section we aim at evaluating our decision making
mechanisms for flat coalitions on actual-world topologies.
Thus in this section we focus on the same problem than in previous one (Section
3.4.1), i.e., emergence of cooperation using flat coalitions. Again, the interaction
between agents is modeled as an n-person game, i.e., n agents playing simultaneously
the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD). However, in our model each game is not a
spatial version of the IPD [101], but agents are connected in a complex network,
where each of them interacts with a different number of neighbors. Every agent must
decide whether to behave as cooperator or defector during each round of the game,
and they are payed according to the payoff matrix in Table 3.1.
59
3. Dynamic coalition formation over static topologies
Additionally, in previous sections, both in leader and flat coalitions, it was assumed
that agents cooperate with their coalition mates. However, assuming cooperation is
too restrictive and naive. Other works, as Fu et al. [55], consider that an agent
should be able to autonomously decide how to behave with respect to coalition-mates
and agents outside her coalition. That is why we also endow agents with a decision
making to choose their behavior not only against the non-members, but also against
the members of their coalition.
3.4.2.1 Model description
Our mechanism here is based on the one for dynamic coalition formation presented
in Section 3.4.1.3. However, in this case, instead of using Q-learning, we use simpler
algorithm, Learning Automata (LA) algorithm [83] (explained in Section 3.2.2.1),
which well studied type of reinforcement learning technique.
An agent several decisions to take, namely: if it wants to be independent or to
belong to a coalition; which behavior to show if it is independent; and when the
agent belongs to a coalition, the behavior against insiders and outsiders . To take
this decisions, each of agent has four probability vectors (pcoa, pind, pcoaIn and pcoaOut,
respectively). These vectors are updated using the Learning Automata algorithm
(Eq. 3.2) depending on the gains obtained performing an action in the past, thus
increasing the probability of performing the action that has provided higher gain.
Note that in this case, contrary to all our previous approaches, we consider that an
agent in a coalition can also decide how to behave against its mates, i.e., it is not
forced to cooperate inside the coalition.
Now, we turn our attention to the actual strategies employed by an agent to
decide if it wants to belong to a coalition or to be independent. Every agent has a
probability vector pcoa containing the probability of belonging to a coalition or to be
independent. This vector is updated depending on which action has provided higher
payoff in the past, thus agent’s decision mainly depends on payoff.
1. Being independent
There are two options, depending if the agent that decides to be independent
belongs to a coalition or is already independent:
• Independent agent: It stays independent.
• Coalition agent: If an agent belongs to a coalition, it leaves the coalition
and becomes independent. Besides, an agent can also leave a coalition if
it is isolated, i.e., none of its neighbors belong to its coalition.
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2. Belonging to a coalition
There are two options, depending if the agent that decides to belong to a coali-
tion is already in one or is independent:
• Independent agent: If an independent agent wants to belong to a coalition,
then it searches an agent within its neighborhood that also wants to belong
to a coalition (it can be another independent agent or one agent already
belonging to one coalition). If there is more than one candidate to join,
the agent forms the coalition with the one that has obtained highest payoff
in last round.
• Coalition agent: An agent already belonging to coalitions can change to
another, or form a new one with another agent. Thus, an agent switches
coalition if there is a neighboring agent that wants to belong to a coalition
that has had more payoff in last round. If there is more than one candidate,
it chooses the one that obtained the highest payoff.
Thus, once each agent has decided its role, it has to decide its action:
1. Independent agents
An independent agent decides its own action (whether to cooperate or defect)
during each round. It decides its next strategy using the probability vector pind,
which contains two items: the probability of defecting and the probability of
cooperating.
2. Coalition agents
Every agent has to decide an action to play against outsiders and another one
to play against insiders. Thus, first each agent individually decides if it wants to
cooperate or defect both against outsiders and insiders. To do this, each agents
has two probability vectors: the first one contains the probability of cooper-
ating and defecting against insiders (pcoaIn), and the second one contains the
probability of cooperating and defecting against outsiders (pcoaOut). However,
the behavior of the coalition is decided by all the members. Thus secondly, each
agent votes its preferred action both against insiders and outsiders. The one
that has more votes is the behavior that all agents in coalition will perform.
Moreover, as the decision is jointly taken by all the members, all the gains are
equally shared in the coalition.
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3.4.2.2 Experiments
The purpose of these experiments is to study if our decision making mechanism helps
to improve the cooperation among the population, increasing this way the global
gains.
Unless stated otherwise, we use 100 agents over a Scale-free and Small-world net-
works. The parameters used to build it are S5;−2100 and W
5;0.1
100 , respectively. Each exper-
iment consists of a number of iterations where agents played the Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma (IPD) game. Each of this executions consists of a number of generations
(NumGen) or rounds where all the agents play with their neighbors.
Agents’ initial strategy is chosen at random, i.e., they are C or D with a 50% of
probability. The IPD game matrix used in all simulations is: T = 5, R = 3, P = 1,
and S =0. Finally, the learning factor used with the Learning Automata algorithm,
α, is set to 0.1.
In the following sections, we present the results of two scenarios: one in which
agents cannot form coalitions, and another one where they are allowed to create them.
With this, we will analyze the effect of coalitions over cooperation both in scale-free
and small-world networks.
Scenario without coalitions
For comparative purposes, we first present the results of a scenario where agents
cannot form coalitions, i.e., they can only behave as independent agents. This implies
that they only use one of the probability vectors: the one needed to learn which is
the best behavior when being independent (pind).
In Figure 3.11 we present the result of the evolution of the two strategies along
the generations. We see that at the end of the simulation, all the agents of the
population become defectors. When an agent starts playing, approximately 50% of
their neihgbors are defectors and another 50% are cooperators. Thus, if this agent
plays cooperatively, it gets three points from cooperators, but zero from defectors.
However, if it defects, it gets maximum payoff (five) when playing against cooperators
and one when playing against defectors. As agents are self-interested, i.e., each agent
only looks for its own benefit, after trying both actions they learn that by defecting
they get more payoff. Thus the whole population becomes defective, and the more
defectors there are, the useless is to be a cooperator.
As all agents are defectors, their gains decrease, as we can see in Figure 3.12,
where we show the percentage of gain in relation to the maximum obtained in the
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(a) Small-world.
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(b) Scale-free.
Figure 3.11: Percentage of agents per action (scenario without coalitions).
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Figure 3.12: Evolution of the percentage of gain per agent (scenario without coali-
tions).
experiments, both in scale-free and small-world networks. However, if all agents would
behave cooperatively, the gain of the whole population, and of each individual would
be better.
Scenario with coalitions
In this second scenario, we want to see if by grouping in coalitions and organizing the
coalition behaviour increases the cooperativity and the global payoff of the population.
In the case of allowing coalitions, at each generation, every agent has four decisions
to take: if it wants to be independent or to belong to a coalition; which behavior to
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select if it is independent; and the behavior against insiders and outsiders when an
agent belongs to a coalition. Remember that inside coalitions agents vote to decide
both the internal and external coalition behavior.
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Figure 3.13: Independent vs. coalitional agents
Figure 3.13 shows the percentage of agents that stay independent or that belong
to a coalition, depending on what has provided higher benefits in the past. We
see that over 90% of the agents belong to a coalition. The reason for this high
percentage of agents belonging to a coalition is that agents learn that cooperating
inside a coalition provides higher benefits. This increase in cooperation can be seen
in Figure 3.14. Each agent learns and votes that behaving cooperatively with their
coalition members results in higher benefits. In this scenario, what is good for a
coalition, is good for its agents, since they equally share gains among them. Not only
that, but as simulation evolves, agents group in less but bigger coalitions, resulting
in an increase of the global payoff, because when there are bigger groups cooperating
internally the global payoff increases.
However, in Figure 3.15 we see that coalition agents learn that against outsiders
they should behave as defectors. The reason for this is that an agent cannot foresee
which action an outsider will perform, thus if it defects, it gets at least one point.
As we stated above, the situation with insiders is different, because an insider learns
that if it cooperates with its mates, it pays back, since the rest of the members of the
coalition will also perform the same action. As they share gains, this behavior will
improve their benefits.
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Figure 3.14: Percentage of agents per action against insiders.
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Figure 3.15: Percentage of agents per action against outsiders.
In Figure 3.16 we compare the percentage of gain when using coalitions with the
case of non allowing coalitions. Again, we show the percentage of gain in relation
to the maximum obtained in the experiments. As we can see, allowing coalitions
improves the total cooperation among the population, and the global payoff increases.
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Figure 3.16: Comparison of gains per agent with and without coalitions.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented dynamic coalition-based mechanisms to allow
the emergence of cooperation in a defection-prone environment. We have proposed
decision making mechanism both for agents and coalitions in two different scenarios:
one in coalitions with leaders, and the other with flat coalitions.
As for coalition with leaders (Section 3.3), we confirmed that they indeed facili-
tate cooperation between self-interest agents. However, we found that the coalition
formation process is considerably sensitive to the MAS topology. In particular, to the
complex network topologies that model actual-world environments.
To that end we proposed a new distributed, lightweight and efficient coalition
emergence approach. We showed that agents on complex network topologies em-
ploying this approach can achieve full cooperation by grouping into a single super-
coalition. Moreover, agents in this super-coalition can maintain cooperation over time
in exchange of some significantly low tax, which is agreed by the agents themselves
(thus increasing their overall profits). Hence, closely maximizing their payoffs. In our
experiments, we determined that rebellion is a crucial factor for coalition emergence.
Through rebellion, smaller and unprofitable coalitions disappear so that bigger ones
can rise. Moreover, the agent population can use rebellion to pressure leaders to de-
crease their taxes. Consequently, increasing competitiveness among leading agents.
This contrasts with Axelrod’s model [16], where leaders were the ones who pressured
the population to the point of extortion. Overall, our proposed approach results in
a faster single-coalition emergence and in lower taxes for the population as a whole.
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Nonetheless, the emergence time and the taxes still vary depending on the topology.
However, even if using coalitions with leaders allows cooperation to emerge, and
even if with our mechanism agents are able to decrease the taxes that leaders charge,
the use of leaders has some drawbacks. Firstly, a coalition leader must be paid by the
agents belonging to the coalition. Secondly, a coalition leader imposes its decision on
the agents in the coalition to maximize cooperation. Therefore, each coalition leader
receives a payoff that is not shared between the members of her coalition. Moreover,
the decision-making of each coalition is centralized in a single entity: the leading
agent, not taking into account valuable information that agents could use for the
benefit of all the members of the coalition, not only the leader.
In the second part of this chapter, we avoid those drawbacks by forming flat
coalitions, i.e., coalitions without leaders. Thus we propose the use of RL together
with flat coalitions in order to achieve cooperation without the need of leaders (Section
3.4). Two kinds of biases were tried with agents interacting in a grid topology.
First, we form predefined static coalitions that where agents use supervised learning.
Second, we provide mechanism for dynamic coalition formation.
Our experiments (Section 3.4.1.4) show that both methods are able to depict mu-
tual cooperation. However the rate of cooperation was higher when dynamic coalitions
were used (e.g., the average reward agents received was close to the highest possible,
R). The reason for the dynamic coalitional method performing better than the static
coalition with supervised learning one is twofold. First coalitions may emerge among
agents that have experimented some benefits in past encounters. Groups in the su-
pervised learning are fixed thus they do not fully support the dynamics of the game.
The second reason is that the supervised learning approach works better for the cases
in which more than one equilibria exist (which is not the case of the IPD) and their
selection must be coordinated.
Therefore our dynamic coalition formation mechanism improved cooperation in
a grid topology. However, this topology may not model nowadays interconnected
world. Therefore, in Section 3.4.2 we have studied if our decision making mechanisms
for flat coalitions still held when agents interact in a complex network (scale-free and
small-world), and where cooperation inside the coalition is not mandatory.
Our experiments (Section 3.4.2.2) confirm that our mechanism allows the emer-
gence of cooperation when agents interact over complex networks. In fact, the gains
obtained when allowing coalitions are much higher than in the case we do not use
them. This is because in an scenario without coalitions, agents learn that their pre-
ferred behavior is to defect. However, we have seen that when we allow coalitions,
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agents learn that grouping (around 90% of agents belong to a coalition) results in
higher benefits. Not only that, but around 100% of agents learn that being coopera-
tive with their mates results in higher benefits. This is because in this scenario what
is good for a coalition, is good for agents belonging to it.
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Chapter 4
Dynamic coalition formation in
dynamic topologies with resources
4.1 Introduction
To prevent social dilemmas and promote and stabilise cooperation, we distinguish
two main strands of work in the literature: coalition-based mechanisms, and partner-
switching. Coalition-based mechanisms have their roots in the seminal work of
Axelrod introduced in [12] (chapter 6). Coalition formation [123, 131] is one of
the fundamental approaches in multi-agent systems for establishing collaborations
among agents, each with individual objectives and properties. In fact, in previous
chapter, using coalition-based approaches, we presented mechanisms to promote co-
operation on different network topologies, where these networks are static (fixed)
[22, 33, 108, 109, 122].
However, in most real-world situations, the topology of the network changes in re-
sponse to the state of the network and the other way around, namely the state of the
network changes in response to the topology. Research on games on dynamic topolo-
gies has found empirical evidence showing that partner switching leads to cooperative
behaviour. Along this line, Fu et al. [54] propose a model of coevolutionary prisoner’s
dilemma that allows agents to either adjust their strategies or switch their defective
partners, showing that partner switching may help stabilise cooperation. Although
in a different realm (the investigation of tag-based coordination), Griffiths et al. [58]
show that partner switching (rewiring in their terms) can help increase coordination
resilience in the face of malicious behaviour. Finally, Rand et al. [118] present a work
where they study the effects of link reciprocity (rewiring) using humans interact-
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ing in a complex network topology. The authors present experimental evidence of the
power of using strategic link formation and dissolution, and the network modiffication
it entails, to stabilize cooperation in sizable groups.
In previous chapter, the emergence of cooperation was studied in the context of
the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) theoretical framework [13], which captures the
conflict of interest between what is the best for the individual (defection) and what
is best for the group (cooperation), and thus creates a social dilemma [66]. However,
this game may not be enough when we want to model actual-world scenarios where
agents cannot only cooperate or defect, but they own resources.
In this chapter, we present mechanisms to improve cooperation, both using coali-
tions and partner switching (rewiring from now on) in a scenario where agents own
resources. To model this dilemma, we use two different game theoretic approaches
that consider that agents own resources. Thus we divide the contents of this chapter
in two parts. In the first (Section 4.2), we present our mechanism to maximize coop-
eration among self-interested agents that own resources with which they can trade,
i.e., benefits of agents are increased through exchange of their resources. We model
this problem using the well know Possesor-Trader game [155]. In the second (Section
4.3), we present a new mechanism that also maximizes cooperation, but in this case
we focus on unidirectional exchange of resources, using the donation game [99]. To
the best of our knowledge, no prior work in the literature has investigated whether
putting together dynamic coalition formation with partner switching show positive
synergies that lead to increase even further cooperation.
4.2 Fostering cooperation through dynamic coali-
tion formation and partner switching with learn-
ing
Apart from how coalitions are formed, we must also consider why members of a
coalition establish cooperation. This is particularly important when considering
actual-world scenarios where agents own resources that they can trade. In fact, re-
garding social and economic collaborating entities (as international alliances, trading
agreements, or cooperation among corporations), resource trading plays an important
role [72]. Not only in social and economic environments, but we can also consider
technological scenarios, as networks of computers that may share their resources, e.g.,
its CPU, files, etc. That is why we are interested in the scenario where agents can-
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not only cooperate or defect, like in the classical IPD, but where they can also own
tradable resources.
From an economical point of view, Yee [155] develops an evolutionary game model
of property ownership and trade. Based on an evolutionarily model of animal ter-
ritoriality, the author models human property ownership theoretically, showing that
trading is evolutionary preferred over permanent ownership without trade. Based on
that work, Burguillo et al. [31] perform a study of the extended IPD-Possessor-Trader
model. They present how evolutionary forces allow the emergence of different types
of strategies using a spatial scenario. However, their work studies a grid and static
scenario, which may not represent real world dynamic and complex topologies among
agents and where no coalitions can be formed. Moreover, in such model, agents play
independently, i.e., they cannot join coalitions to improve cooperation. To the best
of our knowledge, no coalition-based mechanism in the literature has captured the
concepts of ownership and trade of resources.
Against this background, our main contribution is a novel mechanism to maximize
cooperation among self-interested agents that own resources, where benefits of agents
are increased through exchange of their resources. Our cooperation mechanism is
based on three main components:
• a game-based interaction model that includes the trading of resources, based
on Yee’s [155] trading model;
• a dynamic coalition formation mechanism that allows agents to: (i) decide
whether to join or leave coalitions; and (ii) collectively self-determine decide
the inner and outer behaviours of a coalition (without the intervention of a
leader); and
• a partner switching (rewiring)1 strategy based on experiences acquired in pre-
vious interactions that helps agents avoid defective behaviours.
Furthermore, we empirically and thoroughly evaluate our mechanism. We observe
that indeed coalition formation plus rewiring allows agents to obtain up to 15% more
payoff than only employing either coalition formation or rewiring, and up to 30% more
when none of them are employed. However, the benefits of our mechanism depend
on the availability of resources, the network topology, and the rewiring frequency
employed by agents. Thus, overall our experiments indicate that:
1Henceforth we shall employ the term rewiring for shorter.
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• The higher the availability of resources, the larger the payoff that agents obtain
by cooperating, being 40% more when comparing a plentiful resource scenario
versus a scarce one.
• Rewiring leads to an increase of gains independently of the topology and its
effect in the increase of gains is larger the higher the availability of resources.
This increase reaches 20% in a plentiful resource scenario.
• The higher the rewiring frequency, the lower the clustering of the agent popula-
tion. In other words, the higher the rewiring frequency, the bigger the coalitions
formed by agents and the fewer the number of coalitions.
• Agents’ strategies adapt to the availability of resources and concrete scenarios
to obtain the highest benefits.
• The number of traders increases with the availability of resources, being al-
ready more than 80% when the resources are not scarce. Thus trading, i.e.,
cooperating, emerges as the preferred strategy;
In Section 4.2.1 we introduce our cooperation mechanism, while in Section 4.2.2
we offer a detailed empirical analysis.
4.2.1 Model description
In our model, we consider an agent population using a network as its iteration topol-
ogy, where we model agents as nodes, and relations among them as edges. These
agents interact with the peers in their social neighbourhood, i.e., the agents to which
they are linked, playing the Possessors-Traders game (agents are possessors or traders,
see Sect. 4.2.1.1). Thus agents not only cooperate or defect, but they also have re-
sources, with which they can trade. Moreover, to increase the cooperation level of
the multi-agent system, agents can form coalitions, since group decisions (social) can
result in a mutually beneficial cooperation that holds over time. Finally, agents do
not have static neighbourhoods, but they can change partners using rewiring. Thus
during the game, additionally of trading resources, each agent must decide:
• To belong to a coalition or to be independent: Agents must decide whether
being independent or in a coalition provides more benefits.
• To whom to rewire: As agents can change their neighbours, i.e., they rewire to
improve their neighbourhood, they have to decide which agent to rewire.
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Additionally, agents in a coalition act as a unity, i.e., all the agents of a coali-
tion must decide which action to perform with agents belonging to their coalition
(insiders) and with agents not belonging to it (outsiders). Thus, which is the coali-
tion behaviour, and how it is decided, is an important factor in the dynamics of the
coalition.
In the following subsections we explain in detail the main agent decisions (see Algo-
rithm 8): the trading strategies, the coalitions strategies, and the rewiring strategies.
Algorithm 8 Agent Cycle
1: Payoffs = TradeAgainstAllneighbours()
2: Rewiring(Payoffs)
3: ReviseCoalition(Payoffs)
4.2.1.1 Trading strategies
In this section we describe the strategies that agents use to trade among them. It is
primarily based on the model of property ownership and trade [31, 155]. This model
is an extension of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), i.e., trading is modeled as
an extension of the IPD’s cooperate and defect actions. In the model of property
ownership and trade, there are two types of players: Possessors (P), which own a
resource; and Traders (T), which sell and buy resources. In the following subsections
we explain in detail the trading strategies of our game, that we define as Iterated
Possessor-Trader (IPT).
Ownership (Possessors)
A Possessor (P) is an agent owning a resource. Its strategy models the practice
of ownership, i.e., the agent owns a resource with which it does not trade. Their
behaviour depends on whether they own a resource or they do not own it, i.e., if a
possessor owns a resource, it acts as a defector, but if it does not, it cooperates (see
[155] for details). We show the Possessor (P) strategy in Algorithm 9.
Algorithm 9 Possesor Strategy
1: if owning(resource) then
2: Defect
3: else
4: Cooperate
73
4. Dynamic coalition formation in dynamic topologies with resources
Trading (Traders)
A trader (T) is an agent willing to sell or buy a resource when dealing with a fellow
trader. If an agent has the capability of trading, it uses it to try to maximize its
benefits by selling a resource when owned. Indeed, nowadays society is based on
trading agreements, obtaining services on the one hand, and benefits on the other. In
particular, when two traders meet, the owner (agent that owns the resource to trade)
values the resource at a random value y 1, where v < y < V , (v, V ) ∈ R. Then, the
buyer (the agent that wants to get the resource) offers a value x for the resource,
where v < x < V . If x > y, then the buyer purchases the resource at random value z,
being y < z ≤ x. In [155], the author models this norm introducing the Trader (T)
strategy (see Algorithm 10). Note that if a trader plays against an agent that is not
a trader, it behaves as a possessor (agents can know the type of the adversary before
playing).
Algorithm 10 Trader Strategy
1: if is Trader(neighbour) then
2: if onwing(resource) AND v < y < V then
3: Sell for y
4: else if not(owning(resource)) AND y < x then
5: Buy for z
6: else
7: Behave as Possessor
8: else
9: Behave as Possessor
The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
The model of property ownership and trade is an extension of the Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma (IPD). IPD models a situation in which two agents have to decide whether to
cooperate (C) or defect (D), but without knowing what the other is going to do. In the
IPD, the payoffs achieved in interaction are the following: if both agents cooperate,
they get a reward (Re) each, but if they both defect they get a punishment (Pu). If
one defects and the other cooperates, the first one gets Te (meaning the temptation
payoff), and the cooperator receives Su (the sucker’s payoff) (Table 4.1). A prisoner’s
dilemma game satisfies the inequalities Te > Re > Pu > Su and 2Re > Su + Te.
Considering that Te > Re, it pays to defect if the other player cooperates. When the
1We choose a random value because the valuation of the resources is beyond the scope of this
chapter.
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Player Aj Cooperates Player Aj Defects
Player Ai Cooperates Re, Re Su, Te
Player Ai Defects Te, Su Pu, Pu
Table 4.1: General Prisoner’s Dilemma Matrix
other player chooses defection, there is a choice between defection, that provides P
(the punishment for mutual defection) or cooperation which yields Su (the sucker’s
payoff). Again, considering Pu > Su , it pays to defect if the other player defects.
Thus, independently from what the other player does, it pays to defect. However,
when they both defect, they get Pu instead of Re, which is a higher value that they
both could get if they cooperate [13].
Payoffs in this model are set based on [155]. The author defines a payoff matrix
for its trader game starting from the Hawk-Dove (HD) problem [87]. If 1
2
V > h then
the HD corresponds to the PD game. As this is our case, we model our defection and
cooperation based on the HD values that Yee defines for his Trader game:
Te = (V + v)/2
Re = (V + v)/4
Pu = (V + v)/4− h
Su = 0
4.2.1.2 Coalitions
The basic strategy by which agents join a coalition or change to a new one is shown
in Algorithm 11. If an agent (ai) has the worst payoff within its neighbourhood after
the last round (line 1), it joins the agent that has had the best one (line 2). If aj
is an independent agent, then ai joins aj to create a new coalition (line 4); but if aj
already belongs to a coalition, then ai joins aj’s coalition (line 6). Note that this rule
also enables any agent to change from a coalition to another in case it receives very
poor payoffs in the former one.
In this dynamic network, agents form coalitions to act as a unity. All agents be-
longing to a coalition (each agent can belong to only one coalition at a time) do not
need to be linked among them: they are a set of agents that act together, to maximize
their performance. However, even though an agent does not have to have a link to all
their coalition mates, it must have at least one link with one agent belonging to its
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coalition; if not, it becomes independent (lines 7-8, Algorithm 11). This is because
if the agent is not connected to any of their coalition mates, it cannot know coali-
tion information, strategy, share and divide gains, thus it must become independent.
Again, notice that if agents change links, it does not imply that they change coali-
tions: rewiring to others means changing neighbours. We explain in following section
how agents form and join coalitions, and how they decide the coalition behaviour.
Algorithm 11 ReviseCoalition(Payoffs)
1: if WorstPayoffInneighbourhood(Payoffs) then
2: aj = neighbourWithBestPayoff()
3: if Independent(aj) then
4: CreateNewCoalition(aj, ai)
5: else
6: JoinCoalition(aj, ai)
7: if Isolated() then
8: GetIndependence()
9: else
10: [ProbInT, ProbInP ] = UpdateLAInsiders(Payoffs)
11: [ProbOutT, ProbOutP ] = UpdateLAOutsiders(Payoffs)
12: ActionIn = ChooseInAction(ProbInT, ProbInP )
13: ActionOut = ChooseOutAction(ProbOutT, ProbOutP )
14: V oteBestBehaviour(ActionIn,ActionOut)
Algorithm 12 VoteBestbehaviour(Action)
1: for i = 1 to sizeCoalition() do
2: if Action == T then
3: V otesT + +
4: else if Action == P then
5: V otesP + +
6: if V otesT > V otesP then
7: ActionCoalition = T
8: else
9: ActionCoalition = P
When agents are in a coalition, they must agree on the behaviour to play with
the other agents in the coalition (insiders) and with agents outside the coalition
(outsiders). In our approach, we consider that coalitions are flat, i.e., there are no
leaders, nor central authority imposing any policy, unlike in [33, 122]. To decide the
coalition behaviour, each agent votes for a strategy (P or T) to play with insiders
and for a strategy to play with outsiders (line 14, Algorithm 11).
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To decide its vote, each agent uses a Learning Automata (LA) algorithm [83]
that is trained from its trading history experience and payoffs. The LA algorithm
keeps two probability models, one to assess the strategy to play against insiders
([ProbInT, ProbInP ]) and another to assess the strategy to play against outsiders
([ProbOutT, ProbOutP ]). Specifically, each agent uses Eq. 4.1 to reinforce the action
with which the agent has obtained a higher payoff in the past:
pi,t+1 = pi,t + α(1− pi,t)
∀j 6=i : pj,t+1 = pj,t(1− α)
(4.1)
In these equations, pi,t+1 is the probability that an agent performs a concrete
action i, and α ∈ [0, 1] is a (small) learning factor. The first rule is used to reinforce
the action i chosen if it performed better than its alternatives in the considered
state. At the same time, we apply the second rule to the other actions, decreasing its
probability. In the next round, the agent chooses its new strategy using the updated
probabilities. For instance, if the agent has obtained more gains in the past by playing
action T against insiders (members of the coalition), then the probability of behaving
as T with insiders is higher than behaving as P, and the same for playing against
outsiders (out of the coalition). Using the corresponding probability model, each
agent decides the action it wants to propose (line 14-15, ActionIn and ActionOut).
Once each agent has calculated its strategy (ActionIn and ActionOut), all the
members of a coalition vote to decide the coalition strategy with insiders and outsiders
(line 16, Algorithm 11). The voting is carried out using a voting protocol in which
agents pass the vote, so there is no need of a central entity. Moreover, contrary to the
case of having a leader, where agents belonging to a coalition may pay taxes to the
leader [33, 122], all the payoff within the coalition is equally and fairly shared among
all coalition members. We choose a simple approach for the payoff distribution, since
it is out of the scope of this paper to study other more complex approaches. However,
there are several fair division techniques in social choice that are worth exploring, as
in [29, 40, 111].
4.2.1.3 Rewiring mechanism
In most real-world network interactions, relationships are not static, i.e., agents can
change the individuals with whom they interact. This capability is modeled introduc-
ing a rewiring mechanism. Introducing rewiring, agents can modify their neighbour-
hood whenever they are not satisfied with the outcome they receive from their actual
neighbours. In the current work, we consider that only one link can be rewired by
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Algorithm 13 Rewiring(Payoffs)
1: Aw = WorstNeighbour()
2: if Independent() then
3: [ProbRewP, ProbRewT ] = UpdateLARewiring(Payoffs)
4: Ac = FindNewAgentToRewire(ProbRewP, ProbRewT )
5: else
6: Ac = BestNeighbourWithinCoalition()
7: if ShouldIRewire() then
8: if Ac 6= ∅ AND AcceptsRewiring(Ac) then
9: LeaveWorstNeighbour(Aw)
10: RewireTo(Ac)
each agent at each iteration, although each agent can have several neighbours. We do
not consider the all-or-nothing rewiring, where an agent adopts a new neighbourhood,
since that extreme rewiring is not realistic in most scenarios [58].
We have two rewiring strategies, depending on whether the agent is independent
or belongs to a coalition:
1. Independent agents
Independent agents use a Learning Automata to learn which type of agent
it is the best to rewire and the kind of agents must be refused for rewiring.
Analogously to the coalition strategy, each agent keeps track of its history and
revises the decision depending on its experience and payoffs. The LA stores
a probability model [ProbRewP, ProbRewT ] which represents the probability
to rewire to a possessor or to a trader. Specifically, the probability model is
updated (line 3, Algorithm 13) using Eq.4.1, reinforcing to rewire to the type of
agents that has provided more gain in the past. Once every independent agent
has updated the probability vector, it looks for a candidate agent to rewire
fitting the current probability model (Ac, line 4, Algorithm 13). Since there are
two types of agents (P or T), the selected candidate is randomly selected within
all the population of the estimated best type (P or T).
However, it can happen that there is not a candidate, or the selected agent Ac
refuses the agent that wants to add a link with it, if it does not belong to the
type of agents that they learn that they want to rewire. Finally, note that since
the number of links in the network must remain constant (we do it as in [58]), if
the rewiring succeeds, the agent must leave the neighbour with the worst payoff
in the last round (line 10, Algorithm 13).
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2. Coalition agents
A coalition agent may rewire to the neighbour’s best neighbour. This greedy
approach takes advantage of the qualified information that coalition agents may
obtain from their peers. Moreover, by allowing to rewire to agents that may
not belong to the coalition, we provide more flexibility for coalition formation
and agent interaction. To rewire, a coalition agent asks all its coalition peers
for the neighbour that provided the biggest payoff in the last round (line 6,
Algorithm 13). Then, the agent rewires to the best neighbours’ neighbour (Ac)
and leaves the peer that provided it the worst payoff (Aw).
4.2.2 Experiments
The aim of this section is to empirically analyse the cooperation mechanism for the
resource trading environment introduced in Section 4.2.1. First experiments focus on
analysing the contribution of the coalition and rewiring mechanisms to increase the
payoffs of the agents. Specifically, each proposed mechanism is compared with the
complete coalition+rewiring proposal. Moreover, we compare our approach against
the mechanism described in [122]. We will also focus our attention on the dynamics
of coalition formation and on the influence of rewiring in the coalition formation
process. To evaluate the resilience of our approach, we will also report experiments
on the presence of free-riders (agents that, despite belonging to a coalition, do not
follow its agreements).
Hence, first in Section 4.2.2.2 we start by comparing four cooperation mechanisms,
namely:
• Base. Agents employ the Iterated Possessor-Trader (IPT) as their interaction
mechanism.
• Rewiring-only. Agents interact by means of the IPT, but they also use rewiring
to change their neighbourhoods.
• Coalition-only. Agents interact by means of IPT, but they also use coalition
decisions to either form, join or leave coalitions.
• Coalition-plus-rewiring. Agents interact by means of IPT, but they also use
coalition decisions and rewiring.
Our purpose is to show the benefits in terms of payoff increase that agents derive
when using the coalition plus rewiring mechanism with respect to the other three
cooperation mechanisms.
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Next, in Section 4.2.2.3 we analyse the dynamics of the coalition formation mecha-
nism described in Section 4.2.1 when paired with rewiring. We study how the coalition
formation mechanism partitions the agent population into coalition agents (those be-
longing to some coalition) and independent agents. Our purpose is to quantify the
effectiveness of our coalition formation mechanism in helping agents to form coalitions.
Furthermore, we also analyse the effect of adding rewiring to our coalition formation
cooperation mechanism. More precisely, we observe how rewiring influences the coali-
tion formation process by observing the number and sizes of the coalitions formed by
agents.
Then, in Section 4.2.2.4 we focus on the coalition-plus-rewiring mechanism iden-
tified as the one leading to higher gains by our first experiment. Then, we explain
the evolutionary behaviour of agents within coalitions: (i) to understand how they
strategically behave with other agents inside and outside their coalitions; and (ii) to
understand their rewiring behaviour. The purpose of this analysis is to observe how
agents learn to be more cooperative.
In Sect. 4.2.2.5 we analyse the effect of varying our payoff matrix while maintaining
the constraints that payoff values must satisfy. Our purpose is to show that our
results do not depend on the specific parameters we have chosen for the represented
experiments.
In Sect. 4.2.2.6, we study the influence of rewiring in the coalition formation
process. We do this since rewiring and coalition formation are closely related, and,
as we will show in our experiments, rewiring has a non-trivial effect on coalition
formation.
Finally, in Sect. 4.2.2.7 we summarize the main results of the presented experi-
ments.
4.2.2.1 Empirical settings
Our empirical evaluation is based on a discrete-event simulation of a population of
agents interacting with one another on a network. Each agent is placed in a node of
the network and two agents cannot be placed at the very same node. Interactions
only occur between a pair of agents whenever they are connected by a link of the
network.
At the outset of a simulation, agents in the agent population are endowed with
one of the cooperation mechanisms listed at the beginning of Section 4.2.2. A simu-
lation consists of a sequence of simulation steps. At each simulation step, each agent
will be able to interact with its neighbouring agents playing the game described in
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Section 4.2.1 (either as part of a coalition or as an independent agent). Furthermore,
depending on the cooperation mechanism deployed on the agent population, each
agent will be allowed to form coalitions, join coalitions, leave coalitions, and rewire to
other agents. As a simulation proceeds, each agent accumulates payoffs as a result of
the games played with its neighbouring agents. We shall consider that a simulation
has converged when the number of coalitions formed by the agent population remains
stable after twenty simulation steps.
For each of the experiments reported below, we ran ten simulations till conver-
gence. The reported results correspond to averaging the values observed during these
simulations unless indicated otherwise. Moreover, we show the variances of average
values.
Agent population
Unless stated otherwise, for each experiment we generate an agent population com-
posed of 400 agents. The IPD game matrix employed by all agents in the population
is set as follows: Te = 2.5, Re = 1.25, Pu = 0.25, and Su = 0. Each agent’s initial
strategy to play in a game is chosen at random so that there is a 0.5 probability that
each agent is initially either a trader (T) or a possessor (P). Moreover, an agent’s
initial strategy is the one played by its when it becomes independent. The trading
values required by traders (v and V ) are sampled from a uniform distribution U [0, 5].
We set h = 1.
Recall from Section 4.2.1 that possessors and traders behave differently depending
on whether they own resources or not. Thus we will generate agent populations with
varying distributions of resources: from 10% up to 90% of the agents in a population
owning resources. We will be particularly interested in investigating three types of
cooperation scenarios, which depend on the following distributions of resources in the
population:
• Scarcity of resources. A small fraction of the agent population (10%) own
resources.
• Balanced resources. Half of the agents in an agent population (50%) own re-
sources.
• Plentiful resources. There is plenty of agents owning resources in the agent
population (90%).
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Finally, the learning factors used by all agents employing coalition strategies and
rewiring strategies, αcoalition and αrewire respectively, are both set to 0.1.
Network topology
We have chosen two types of network topologies: small-world and scale-free. Both
small-world and scale-free networks provide realistic models of the topological features
found in many nature, social, and technological networks [105, 119, 149].
On the one hand, small-world networks model real world complex systems such
as neural networks, food webs, scientific-collaboration networks, and computer net-
works [80]. These networks are characterised by the small-world phenomenon, in
which nodes have small neighbourhoods, and yet it is possible to reach any other
node in a small number of hops. This type of networks is highly-clustered, namely
they have a high clustering coefficient. Recall that the clustering coefficient is a mea-
sure of degree to which nodes in a graph tend to cluster together. Thus, small-world
networks tend to contain cliques, and near-cliques, meaning sub-networks that have
connections between almost any pair of nodes within them. Formally, we note a
small-world network as W k;pN , where N is the number of nodes, k stands for the aver-
age connectivity (the average size of a node’s neighbourhood), and p is the rewiring
probability. In this experiments we employed the Watts & Strogatz model [149] to
generate small-world networks with the following settings: N = 400, k = 5, and
p = 0.1.
On the other hand, scale-free networks model real-world networks like the world-
wide web [3], the Internet, and some biological networks [94]. These networks are
characterized by having a few nodes acting as highly-connected hubs, while the rest of
them have a low connectivity degree. Unlike small-worl networks, scale-free networks
are low-clustered networks. Formally we note a scale-free network as Sk;−γN , where
N is the number of nodes, and the probability that a node in the network connects
with k other nodes is roughly proportional to k−γ, namely P (k) ∼ k−γ. In this
experiments, we employed the Barabasi-Albert algorithm [119] to generate scale-free
networks with the following settings: N = 400, k = 5, and γ = 2.
4.2.2.2 Evaluating cooperation mechanisms
Next we compare the coalition-plus-rewiring mechanism with the base, rewiring-only,
and coalition-only mechanisms. Our aim is to quantify the benefits in terms of pay-
off that agents obtain when employing the coalition-plus-rewiring mechanism. We
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(b) Scale-free network.
Figure 4.1: Comparison of gains obtained by all cooperation mechanisms (with prew =
0.4).
measure such benefits depending on the distribution of resources in the agent popu-
lations that we simulate. More precisely, we assess the benefit of a given cooperation
mechanism as the percentage of payoff that it obtains with respect to the maximum
payoff that it could obtain. We obtain the maximum payoff from the simulation run
with the maximum average payoff out of all the simulation runs performed for the
four cooperation mechanisms.
Figure 4.1 shows the percentage of payoff gain obtained by the four cooperation
mechanisms over different network topologies, and depending on availability of re-
sources. Overall, all cooperation mechanisms lead to higher payoffs as more resources
are available, namely the higher the availability of resources, the larger the profit
obtained by cooperating. However, the slope of rewiring-only, coalition-only, and
coalition-plus-rewiring is larger than the slope of base. This indicates that the in-
crease of payoff with the availability of resources is larger when either using rewiring
or coalitions or both. As we will discuss further in Section 4.2.2.4, as more resources
are available, there are more opportunities to trade, and hence trading emerges as
the preferred strategy. Moreover, independently of the topology, the coaliton-plus-
rewiring mechanism leads to the higher payoffs. However, the amount of profit that
coaliton-plus-rewiring delivers does differ depending on the network topology. As
to small-world (see Figure 4.1a), observe that using coaliton-plus-rewiring leads to
up to 30% more payoff than the base mechanism over a small-world network (see
Figure 4.1a) and up to 25% over a scale-free network (see Figure 4.1b).
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of our mechanism with other previous approach that uses
leaders (scale-free network and prew = 0.4)).
So far we have compared our coalition-plus-rewirng mechanism against the simpler
cooperation mechanisms described at the beginning of Section 4.2.2. Next, we com-
pare our approach against the mechanism described in [122]. In [122] Salazar et al.
introduce a dynamic coalition formation mechanism aimed at emerging cooperation.
Unlike our approach, the mechanism in [122] relies on leaders that impose the be-
haviour of the coalitions and charge taxes to coalition members. Figure 4.2 shows the
percentage of gain of our mechanism (labelled Without leaders in the figure) against
the leader-based mechanism in [122] (labelled With leaders in the figure) as resource
availability increases. We observe that our mechanism outperforms the leader-based
mechanism. The larger the resource availability, the larger the percentage of gains of
our mechanism with respect to the leader-based one. There are two main reasons that
explain why our mechanism outperforms the leader-based one. First, agents using our
mechanism do not pay taxes to any leader, thus all gains are shared among coalition
members. Second, recall that leaders impose coalitions’ behaviours. In doing so, a
leader disregard valuable, local information that might potentially benefit all coalition
members, not only the leader. Unlike the leader-based approach, our mechanism lets
agents learn their best coalition strategies from their own experience. Hence, agents
can exploit such information to reach a consensus and decide the overall behaviour
of their coalitions.
Next we focus on the coaliton-plus-rewiring mechanism to assess the effect of us-
ing rewiring on the payoff gain obtained. Figure 4.3 shows the percentage of payoff
gain obtained depending on the rewiring probability employed by agents (prew) and
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depending on the availability of resources (scarcity, balance, plentiful). Notice that
the results when there is no rewiring (prew = 0) correspond to using the coalition-only
mechanism. Recall that the use of rewiring is intended to help an agent increase
its payoffs by disconnecting from neighbours that have demonstrated not to deliver
good payoffs in the past and connecting to other agents that may potentially deliver
better payoffs in the future. We observe that indeed rewiring leads to increase gains
independently of the topology, and that by introducing small rewiring (prew = 0.1)
the gains are already highly increased (20% with plentiful resources). Moreover, this
payoff gain does depend on the distribution of resources: the larger the number of re-
sources, the larger the payoff gain. We observe for both topologies that total rewiring
(prew = 1) represents a extreme case depending on the distribution of resources. Thus,
using total rewiring (continuously changing neighbours) has a rather negative effect
when there is either plentiful or balanced resources. However, although total rewiring
is worse in terms of payoff gain than lower rewiring probabilities, it is still better than
no rewiring at all. Notice that agents benefit from total rewiring when there is low
resources in both topologies. This is because the fact that agents continuously change
neighbours help them to find agents eager to trade in a scenario where resources are
scant. Finally, we noticed here that in Rand et al. [118] experiments the authors find
that the network structure has influence provided the dynamism is at least 30%. In
our case, we have seen that a small amount of rewiring leads to cooperative outcome.
However, we have to consider that we use different techniques and that we allow
agents to join into coalitions.
Finally, we are also interested in studying the sensitivity of our mechanism to
free riders (agents that, despite belonging to a coalition, do not follow its rules).
Figure 4.4 shows the percentage of gain obtained when using our mechanism without
free riders compared to the percentage of gain obtained as the percentage of free riders
increases. Observe that as the percentage of free riders increases, the percentage of
gain decreases. The gain loss ranges from ∼ 14% to ∼ 33%. Thus, free riders to
affect our mechanism. However, notice that the gain loss is not dramatic. This is
because our mechanism manages to isolate a free rider within a coalition because
its members realise that the free rider is selfishly looking for benefitting from the
coalition. Thus, the free rider ends up not belonging to the coalition. However, since
we assume anonymity (agents are not identified with ids), after an agent is expelled
from a coalition, she is free to join another one because this new coalition knows
nothing about the agent’s past. Hence, future work should aim at extending our
mechanism to cope with anonymous free-riders.
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(a) Small-world network.
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Figure 4.3: Coalition-plus-rewiring mechanism. Percentage of payoff gain per agent
when varying the rewiring probability of agents and depending on the availability of
resources (scarcity, balance, plentiful).
4.2.2.3 Analyzing coalition formation dynamics
As we have shown in the previous section, grouping agents into coalitions and rewiring
improves their payoff gains. Hereafter we analyse how the coalition formation mecha-
nism, described in Section 4.2.1, partitions the agent population into coalitions agents
and independent agents. We pursue to measure the effectiveness of our coalition for-
mation mechanism in helping agents to form coalitions. Moreover, we analyse how
rewiring influences the coalition formation process by observing the features present
in the coalitions that emerge.
According to our model in Section 4.2.1, agents can decide either to stay indepen-
dent or join a coalition. Figure 4.5a and Figure 4.5b show the percentage of agents
belonging to coalitions depending on the distribution of resources on small-world and
scale-free topologies. Since agents employ no rewiring, both cases correspond to us-
ing the coalition-only cooperation mechanism. Observe that the results are slightly
affected by the amount of resources in the agent population. On the one hand,
around 90% of the agents in the population become coalition agents on small-world
networks, whereas around 85% of the agents become coalition agents on scale-free
networks. Figure 4.5c and Figure 4.5d show the percentage of coalition agents when
using rewiring. For both topologies, the use of rewiring leads to a 5 − 10% increase
in the percentage of coalition agents. Thus, the percentage of coalition agents comes
close to 95% on small-world networks and close to 95− 100% on scale-free networks.
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Figure 4.4: Gains obtained by our mechanism when the agent population contains
free riders and when it does not (scale-free network, prew = 0.4 and plentiful resources
(90%)).
Notice though that the percentage of coalition agents decreases with total rewiring
(prew = 1). Thus, total rewiring has a detrimental effect on the coalition formation
process, since when agents constantly change their neighbours, rewiring acts as noise.
Moreover, we have observed, that these individual agents are ostracized. Since they
do not show a cooperative behaviour, other agents rewire to other agents, isolating
them. This is in line with the results of Fu et al. [54], where they show that isolated
individuals are often defectors.
Now we turn our attention to analyzing how our coalition formation mecha-
nism partitions the agent population into different coalitions. Figure 4.6a shows the
number of coalitions as the percentage of resources in the population varies for the
coalition-only and coalition-plus-rewiring cooperation mechanisms. Observe that al-
lowing agents to rewire leads to significantly reduce the number of coalitions that are
created by means of coalition-only. In fact, coalition-plus-rewiring leads to less than
a half of the coalitions created by means of coalition-only. Therefore, using rewiring
has a compacting effect on the coalition formation process: less and bigger coalitions.
Since agents within the same coalition cooperate, having less and bigger coalitions
is bound to yield significant payoff benefits. This is confirmed by Figure 4.7, which
shows the percentage of payoff gain that agents obtain when employing coalition-plus-
rewiring versus employing coalition-only. We observe that the benefits are larger as
the percentage of resources in the agent population is higher, thus our approach takes
advantage of the availability of resources to increase the benefits of the agents..
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(a) Small-world network, no rewiring.
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(b) Scale-free network, no rewiring.
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(c) Small-world network, plentiful resources
(90%).
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(d) Scale-free network, plentiful resources (90%).
Figure 4.5: Independent versus coalition agents.
In general, as shown by Figure 4.6b, the larger the rewiring probability, the lower
the number of coalitions. Notice also that when there are abundant resources (90%),
the number of coalitions reaches its minimum. This occurs because, in general, the
larger the number of resources, the larger the number of possessors behaving as de-
fectors, and hence agents learn to group into bigger coalitions to avoid defection.
So far we have shown that the number of coalitions decreases as the rewiring prob-
ability employed by agents increases. Hereafter we show that the size of the coalitions
formed increases with rewiring. Figure 4.8 displays several histograms representing
the number of coalitions that are formed per coalition size as the rewiring probabil-
ity increases for both scale-free and small-world networks. Figures 4.8a, 4.8b, and
4.8c show how the size of coalitions formed by agents increases as rewiring increases.
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Figure 4.6: Number of coalitions.
Thus, in Figure 4.8a, there are 45 coalitions with 2 or less than 2 agents, being 22
the maximum coalition size. In Figure 4.8b there are 15 coalitions with less than
10 agents, and the maximum coalition size goes up to 80. Finally, in Figure 4.8c, a
big coalition composed of more than 250 agents is formed, while the rest of agents
spread into coalitions with less than 50 agents (e.g., there are 92-agent coalitions).
Rewiring leads to this increase in coalition sizes. Since agents are allowed to change
their neighbours, they can choose to wire to agents that provide more benefits and
to join bigger coalitions to be more efficient against non-cooperative behaviours. To-
gether, the decrease in the number of coalitions, and the increase in their size, results
in higher payoffs for agents. Notice that we observe the same effect of rewiring on
small-world networks, as shown by Figures 4.8d, 4.8e, and 4.8f.
4.2.2.4 Analysing agents’ behaviours
Finally, we focus on the individual behaviour of agents employing the coalition-plus-
rewiring mechanism. We dissect the individual behaviour of agents: (i) to understand
how they strategically behave with other agents inside and outside coalitions; and (ii)
to understand their rewiring behaviour. Our aim is to learn how agents’ individual
behaviours lead to cooperation.
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(a) Small-world, medium rewiring probability
(prew = 0.4).
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Figure 4.7: Average payoff gain per coalition.
Coalition behaviour
Recall from Section 4.2.1.2 that agents within a coalition vote to decide the coalition
behaviour to play both against insiders (coalition members) and outsiders (agents
out of the coalition). Such decisions depend on what agents learnt in the past, i.e.,
on the actions that yield more payoffs. Note that agents choose the action with the
highest number of votes. In case of draw, they randomly choose one of the tied
actions. Therefore, consensus is always guaranteed. Next we study which actions
agents choose to improve their payoffs.
Figures 4.9a and 4.9b show the percentage of coalition agents per strategy (pos-
sessor or trader) for both small-world and scale-free topologies as the distribution of
resources varies. As resource availability increases, coalition agents’ behaviours both
against outsiders and insiders (coalition mates) varies. Thus, along the line of [55],
we are interested in the conditions under which preferential in-coalition cooperation
emerges. Moreover, we are also concerned with assessing when behaving cooperatively
with outsiders of a coalition might be beneficial.
We consider first the small-world topology. In Figure 4.9a we clearly differentiate
three scenarios:
• Low cooperation. When there is less than 20% of resources, coalition agents
do not trade with outsiders, but mostly do it with insiders (around 75% of the
agents behave as traders with coalition-mates). Since there are few resources to
trade with, even behaving as possessors with coalition-mates eventually occurs.
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Nonetheless, coalition agents quickly learn that it is more beneficial to trade
with coalition mates. To summarise, the dominant strategy with outsiders
when the percentage of resources is very low is to be a possessor.
• No dominant strategy. When the percentage of resources is around 20%, there
is a transition in the behaviour of coalitions with outsiders. Thus, we observe
that half of coalitions behave as possessors with outsiders, while the other half
behave as traders. At this point there is no dominant strategy with outsiders.
• High cooperation. Beyond 20% of resources, coalition agents progressively be-
come more and more cooperative with outsiders. A medium or large availability
of resources allows agents to perform more trades, obtaining higher benefits by
cooperating in this way. However, notice that the percentage of traders with
insiders is larger than with outsiders, though the gap closes as the availability
of resources increases because the number of trades increases and also the de-
fective behaviour of outsiders. To summarise, trading becomes the dominant
strategy against outsiders.
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(c) Scale-free network, high rewiring (prew =
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Figure 4.8: Histogram for the size of coalitions created when employing the coalition-
plus-rewiring cooperation mechanism. The x-axis represents the size of coalitions,
and the y-axis represents the number of coalitions.
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(a) Small-world topology.
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(b) Scale-free topology.
Figure 4.9: Percentage of agents per strategy within coalitions.
Consider now the scale-free topology. We observe the very same scenarios de-
scribed above. However, there are slight differences. Firstly, in the low cooperation
scenario, the percentage of traders with outsiders is larger (hence the percentage of
possessors, is smaller). Secondly, once the transition between low and high coopera-
tion occurs (beyond 20% of resources), trading with outsiders very quickly becomes
the dominant strategy.
Rewiring behaviour
Recall that the rewiring strategy described in Section 4.2.1 allows agents to change
their neighbourhoods. Recall also from Section 4.2.2.2 that using rewiring together
with coalition formation, the so-called coalition-plus-rewiring cooperation mechanism,
helps agents to obtain higher payoffs than only using coalition formation (as shown
in Figure 4.1) .
First, we analyse the rewiring behaviour of coalition agents. Figure 4.10 shows the
distribution of links for coalition agents with coalition-mates and with outsiders for
both small-world and scale-free topologies. The rewiring behaviour radically differs
depending on the network topology.
On the one hand, regarding small-world networks, we observe that as the rewiring
probability increases, the number of links that agents establish with coalition-mates
increases. Thus, when the probability of rewiring is large (beyond 80%), coalition
agents establish more links with coalition-mates than with outsiders. This results
in fewer and bigger coalitions, as shown in Figure 4.8, which are loosely connected
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with outsiders. Therefore, cooperation increases and agents obtain larger payoffs, as
shown in Figure 4.3a1.
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(a) Small-world topology. Medium availability
of resources (50%).
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Figure 4.10: Percentage of links of coalition agents: with insiders (coalition-mates)
and with outsiders.
On the other hand, we do not observe the same behaviour on scale-free networks.
Indeed, as the rewiring probability increases, the number of links that agents establish
with coalition-mates increases too. However, the percentage of links with outsiders
remains significantly larger. To understand this differing behaviour, we further in-
vestigated how the topology of a scale-free network evolves. Figure 4.11 illustrates
the final topology of a network (depicted using Pajek [21]) that started as a scale-free
network upon convergence. The network contains 100 agents (to ease its display) with
high availability of resources (90%) and medium rewiring probability (prew = 0.4).
Two different types of coalitions are formed:
• Hub-centered coalitions. A coalition that is organised around a hub. This hub
is connected to a large number of agents. Each of these agents has in turn a
single link to the hub.
• Clique-like coalitions. These are coalitions whose agents share many links with
coalition-mates, thus showing a clique-like structure.
We observe that the number of hub-centered coalitions is larger than the num-
ber of clique-like coalitions. Therefore, this explains why the percentage of links
1Except when agents employ total rewiring, which has a detrimental effect, as discussed in
Section 4.2.2.2.
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Figure 4.11: Final topology of a scale-free network after agents deploy the coalition-
plus-rewiring mechanism.
with insiders is low compared to the percentage of links with outsiders, as shown in
Figure 4.10b.
Finally, we analyse how coalition agents establish links with outsiders. Figure 4.12
shows the percentage of links established by coalition agents with outsiders depending
on the outsiders’ cooperation behaviour in an environment with plentiful resources,
i.e., a highly defective environment in the presence of possessors. The figures show
how the percentage of links varies with the rewiring probability for both small-world
and scale-free topologies. In both networks, we observe that agents behaving as
traders with outsiders increase their number of links. The reason for this is that
agents want to have as neighbours the agents that provide the largest payoffs. With
this aim, an individual agent learns that rewiring to traders provides larger benefits,
while a coalition agent recommends to rewire to its neighbours’ traders (since these
provide its with the largest benefits). This increases the links of traders with outsiders
which, in turn, reinforces their trading strategy with outsiders since their gains are
expected to increase.
95
4. Dynamic coalition formation in dynamic topologies with resources
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Rewiring probability
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
o
f L
in
ks
Possessors' links
Traders' links
(a) Small-world network. High availability of
resources (90%).
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Rewiring probability
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
o
f L
in
ks Possessors' links
Traders' links
(b) Scale-free. High availability of resources
(90%).
Figure 4.12: Percentage of links of coalition agents with outsiders.
4.2.2.5 Discussion on the effects of varying payoffs
In the above-described experiments we have employed a payoff matrix based on the
one introduced in [155]. In this section we analyse the effect of varying our payoff
matrix while maintaining the constraints that payoff values must satisfy as stated in
Sect. 4.2.1.1. Overall, our empirical evaluation indicates that changing the payoff
matrix does not have a big influence in the final results (provided PD inequalities are
maintained).
First, we observed the effects of increasing the value of Pu until it becomes almost
same as Re. In this case, although the number of agents behaving as possessors with
insiders increases a 10%, trading prevails as the dominant strategy. Secondly, when
increasing the value of Re until it becomes almost the same as Te, there is an increase
of 20% of traders when resources are scarce. This result is coherent: when two traders
meet and they do not have a resource, they both cooperate, obtaining Re as payoff.
Finally, we have also investigated the effects of changing the value V . With this aim,
we doubled its initial value. This caused that the percentage of agents of each type
remains almost the same as in Figure 4.9. Nonetheless, we also observed that the
total gains of the population increase, being this increase higher when there are more
resources available.
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4.2.2.6 Effects of rewiring on coalition formation
As mentioned above, rewiring and coalition formation are closely related. Thus, we
next focus on analysing the effect of rewiring on coalition formation. Figure 4.13
illustrates the influence of rewiring on the the number of agents that change its
coalition (Coalition changes) versus the number of agents that change a link (Rewiring
changes) for different rewiring probabilities.
Figure4.13a shows the percentage of coalition changes and of rewiring changes
along three different simulations corresponding to different rewiring probabilities (low,
medium, and high, namely prew ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6}). As the probability of rewiring
increases, not only the number of partner changes (rewirings) increases, but also the
number of coalition changes. This is because the increase of rewiring leads to higher
coalition instability. Thus, although an agent can be stable in a coalition, after
rewiring she may discover a better coalition or become isolated from the coalition she
belonged to. Furthermore, we observe that the gap between the number of rewiring
changes and coalition changes also increases with the rewiring probability. That is, as
we increase the probability of rewiring, the number of partner changes proportionally
increases. However, coalition instability is lower than rewiring changes.
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Figure 4.13: Influence of rewiring on coalition formation
Figure 4.13b shows the effect of varying the value of the probability of rewiring
during a simulation. At the outset of the simulation, we set the probability of rewiring
to a large value (prew = 0.8). After 50 simulation ticks, we set the probability of
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rewiring to 1/3 of its initial value. Thereafter the number of rewiring and coalition
changes drop until we turn up again the the probability of rewiring: we set it to
2/3 of its initial value when reaching 100 simulation ticks. We may observe that
both coalition and rewiring changes increase again. After 150 simulation ticks we set
back again the probability of rewiring to 1/3 of its initial value. Finally, after 200
simulation ticks, we set the probability of rewiring to its initial value. Experiments
reported show that the number of coalition and rewiring changes increases again to
reach similar percentages to the ones at the beginning of the simulation.
4.2.2.7 Summary
In this section we summarize the main results of the presented experiments. Unless
otherwise stated, the results are the ones when using our mechanism coalition-plus-
rewiring.
1. Analysis of agents’ gains.
• Comparison of coalition-plus-rewiring with alternative mechanisms (base,
rewiring-only, coalition-only). Overall, there is an increase of benefits with
increase of resources. Moreover, our mechanism coalition-plus-rewiring
leads to higher payoffs than the others.
• Comparison of coalition-plus-rewiring with a leader-based mechanism. Our
mechanism outperforms the leader-based mechanism in terms of agents’
gains. The larger the resource availability, the larger the percentage of
gains of our mechanism with respect to the leader-based one.
• Effects of rewiring. Rewiring leads to increase gains independently of the
topology when using coalition-plus-rewiring. In fact, introducing a small
rewiring (prew= 0.1) highly increases the gains already.
• Sensitivity of coalition-plus-rewiring to free riders. As the percentage of
free riders increases, the percentage of gain decreases, ranging the loss
between 14% and 33%.
2. Analysis of the effects of rewiring on coalition formation.
• Independent and coalition agents. Using coalition-only (without rewiring),
around 90% of agents are in a coalition. Using our mechanism coalition-
plus-rewiring leads to a 5-10% increase in the percentage of coalition
agents. Total rewiring (prew = 1) has a detrimental effect on the coalition
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formation process because rewiring becomes noise when agents constantly
change their neighbors.
• Effects of rewiring over coalitions. Using our mechanism coalitions-plus-
rewiring leads to significantly reduce the number of coalitions that are
created when compared to coalitions-only, in fact to less than half. Thus,
the larger the rewiring probability, the lower the number of coalitions.
Moreover, rewiring also leads to an increase in coalition sizes. Together, the
decrease in the number of coalitions, and the increase in their size, results
in higher payoffs for agents. Therefore, using rewiring has a compacting
effect on the coalition formation process: less and bigger coalitions.
• Effects of rewiring on coalition formation. As the probability of rewiring
increases, not only the number of partner changes (rewirings) increases,
but also the number of coalition changes. Moreover, as we increase the
probability of rewiring, the number of partner changes proportionally in-
creases. However, coalition instability is lower than rewiring changes.
3. Analysis of coalition agents’ behavior.
• Trading strategies. As resource availability increases, coalition agents be-
haviors both against outsiders and insiders (coalition mates) varies. We
have observed three scenarios: low cooperation (less than 20% of resources),
where coalition agents do not trade with outsiders, but mostly do it with
insiders (around 75% of the agents behave as traders with coalition-mates);
no dominant strategy (percentage of resources is around 20%), where half
of coalitions behave as possessors with outsiders, while the other half be-
have as traders; and high cooperation (beyond 20% of resources), where
trading becomes the dominant strategy against outsiders.
• Rewiring behavior. As the rewiring probability increases, the number of
links that agents establish with coalition-mates increases. Moreover, agents
behaving as traders with outsiders increase their number of links.
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4.3 Exploring indirect reciprocity in complex net-
works using dynamic coalitions and rewiring
In previous section, we have seen that the use of both coalitions and rewiring indeed
improves cooperation. We presented decision-making mechanisms both for agents
and coalitions in a scenario where agents own resources with which they can trade.
Thus agents increased their gains by trading, avoiding that agents have resources they
do not use, which results in loses for the whole population. We have used learning
in our decision making mechanisms in order to allow agents to learn how to interact
with others from their past experiences.
However, instead of agents learning how to behave from their past experiences, we
consider that reputation may also be useful in order to asses the risk of interacting
with other agents, as well as deciding which is the best strategy. Moreover, we can
also think about agents owning resources with which they do not trade, but they
donate them. This may be modeled with the donation game [99], in which an agent
has to decide whether to donate or not to another, i.e., there is unidirectional trading.
It is generally known that cooperation can be achieved in complex real-world inter-
actions that are not limited to direct interactions only [98]. In particular, cooperation
can consider prior interactions with other players, i.e., indirect reciprocity. In a highly
simplified example, the donation game is used to show how the mechanism of indirect
reciprocity operates using players’ reputation to promote cooperation [99]. Indirect
reciprocity has been used by players that compare reputation of potential recipients
and cooperate only when the recipient has the same or higher reputation than the
donor’s strategy. It can be shown that a population of such players can evolve cooper-
ative plays through discriminators that can distinguish players with high reputation
(those that have cooperated with other players in past interactions) and cooperate
only with such players [99]. Other studies have applied the mechanism of indirect
reciprocity in complex interactions where cooperative plays are difficult to evolve.
Chong et al. [41] have shown that the mechanism of indirect reciprocity through
repeated interactions is less effective in promoting cooperation for interactions with
higher number of alternative choices and shorter encounter (e.g., lower number of
rounds in a repeated game). However, strategies can evolve to use reputation as a
mechanism to estimate behaviors of future partners and to elicit cooperation right
from the start of interactions. Cooperation occurs when strategies evolve to maintain
high reputation scores.
In this section we present a mechanism to improve cooperation among self-interested
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agents placed in a complex network, but where agents play the donation game with
any other members of the population. Our mechanism is based on three main pil-
lars: (i) indirect reciprocity, (ii) coalitions; and (iii) rewiring. Our coalition formation
mechanism differs from previous approaches since agents in a coalition do not agree
to control or behave in a certain way neither with agents inside the coalition, nor with
agents outside of it. Instead, coalitions are groups of agents that share information
regarding reputation that might result beneficial for them. This is why we propose to
use a coalition reputation measurement to decide to which coalition to join. Concern-
ing the dynamics of agent behavior, and as our agents are placed in a social network,
they may imitate their neighbors’ strategies, if they seem successful in terms of payoff.
Finally, to improve cooperation even further, we include a rewiring mechanism that
uses the reputation of the neighbors to change their social links (i.e., rewire). In our
experiments we determine that cooperation is improved when we include our coalition
and rewiring mechanism. Moreover, we analyze how topology influences cooperation
in this scenario.
The rest of the section is organized as follows. First, in Sect. 4.3.1 we explain the
basic donation game model that we consider in our framework. Then, in Sect. 4.3.2
we extend such model using coalitions and partner switching (rewiring). Finally, in
Sect. 4.3.3 we describe the simulation results obtained from our framework.
4.3.1 Donation game rules
Our donation game is based in the classic donation game published by Nowak and
Sigmund [99] involving image scoring strategies which are a measure of reputation.
As described in their paper, the game is composed of several rounds where N agents
play the donation game. In each round, a small set of m donor-recipient pairs are
chosen. Therefore, the chance that a given player meets the same player again is
negligibly small. Thus, direct reciprocity cannot work here.
From each each pair of agents, one is selected as the donor, and the other one as
the recipient. Every agent i has a strategy represented by the integer ki ∈ [−5, 6] and
an image score (reputation) given si ∈ [−5, 5] that depends on its behavior in the
past. The donor i has to decide, depending on its strategy (ki), and its the opponent
j score (sj), if it cooperates (donates) with the other agent. If ki ≤ sj, then agent i
donates a benefit b to agent j at a cost c to itself, and increases its image score (si)
by 1. Otherwise (i.e., ki > sj), no donation or cost are involved (both obtain zero
payoff) but the image score of the donor (si) is decremented by 1. Note that the
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image score of the recipient does not change in any case.
Hence, strategies with k ≤ 0 are termed cooperative, because individuals with
these strategies cooperate with individuals that have not had an interaction. Then,
we can observe two extreme game-playing strategies, i.e., the strategy with ki = −5
represents cooperation regardless other agent’s score, while the strategy ki = 6 repre-
sents defection in all cases. Other strategies represent various degree of discriminating
play, e.g., ki ∈ [−4, 0] are discriminators that lean towards cooperation [99].
In our case, after finishing a round, agents imitate the best strategies in their
neighborhood, while in [99] agents reproduce themselves, to produce a new popula-
tion, depending on their obtained payoff. Note that that in both cases, depending on
the value of m and the random selection, it may happen that there are differences in
the amount of times that different agents have played the donation game in a round.
However, what is relevant is the evolution of the whole game, and not what happens
to a particular agent.
4.3.2 Model description
We consider a population of N agents where any agent can interact with any other
agent (i.e., panmictic interaction) to play the donation game (see Sect. 4.3.1). How-
ever, agents are connected in a complex network, having each of them a set of peers
that constitute their neighborhood. We want to model real world interactions over so-
cial networks, so agents’ neighbors are their close related contacts from which agents
obtain information. However, in real world, apart from having a set of direct con-
tacts, people usually belong to several clubs, associations, organizations, or groups
in general. We model this second set of contacts with the notion of coalitions, as a
way that agents may share some information about the environment where they play.
Thus if an agent agrees to become a member of a coalition, it also agrees to share
information with the rest of the coalition members. This information sharing helps
agents while interacting with the whole population in the panmictic game.
In Algorithm 14 we present the basic game behavior, that will be explained detail
in the following sections. As a short description, we can see how pairs of agents (line
3) play the donation game during a round (set of encounters), and that any agent
has to decide:
• Its action (to donate or not) depending on its own strategy, and the other’s
image score (line 4). This influences its payoff and image score (line 5).
• To keep independent or join a coalition, and if joining, to which one (line 7).
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• Deciding its new strategy for the next round (line 8).
• Changing their neighbors, depending on the image score of the neighborhood
(line 9).
• Finally, the payoff and image score are reset for the next round (line 10).
Algorithm 14 Game Behavior
1: function PlayRound(m ≤ N)
2: for m times do
3: (ai, aj) = FindP layers(i, j ∈ [1, N ]; i 6= j)
4: ai.DecideAction(si, kj)
5: ai.ChangePayoffScore()
6: for all ai do
7: ai.ChangeCoalition()
8: ai.ChangeStrategy()
9: ai.Neighborhood = Rewire()
10: ai.ResetPayoffScore()
4.3.2.1 Reputation sharing
In order to decide their strategy, and to maximize their payoff, agents need to know
their opponents’ image score. This is a challenging issue, since each of the agents
can play with any other in the population. In Nowak’s model [99], they use two
approaches to solve this problem. First, they consider that image score is public, and
that all agents know the image score of any other agent in the population. Second,
the authors consider that there exist a small percentage of agents (neighbors) that
can observe a particular interaction; and only those agents, plus the recipient, update
the other agent’s image score. The first scenario is an idealistic one, while in the
second scenario, each agent has a different perception about the image score of the
others.
In this paper, we model reputation sharing in a different manner. Each agent has
a set of neighbors, and this neighborhood represents the direct contacts (friends or
mates) that an individual has. We assume that each agent knows the image score of
its neighbors. At the same time, we assume that an agent may belong to coalitions,
that models groups of interest, or organizations, that shares reputation information
among its members. Therefore it models a global exchange of information biased by
the different coalitions.
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Thus, differing to [99] and as in [53], in our model agents are connected to others
in a complex network, where each of the agents has a neighborhood. However, as
in [99] and differing to [53], each agent may interact with any other agent of the
population. We do not consider agents playing only in their neighborhood, since then
agents could have a direct reputation from its neighbors. Therefore, as each player
may interact with any other in the population, direct reciprocity does not work, since
the chances of one player interacting again with the same player are negligibly small
[99].
4.3.2.2 Action selection
In previous sections we have presented the donation game and how reputation infor-
mation flows among the agents. Now, in Algorithm 15 we proceed to explain how a
donor acts in our model when it encounters with a recipient (line 4, Algorithm 14).
Once a random pair of agents ai and aj has been randomly selected to interact,
and their roles are defined, the donor (ai) checks if the recipient (aj) belongs either to
its neighbors or to its coalition mates (line 2, 15). If it belongs to any of those groups,
then we assume that the donor knows the score of the recipient. In the contrary case,
as it has no information, it assumes that the image score of aj is 0 (following [99]).
After this, the donor has to decide, depending on its strategy (ki), if it donates to the
recipient, providing a benefit b with a cost c to itself (line 7). This action increases its
image score (line 8). On the contrary, if ai does not donate, both individuals receive
zero pay-off, but the image score of the donor is decreased by one (lines 10 and 11).
Algorithm 15 Behavior of a donor ai
1: function ChangePayoffScore(ai, aj)
2: if ai.InCoaOrNeighbor(aj) then
3: sij = aj.GetScore()
4: else
5: sij = 0
6: if ki ≤ sij then
7: ai.Donate(aj, b, c)
8: ai.ChangeScore(+1)
9: else
10: ai.Donate(aj, 0, 0)
11: ai.ChangeScore(−1)
104
4. Dynamic coalition formation in dynamic topologies with resources
4.3.2.3 Coalition formation
In our approach, we allow agents to form coalitions in order to share reputation
information and therefore to improve cooperation. We consider that when an agent
joins a coalition, it agrees to share its image score with the rest of the coalition
members. We impose that any agent can only belong to a unique coalition at a
time, to avoid conflicts of interests. Moreover, agents belonging to a coalition are not
necessary neighbors.
Each coalition has an image score that depends on the average image score of its
members. Let Coaj represent the coalition j with coalition member agents indexed
by i. The size of the coalition |Coaj| gives the number of agents in the coalition. The
coalition score, CSj, is specified as follows:
CSj = ln|Coaj| ·
∑
i∈Coaj si
|Coaj| (4.2)
where si is the image score of member agent i. We include a scaling factor ln|Coaj| to
model that larger-sized coalitions have more influence to attract agents to join those
coalitions, as the amount of information they may share is bigger. At the same time,
if an agent joins a bigger coalition it will be known by the agents that in average
provide more frequent donations, so the benefits for him are double: donation in
encounters and better options to rewire.
In Algorithm 16 we present the rules for coalition dynamics, which we adapt from
other approach that considers direct interactions [32]. The decision to join a coalition
is based on simple rules, as in [12], which precludes modeling sophisticated agents
that can learn about the rules to form coalitions.
Algorithm 16 Rules for coalition formation and independence
1: function ChangeCoalition
2: Coai = GetCoalition(ai)
3: if ((Coai 6= ∅) & ai.Isolated(Neighbors, Coai)) then
4: ai.GetIndependence()
5: else if WorstPayoff(Neighbors, Pi) then
6: (sj, aj) = BestIndScore(IndepNeighbors)
7: (CSj, Coaj) = BestCoaScore(CoaNeighbors)
8: if CSj ≥ sj then
9: JoinCoalition(Coaj)
10: else
11: CreateCoalition(ai, aj)
Firstly, if an agent that belongs to a coalition is isolated from its coalition mates,
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i.e., none of its neighbors belongs to its coalition, then it becomes independent (line
4). We do this since we consider that each agent in a coalition must have at least one
connection to another coalition member to transmit/receive information. Otherwise,
it checks the payoff of its neighbors to see if its payoff Pi has been the worst in its
neighborhood (line 5). If this is the case, it searches among its neighbors the agent
or the coalition with the best reputation (sj and CSj, lines 6 and 7) to join them
depending on the value of CSj with respect to sj (lines 9 and 11, respectively).
4.3.2.4 Changing the strategy
At the beginning of the game, each agent is randomly assigned a strategy. However,
depending on the payoffs it is obtaining, it may change it in order to increase its
benefits. When agents are neighbors (directly connected in the network), we consider
that they know each other’s image score, as well as their payoff and their strategy
in the previous game. Thus we assume that agents have access to local information
about reputation, payoff and strategies from their direct contacts, which is reasonable.
With that information, an agent changes its strategy to copy the one with the highest
payoff in its neighborhood, if higher than its own payoff.
4.3.2.5 Rewiring
In most real-world network interactions, relationships are not static, i.e., agents can
change the individuals that they are linked to. We denote this change in the network
topology as rewiring. By using rewiring agents can modify their neighborhood if they
are not satisfied with their neighbors.
As a difference with [53], where one agent is randomly chosen to change its neigh-
bors, in our model, we specify a neighborhood measure of satisfaction to decide if an
agent wishes to change it or not. In Eq. 4.3 we define the probability of rewiring for
an agent i, which depends on the aggregate image score of all the neighbors, i.e., it
depends on the average neighborhood reputation.
pirew =
(10−
∑F
j=1(sj+5)
F
)
10
(4.3)
where sj is the image score of each of the neighbors of ai and F is the number
of neighbors (friends) that the agent ai has. Observe that sj ∈ [−5, 5], thus the
maximum difference between scores is 10. Once agent ai computes this probability,
then it samples a Bernoulli distribution to decide if rewiring or not (Algorithm 14,
line 9). If agent ai decides to rewire, then it leaves its neighbor with the lowest
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image score, and joins the one with the highest one in its coalition. The reason for
this is that, as we stated above, we consider that coalitions are communities that
share reputation information, so agents can benefit from it to change their neighbors.
We point out that this rewiring procedure only happens if the agent with the lowest
image score does not become isolated, i.e., we do not allow disconnected nodes in our
network.
4.3.3 Experiments
In this section, we present the performance of our mechanism, using the final strat-
egy selected by the agents, after the simulation has converged, as a measure of the
cooperation level achieved by the population. Firstly, in Sect. 4.3.3.1 we present the
empirical setting for our experiments. Secondly, in Sect. 4.3.3.2 we analyze how our
mechanism of coalitions and rewiring allows for the emergence of cooperation. Fi-
nally, in Sect. 4.3.3.3, we analyze the differences on results depending on the initial
topology.
4.3.3.1 Experimental Settings
In the experiments we perform simulations in which the number of agents N is set to
400. Each run is composed of a set of iterations in which agents repeatedly play the
donation game. The number of iterations varies in each particular run depending on
the simulation convergence and stability. We consider convergence when there are no
changes in the strategy of the agents during ten consecutive iterations. Finally, the
parameters used for building the networks are W 5;0.1400 and S
5;−2
400 .
4.3.3.2 Emergence of Cooperation
In this section we analyze the effects in cooperation using coalitions and the rewiring
mechanism in the networked donation game.
Firstly, in Figure 4.14 we see the results of a typical simulation when we do not use
coalitions nor rewiring. In the histogram we represent the percentage of agents with a
certain strategy when the simulation has converged. We see that all the agents end up
playing k ≥ 0. This means that agents lean toward playing defective (remember that
k = 6 means that an agent defects independently to the other agent image score).
Secondly, we allow agents to use only rewiring to change their neighborhood. We
have observed that both for scale-free and small-world networks, the results are similar
to the case where we do not use coalitions nor rewiring, since k > 0 for all agents (we
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Figure 4.14: Percentage of agents’ strategies with no coalitions, no rewiring, in a
scale-free network.
do not depict it since it is similar to Figure 4.14). This differs to the results obtained
by Fu et al. [53], where they successfully use rewiring to improve cooperation among
agents. However, here we propose a different environment, where even if agents are
connected to others, they can play with any agent in the population. In fact, as they
have no information about other agents’ reputation, since there are no coalitions for
information sharing, the rewiring is done randomly, and it might even worsen their
neighborhood.
Thirdly, we endow agents only with our coalition formation mechanism, but with-
out allowing them to rewire. We find that in scale-free networks, allowing them to
join coalitions is enough to achieve cooperation. In Figure 4.15 we present the final
percentage of agents per strategy when convergence is reached, as well as the evolution
of strategies in time. We see that in this case all agents converge to strategy k = −3.
Moreover, we have observed that in different simulations the results vary from one
strategy to other, but being k ≤ 0 in all cases. However, when using small-world
networks, we have observed that agents converge to a single strategy, which is not
cooperative (k > 0). In Figure 4.16a we show an example where all agents converge
to k = 2. Moreover, in Figure 4.16b we see the evolution of strategies on time, where
to ease the display, we only name the two strategies that survive longer. We see
that the strategies k = −3 and k = 2 compete to dominate the divided population.
However, in the end the non-cooperative strategy prevails. This pattern is repeated
in different simulations, but with different strategies arising.
Now, we study if cooperation is improved when we add rewiring to the coalition
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(a) Percentage of agents’ strategies. All agents
end with k = −3.
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(b) Evolution of strategies on time. All agents
end with k = −3.
Figure 4.15: Strategies in scale-free without rewiring. Convergence to cooperative
strategy k=-3.
formation mechanism. In Figure 4.17 we present the percentage of strategies after
one simulation when using our mechanism, both starting with an initial scale-free
and small-world topology (Figure 4.17a and Figure 4.17b, respectively). We see that
in both cases, all agents end up a using a cooperative strategy (k ≤ 0). Moreover,
not only agents converge to a cooperative strategy, but we have observed that in
every simulation, all agents converge to the same cooperative strategy (but different
in sucessive runs).
In order to see that our combined mechanism allows only cooperative strategies
to arise (k ≤ 0), in Figure 4.18 we present the results for ten different simulations.
We represent the percentage simulations in which all agents end with each strategy,
keeping in mind that in each simulation, all agents converge to the same strategy.
We only present it for a scale-free initial topology, since results for small-world are
similar. We see that in 30% of the simulations, all agents converge to k = −4, while
other three cooperative strategies (k = −5,−3,−2) appear in 20% of the simulations
each. Only 10% of the agents use k = 0, which is the most discriminating among
cooperative strategies.
Thus, we found that by using coalitions and rewiring cooperation emerges. This
happens mainly by two reasons: firstly, because one single super coalition is formed
(see Figure 4.19, where we see the evolution of the number of coalitions along a
simulation). As an agent has information not only about its neighbors, but also
about its coalition mates, this results in agents having more information about the
109
4. Dynamic coalition formation in dynamic topologies with resources
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
%
 o
f a
ge
nt
s
Strategy
(a) Percentage of agents’ strategies.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
k=−3
k=2
%
 o
f s
tra
te
gi
es
Number of iterations
(b) Evolution of strategies along time.
Figure 4.16: Strategies in small-world, with coalitions but without rewiring. All
agents end with k = 2.
image score of the whole population as the simulation evolves. Secondly, as an agent
can change its neighborhood, it can discover and join other agents with higher image
score. This allows an agent to donate with higher probability, also increasing its
image score, and therefore its chances for obtaining a donation next time it becomes
a recipient.
We have further investigated the effects of adding rewiring to the coalition for-
mation mechanism. For this, we used Pajek [21], which is a tool for analysis and
visualization of large networks. We have observed that in scale-free networks, hubs
(agents with higher number of connections) have a strong influence over the rest of
agents, and also more information than them. This eases the process of convergence
to one single coalition, where all the agents use the same cooperative strategy. This
happens even when we only use our coalition formation mechanism. But, when we
introduce rewiring the process of convergence is even faster. This happens because, as
we allow agents to choose their neighbors, hubs are the most successful ones, making
their own influence even higher, and also the influence of the coalition they belong
to.
In the case of small-world networks, all agents have more or less the same number
of connections, meaning that all agents have a similar level of information at the
beginning. However, when we add rewiring, agents start to create influence groups
composed by some agents which have higher connections than the others. In Fig-
ure 4.20 we depict an example of a final configuration when we start with a small-
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(a) Percentage of agents’ strategies in a sim-
ulation with a scale-free topology. All agents
end with k = −3.
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(b) Percentage of agents’ strategies in a simu-
lation with a small-world topology. All agents
end with k = −4.
Figure 4.17: Strategies obtained after two simulations with scale-free and small-world
initial topologies, using coalitions and rewiring.
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Figure 4.18: Average percentage of strategies after ten simulations.
world network topology (here we used only 25 agents to ease its display). We see
that agents self-reorganize in a structure, where some of them have much more links
than the others. Thus, as in the scale-free case, bigger and more influential coalitions
(regarding their image score and size) are formed.
Finally, we compare our results with the ones obtained in [99], which is the basis
for our work. The comparison is not easy as that paper presents a panmictic scenario,
and genetics are used to evolve the most popular strategies in the population. In the
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Figure 4.19: Evolution of the number of coalitions along the iterations.
Figure 4.20: Final topology, after starting with a small-world network with 25 agents,
using coalitions and rewiring.
scenario with public image score, the obtained strategy was k = 0. But in a second
scenario where agents have a limited view of others’ image score, agents tend to be
defective (k > 0). In our case, our coalitions and rewiring mechanism allows to
achieve cooperation even in this second scenario with limited information.
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4.3.3.3 Topology Influence
In previous section, we have presented how regardless of the initial network configura-
tion, all agents converge to the same cooperative strategy, with k ≤ 0 (Figure 4.17 and
Figure 4.18), and one single super coalition emerges (Figure 4.19). However, we have
noticed differences between scale-free and small-world about how they reach conver-
gence. Salazar et al. [122] also addressed this issue, although in a different problem,
and with a different focus. Now we investigate the reasons for those differences in our
scenario.
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Figure 4.21: Evolution of agents’ strategy along the iterations.
We have noticed that the time required for the convergence varies depending on
the topology. In Figure 4.21 we see the evolution of strategies along iterations. It is
noticeable that to reach cooperative convergence, starting with a scale-free topology
the convergence is much faster.
On the one hand, the faster convergence with scale-free is due to the strong influ-
ence that hub agents have over the rest of the population. As a hub has a considerable
higher number of neighbors than the rest of the agents, it has more information to
play initially (as agents know the image score of their neighbors), which increases its
chances to get higher benefits. This puts them in an excellent influence position, since
as they are the ones with highest benefits, other agents copy their strategy. Moreover,
as there are several agents with only one link to the hubs, they promptly join the
hub to form a coalition, thus less and bigger coalitions are formed faster. Besides,
as they belong to bigger coalitions, and have more neighbors, those hubs are very
popular to rewire to them. This causes that they increase even more their individual
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and coalition influences.
On the other hand, in small-world networks each agent has a similar number of
neighbors, so all the agents have more or less the same level of influence. Hence, this
explains why multiple coalitions coexist longer (Figure 4.19b). Therefore the path to
form one single coalition, and converge to the same strategy, is slower. However, with
the use of rewiring, agents with highest score start having more neighbors than the
others, which results in more influence (see Figure 4.20). Afterwards, more agents
imitate them, and the coalitions they belong start to grow faster, allowing to finally
reach a single cooperative strategy.
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented cooperation mechanisms that use coalition forma-
tion and rewiring together to help self-interested agents to establish sustained and
successful cooperation in resource exchange environments.
In the first part of the chapter (Section 4.2), we have focused on a bidirectional
trading problem, where we provided a mechanism based on: (1) a game-based inter-
action model that includes the trading of resources; (2) a dynamic coalition formation
mechanism that allows agents to decide whether to join or leave coalitions, and to col-
lectively self-determine decide the inner and outer behaviours of a coalition (without
the intervention of a leader); and (3) a partner switching (rewiring) strategy based
on experiences acquired in previous interactions to help agents to avoid defective
behaviours.
We empirically analysed our mechanism to quantify its benefits with respect to
alternative cooperation mechanisms akin to others appearing in the literature. We
observed that our mechanism allows agents to obtain higher payoffs, ranging from
15% to 30%, than other cooperation mechanisms. Furthermore, we found that these
benefits depend on the availability of resources in the environment. Thus, the larger
the number of resources, the larger the payoffs that agents are expected to obtain.
The benefits of our cooperation mechanism stem from the fact that rewiring has
a positive effect when coupled with coalition formation. Thus, we empirically showed
that rewiring helps agents to obtain higher payoffs (compared to exclusively using
coalition formation, the so-called coalition-only mechanism), independently of the
network topology. Indeed, even a small rewiring frequency can lead to up to a 20%
increase of payoffs with respect to coalition formation. In fact, we observed that the
higher the rewiring frequency, the less and bigger the number of coalitions, namely
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the lower the clustering of the agent population. In fact, our mechanism leads to less
than a half of the coalitions created by means of coalition-only. Therefore, the use of
rewiring has a compacting effect on the coalition formation process: less and bigger
coalitions. Since agents within the same coalition cooperate, having less and bigger
coalitions is bound to yield significant payoff benefits. The reason for this is that
since agents are allowed to change their neighbours, they can choose to wire to agents
that provide more benefits and to join bigger coalitions to be more efficient against
non-cooperative behaviours. Together, the decrease in the number of coalitions, and
the increase in their size, results in higher payoffs for agents.
Finally, we also analysed agents’ strategic behaviour in the realm of our coop-
eration mechanism. Our main observation is that agents adapt their behaviour de-
pending on the availability of resources. In fact, in low cooperation scenarios, i.e.,
when there is less than 20% of resources, the dominant strategy with outsiders is
to defect. When the percentage of resources is around 20%, there is a transition in
the behaviour of coalitions with outsiders, and there is no dominant strategy with
outsiders. Beyond 20% of resources, coalition agents progressively become more and
more cooperative with outsiders. Thus a medium or large availability of resources
allows agents to perform more trades, obtaining higher benefits by cooperating in
this way. To summarize, trading, i.e., cooperating, becomes the dominant strategy
against outsiders.
In the second part of the chapter (Section 4.3), we have focused on donation game
problem, i.e., unidirectional trading, where we provided a mechanism based on: (1) a
game-based interaction model that includes donation; (2) a scenario where agents are
connected in a network, but contrary to previous ones, any agent may interact with
any other in the population; and (3) a mechanism that combines dynamic coalition
formation, partner switching and indirect reciprocity reputation.
We have confirmed that including coalitions and rewiring indeed improves coop-
eration when we play the donation game in our social scenario. Moreover, we have
analyzed the differences between the results obtained when we use a scale-free or
a small-world topology. In our experiments, firstly we determined that only using
rewiring does not allow cooperation to emerge. This is because rewiring is done
mainly randomly to any other agent, which can even worsen the neighborhood. Sec-
ondly, we determined that using our coalition formation mechanism only, cooperation
emerges only in the case of scale-free networks. However, in small-world networks, we
observed that the use of coalitions is not enough to achieve convergence to a coopera-
tive strategy. The reason is that, in scale-free networks, hubs have a strong influence,
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allowing to create bigger coalitions in less time, and speeding up the appearance of
cooperation. Finally, when using rewiring together with coalitions, both in scale-free
and small-world networks; all agents in the population converge to a cooperative
strategy. In the case of scale-free, the convergence to a cooperative strategy is faster,
since again hubs speed up the convergence process. Thus, we have seen the positive
effects that grouping and social networking have over the apparition of cooperation
in complex networks with indirect reciprocity.
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Chapter 5
Dynamic coalition formation to
support collaboration in
competitive environments
5.1 Introduction
In real world domains, individuals usually face the problem of solving tasks, com-
posed of subtasks, that cannot be solved by them individually, so they need to group
in order to be able to accomplish them with guarantees. This may be the case when
supporting collaboration in new Internet-based scenarios, like co-working [120], or
crowdsourcing [138], which are becoming increasingly important. In these scenar-
ios, customers submit tasks to be serviced, with several actors competing to do so.
Moreover, the distribution of service requests varies along time, as well as the service
workload required by each customer.
Over the past decade, crowdsourcing has emerged as a cheap and efficient method
of obtaining solutions to simple tasks that are difficult for computers to solve but
possible for humans. In fact, crowdsourcing markets bring together requesters, who
have tasks they need to perform, and workers, who are willing to perform these tasks
in a timely manner in exchange for payment [138]. There are several examples of
crowdsourcing platforms, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk [70] or oDesk [102]. The
popularity of crowdsourcing markets has led to empirical and theoretical research on
the design of algorithms to optimize various aspects of these markets, such as the as-
signment of tasks. Thus crowdsourcing has appeared as a new application domain to
model and analyze the problem of online decision making, as well as design algorithms
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to tackle it. Online decision algorithms have a rich literature in operations research,
economics, and several areas of computer science including machine learning, theory
of algorithms, artificial intelligence, and algorithmic mechanism design [138]. How-
ever, in the case of crowdsourcing, as tasks are usually not too complex, workers
are normally gathered individually, without considering the possibility of recruiting
groups of people to jointly perform more complex tasks. This would represent a situ-
ation faced in several domains, as in international commerce, bidding for government
contracts or continuous auctions.
Most crowdsourcing platforms share the common feature of repeated interaction.
Regarding this repeated interaction, in [5], Afsarmanesh et al. confirm that long-lived
groups (those that last in time beyond the servicing of a single job) are successfully
used in real world scenarios, such as in manufacturing or ICT, among others. Ac-
cording to [5], when groups are long-term creations, successful repeated collaborations
help them to enhance their service performance along time, since agents increase their
preparedness towards collaboration. Therefore, to fully benefit from coalition-based
collaborations, we must learn how to form coalitions as well as how to sustain them.
However, sustaining a coalition poses two main challenges: (i) how to cope with agents
within the coalition that do not honor their commitments; and (ii) how to compete
with other coalitions that offer the same services. To tackle these problems requires
that a coalition, as a whole, continuously adapts to remain competitive. Indeed, in
an open environment, several competing coalitions may be formed with the aim of
performing the very same service. Thus, on the coalition side, this requires the capa-
bility of: (i) composing the most appropriate set of agents to perform a service; (ii)
deciding when to disband the coalition because it is no longer beneficial. Moreover,
agents immersed in such competitive environment must also individually adapt by
deciding: (i) whether to remain in a coalition or join another one; and (ii) whether
to remain part of a coalition or to leave it in order to start up a new one. Therefore,
both coalitions and agents require decision-making mechanisms that allow them to
adapt and to remain competitive along time.
Slivkings et al. [138] propose specific directions to tackle the design of a crowd-
sourcing model: adaptive task assignment, dynamic procurement, repeated principal-
agent problem, reputation systems, and the exploration-exploitation tradeoff. In this
chapter, we are mainly focused on the second, using also reputation as a way to asses
the risk of cooperating with others. However, we propose to use coalitions of agents
to perform complex tasks. Most of previous work in task allocation with coalitions
does not consider how coalitions can be maintained over time in the face of change
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once they are formed. For this reason, Klush et al. [79] develop a dynamic coalition
formation scheme (DCF-S) that helps agents react to changes in their set of goals
and in the agent society. Soh et al. [140] present a dynamic coalition formation where
they use learning mechanisms at several levels to improve the quality of the coalition
formation process in a dynamic, noisy, and time constrained domain. Nonetheless,
such approaches suffer from several shortcomings. First, they mainly focus on sup-
porting the formation of a single coalition for a single task. Thus, they do not consider
the bigger picture (and more realistic situation), where there are several coalitions
competing to provide the same service. In fact, most of previous work has com-
monly assumed that a coalition disbands when the current task is finished. Hence,
a coalition disappears after the coalition fulfills its goal. Me´rida-Campos et al. [88]
explore this environments and focus on iterative games, where several coalitions com-
pete to be assigned tasks in several rounds. The authors present a dynamic coalition
formation mechanism where coalitions must adapt at each time step in order to be
competitive. However, with their mechanism, agents use a pre-established strategy
for joining or abandoning partners. Moreover, there is adaptability regarding coali-
tion composition, but the authors do not specifically address the adaptation of the
coalition distribution.
In this chapter we present a model to build and adapt coalitions to assign com-
plex tasks with the goal of maximizing the quality and quantity of completed tasks.
Thus key contribution in this chapter is a decision mechanism that allows agents in
a competitive environment to autonomously enact and sustain coalitions, not only
its composition, but also its distribution. Two key components in such mechanism
are: the reputation of coalitions as a whole, and the reputation of individual agents.
Reputation has been shown to be effective to asses the risk of cooperating with other
individuals; and also the strength of collaboration synergies (successful repeated col-
laborations) within coalitions. This synergy models that working together repeatedly
improves cooperation among humans. In our model, when agents employ our decision
mechanism, we show that it is possible for them to maintain high levels of customer
satisfaction (in terms of percentage of services finished on time). In more detail, we
provide:
• A decision making mechanism for coalitions to help them continuously adapt
to remain competitive. On the one hand, our mechanism allows a coalition to
assemble the most reliable team of agents to service a certain task based on
agents’ reputation. On the other hand, the mechanism also helps a coalition
decide whether the coalition must be sustained or otherwise disbanded because
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it is no longer beneficial.
• A decision making mechanism that allows agents to remain competitive. On the
one hand, our mechanism allows an agent to decide whether to continue being
part of a coalition, or otherwise join another coalition. Such decision is based
on: (i) the strength of the successful repeated collaborations of an agent within
its coalition; and (ii) the overall reputation of the coalition. On the other hand,
our mechanism allows an agent to decide when to start out a new coalition.
• An empirical analysis showing that the usage of our mechanisms by agents
makes it possible to maintain high levels of customer satisfaction (percentage of
tasks serviced on time). First, we show that coalitions exhibit a high resilience:
even when the percentage of reliable agents is low (∼ 40%), the percentage of
serviced tasks on time is beyond 80%. Second, coalitions and agents demon-
strate that they adapt to a varying distribution of customers’ incoming tasks.
Thus, we obtain ∼ 95% of tasks serviced on time despite significant variations
in the incoming distribution of tasks.
Altogether, we aim at providing an interesting and simple model for managing new
emerging coalitions, composed by humans that work using new ICT technologies. The
topic investigated in this chapter can be very complex depending on the conditions
and the assumptions introduced in the model and implemented along the simulations.
However, for the sake of clarity, the assumptions underlying our agent-based model
will be simple, as our goal is to understand the fundamental processes. This is the
approach followed all along the chapter.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, Section 5.2 presents a computational
model for an environment where multiple coalitions compete to service tasks. Next,
Section 5.3 describes the decision making mechanisms employed by coalitions and
agents during task allocation and execution. Section 5.4 introduces the adaptive
mechanism employed by coalitions and agents. Section 5.5 details our empirical anal-
ysis. Finally, Section 5.6 draws conclusions and sets paths to future research.
5.2 Computational model
The purpose of this section is to outline the computational model of a competitive
environment where agents are allowed to autonomously enact and sustain coalitions.
With this aim, we consider that such environment takes the shape of a scenario where
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customers dynamically generate requests for their tasks to be serviced on time. By
dynamic we mean that: (i) the customers’ task distribution changes over time; and
(ii) the workload required by each task also may vary. Within our environment,
coalitions compete to service tasks. Once a coalition is assigned a task, it may either
complete it on time or not. Along time, some coalitions may disappear (because they
are no longer competitive), while others may be formed.
Formally, we represent each task request generated by some customer as a tuple
(Ti, di), where Ti is the specification of a task to be serviced, and di stands for the
deadline by which it must be completed. A task Ti is composed of a set of subtasks
〈τ i1, ......., τ ini〉. Each subtask requires some skill to fulfill it out of a finite set of skills
S = 〈s1, .., sm〉. In our environment, there is a set of agents Ag = {ag1, ....., agn} with
different skills. We consider that a coalition is simply a group of agents, a subset of Ag,
which gather together to perform some task. Multiple coalitions compete to service
each customers’ task request. Since agents may fail to fulfill their commitments, we
say that a task is serviced on time when all subtasks are serviced on time, and serviced
with delay when at least one subtask has not been serviced on time.
Here we consider that each coalition is led by a mediator agent. Mediators have
been extensively used in the multi-agent systems literature because they play the
important role of assisting in locating and connecting the providers of a service with
its requester [44, 86, 143]. In our particular case, a mediator will be also responsible
for the management of the composition of a coalition, a function that, according to
[4, 5], is extremely important to support a coalition activities. Thus, a mediator
leading a coalition will be responsible for searching for the agents to be part of a
coalition, henceforth referred to as worker agents, assembling teams of workers to
perform tasks, and evaluating workers’ performances. The mission of a worker agent
is to perform subtasks within a task. For this purpose, a worker must have the
necessary skill to carry out a subtask. However, a worker may fail in completing a
subtask on time. In other words, a coalition may fail to service a task on time because
some of its workers may in turn fail to complete their subtasks on time. Notice that
we consider that an agent can take the role of either worker or mediator, but never
both at the same time. Moreover, to avoid excessive complexity, a mediator can lead
a single coalition and a worker can only belong to one coalition at the same time.
In general, a coalition (leaded by a single mediator) can service several tasks at the
same time, depending on its mediator’s capacity. We refer to each group of workers
that perform a task within a coalition as a team. Thus, a coalition may contain
several teams performing separate tasks at the same time.
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Figure 5.1: Competitive environment.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the components of our competitive environment. Customers
submit their tasks for them to be serviced, which come into the environment as a
dynamic stream of tasks. Tasks are collected by a contractor, which is in charge of
assigning tasks to coalitions using a contract net protocol (CNP) [139]. The figure
shows several coalitions coalition1, coalition2, and coalition3 as well as three inde-
pendent agents (ag1,ag2, and ag3) that do not belong to any coalition. Each coalition
has a mediator agent (agents within hexagons in the figure). Upon task completion,
the contractor rates the quality of the service provided by a coalition. Furthermore,
coalitions can also rate their own workers. Rating information is kept and aggregated
by the reputation service, since reputation has been extensively used as way to asses
individuals. In Table 5.1 we detail several steps that describe how the cyclic process,
followed in our competitive environment, serve the incoming tasks.
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1. Request for coalitions. For each incoming task, the contractor broadcasts
a request, (Ti, di), to all coalitions.
2. Team formation. Once a coalition receives a task request, its mediator
selects the best available team (a subset of agents in the coalition) to service
such request. If the necessary agents are not available within the coalition,
the mediator can contact free agents or agents within other coalitions. Then,
a team is formed by selecting one agent per subtask.
3. Acknowledgement. If a coalition has been able to put together a team of
agents to service the task, it replies to the contractor that it can do so by
the deadline di.
4. Task assignment. From all the positive replies received from coalitions,
the contractor assigns the task to the coalition with the highest reputation
(to avoid overfitting, with a certain small probability, it is randomly as-
signed). Therefore, it follows that the higher the reliability of a coalition,
the more competitive, and hence the higher the chances of being awarded
the servicing of tasks. Note that to avoid the cold start problem, the rep-
utation of the coalitions in the beginning is the same for all the coalitions,
so the task is randomly assigned in this case.
5. Task execution. The coalition that is assigned the task starts out the
team that must service the task.
6. Task reward. Once a task is serviced, each worker in the servicing team
obtains a reward for completing its subtask. The mediator also obtains
a reward for servicing the task, which is higher than the workers’. This
is intended to compensate for the responsibility and the effort put by a
mediator on selecting, coordinating, and evaluating workers for the team.
Moreover, the mediator takes chances in accepting tasks initially.
7. Coalition and agent evaluation. Once a task is serviced: (i) the contractor
evaluates the performance of the coalition in terms of the delay in servicing
the task; and (ii) the coalition evaluates the performance of each member
of the team that performed the task. Both evaluations are shipped to the
reputation service, where they are kept and aggregated.
8. Coalition and agent adaptation. Since coalitions and agents must adapt
to remain competitive, at this point a coalition (that has no pending tasks
to service) may decide to disband, and a worker (without pending subtasks)
may decide to form a new coalition.
Table 5.1: Steps that describe the cyclic process to serve incoming tasks.
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At the end of this cycle, a new incoming task takes the process to step one again.
Note that when from here on, when we refer to Steps, we mean the steps we have
explained in Table 5.1.
To illustrate the coalition formation and adaptation processes, Figure 5.2 depicts
an example showing a transition in the distribution of coalitions within our compet-
itive environment. The figure shows the distribution of coalitions at two different
moments in time. Agents acting as mediators are within hexagons, while agents act-
ing as workers are within circles. First, the figure at the top shows the distribution
of coalitions when a request to service task T1 arrives. At that point there are two
mediator agents (ag1 and ag2), each one leading a coalition composed of worker agents
({ag3, ag4, ag5} and {ag6, ag7, ag8} respectively). Out of the agents within each coali-
tion, some of them have been selected to be part of a team. There are also three
independent agents that are not part of any coalition (ag9, ag10, ag11). Further on in
time, after servicing several tasks, up to T10, the figure at the bottom shows the new
distribution of coalitions. Several changes have occurred: agent ag6 left coalition2 to
start and lead coalition3 with agents {ag9, ag10, ag11}; agent ag1 disbanded coalition1
to join coalition2 as a worker; and agents ag3, ag4 and ag5 became independent.
So far we have focused on describing the computational model of our competitive
environment. In the following sections we focus of the decision making that coalitions
and agents require to participate in such environment.
5.3 Task allocation and execution
In this section, we present the decision making of coalitions and agents involved in
team formation, task assignment and execution, and evaluation (Steps 2-7, Table
5.1). Thus we present how a coalition: i) decides and gathers the most appropriate
set of agents to service a task; and ii) how a coalition evaluates its team. Moreover,
we present how an agent decides to which coalition to join, or if it already belongs to
one, if it should switch. Finally, we also present how reputation is aggregated in the
reputation module of Figure 5.1.
5.3.1 Mediator’s decision making
Every time a task arrives, each mediator leading a coalition has three main respon-
sibilities. First, to form a team out of the best available agents in the coalition to
service the task (Step 2). Second, to perform the task whenever it has been awarded
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Figure 5.2: Possible evolution of the distribution of coalitions and agents along time
in our competitive environment.
to the coalition (Step 5). Third, once a task is serviced, to evaluate the performance
of the workers in the servicing team (Step 7). In Algorithm 17, we specify the me-
diator general behaviour for team formation, task assignment and execution, and
performance evaluation (Steps 2 to 7 in Table 5.1).
Team formation (Step 2) We focus first on team formation, i.e., we present how a
coalition (represented by its mediator) decides and gathers the most appropriate set of
agents to service a task. Given a task, a mediator must first find a set of workers that
satisfy the skills and time constraints required by the task. There may be different
ways to choose these agents, however, we assume that repeated interactions with the
same agents improve task performance, for instance, during the task supervision the
mediator knows better the strengths and limitations of its workers, proportionally
to the time they have been working together. Therefore, the mediator first sends a
request to the workers in its coalition (line 2). A request is a tuple 〈{τ1, ..., τk}, di〉,
where τk are the subtasks that compose the task, and di the period of time to service
it. After receiving the responses from workers, if the mediator cannot find enough
workers in its coalition to carry out the task, it also sends requests both to independent
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Algorithm 17 coalition formation and performance evaluation
1: function ReceiveRequest((Ti, di))
2: Team = BroadcastRequest(myCoalition, 〈{τ1, ..., τj}, di〉)
3: if not Complete(Ti, T eam) then
4: AO = BroadcastRequest(AgentsOutsideCoalition)
5: Team = add(Team,AO)
6: if Complete(Ti, T eam) then
7: Assigned = send(contractor, ACK, (Ti, di))
8: if Assigned then
9: AddToCoalition(AO)
10: ExecuteTask(Ti, T eam)
11: Receive(rwdm)
12: for all agj ∈ Team do
13: EvaluateWorkers(CoalitionEval)
14: send(evaluations, contractor)
15: Release(Team)
agents or to agents that belong to other coalitions (line 4). Notice that if a mediator
was not allowed to search beyond its coalition, it would not be possible to adequately
perform in a dynamic environment. This may happen for two reasons. First, since
the customers’ incoming task load or task characteristics may change, there may not
be agents with required capabilities within its coalition. Second, a coalition may have
enough agents, but they might be already busy servicing other tasks.
Once there are enough agents, the mediator must select among them. Now, recall
that agents may fail to deliver their subtask on time. Thus, to make the coalition
competitive, a mediator uses a selection criterion based on preventing failures: choose
those with highest reputation.
Task assignment and execution (Step 3-5) Now, we focus on task assignment
and task execution. Thus once a mediator has formed its own team (line 5), it
acknowledges to the contractor that it can perform the task. Note that all mediators
provide the same information, stating just the task they can perform. Then, to
prevent failures, the contractor assigns the task to the most competitive coalition,
which we define as the one with highest reputation. The coalition that obtains the
task (line 8) starts servicing it (line 10), while the coalitions that did not obtain the
task dissolve the teams they had formed (line 15).
Team evaluation (Step 6-7) After workers in a team have serviced their subtasks,
its mediator delivers the serviced task to the contractor. The mediator receives a
reward (rwdm > 0) (line 11) and evaluates its workers (line 13). To evaluate workers,
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each coalition uses a decay function CoalitionEval(agj) that evaluates the delivery
time of an agent. This function considers that a longer delay gives a larger penalty
in reputation. Once the evaluation is computed, this value is sent to the contractor
(line 14). Note that even if an agent changes its coalition, its reputation remains.
5.3.2 Assessing coalition and agent reputation
The contractor is in charge of assessing reputation i) of the coalition, depending on
how the team has performed; and ii) of the agent, depending on how it has individually
performed. Using the reputation module (Figure 5.1), reputation both for coalitions
and agents is updated by combining an evaluation of the performance in the current
task with its current reputation. Thus we use a exploration-explotation between past
and current reputation, which is a simple way of calculating reputation. In Equation
5.1 and 5.2 we show how the reputation of a coalition coai and an agent agj is updated.
It is beyond of the scope of this chapter to define a complex reputation mechanism.
Rep(coai) = α1 · ContractorEval(di, d˜(Coa, Ti) + (1− α1) ·Rep(coai) (5.1)
Rep(agj) = α2 · CoalitionEval(agj)(di, d˜j) + (1− α2) ·Rep(agj) (5.2)
where d˜(coai, Ti) is the time the coalition took to finish its task; di is the time requested
to service the task; d˜j is the time the worker took to finish its subtask; and α1 and α2
are factors that model the influence of current reputation. Moreover, CoalitionEval
and ContractorEval are decay functions to evaluate the delivery time of an agent
and a coalition, respectively. A longer delay gives a larger penalty in reputation. In
Sect. 5.5.1 we propose an evaluation function.
5.3.3 Worker’s decision making
In this section, we focus on how an agent decides the coalition to join, or if it already
belongs to one, whether to switch. This is a critical decision, since the possibility of
obtaining a subtask depends on two factors: i) how competitive an agent is; and ii)
how competitive its coalition is. The second is because tasks are assigned according
to the reputation of each coalition (Step 4), as explained in Section 5.3.1. Thus, since
a worker may have several requests to perform subtasks from different coalitions, it
must decide which coalition to join to form part of a team. Moreover, if the agent
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already belongs to a coalition, it must decide whether leave or stay (Step 2). We
therefore endow each worker with a local stochastic decision making mechanism to
make such decisions.
Algorithm 18 Coalition selection
1: function SubtaskProposalsAndCoalition(Requests)
2: Collect(Requests);
3: pjstay = Calculate(RepCoa(agj), CollSynCoa(agj))
4: if (Bernoulli(pjstay) then)
5: send(Coalition(agj), ”accept”);
6: else
7: send(Coalition(agj), ”leave”);
8: send(CoalitionHighestRep, ”join”);
9: send(OtherCoalitions, ”reject”);
In Algorithm 18 we specify a worker’s behavior after receiving several requests to
perform subtasks. First, a worker collects all the requests it has (line 2). If it already
belongs to a coalition, to decide if it should switch to another one, it must consider:
i) how well its current coalition is doing, i.e, how competitive its coalition is in terms
of obtaining tasks; and ii) whether the mediator is selecting that agent to be part
of teams. These factors correspond to the reputation of a coalition coai (Rep(coai))
and the collaboration synergy of the agent in such coalition (CollSynCoa(agj)). We
introduce the concept of collaboration synergy to model that repeated collaborations
improve performance when humans interact. Thus, the collaboration synergy between
a worker and the coalition it belongs models how good the worker is doing, in terms of
obtaining subtasks in such coalition. This is assessed as the number of subtasks that
a worker has performed without changing from one coalition to another. Note that
this value is reset every time an agent changes its coalition. Thus to calculate the
probability of staying in a coalition, we consider a balance exploration (reputation)
and exploitation (collaboration synergy). Formally, we define the probability of an
agent agj staying in its current coalition coai in Equation 5.3:
pjstay = β ·Rep(coai) + (1− β) · CollSynCoa(agj) 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 (5.3)
Once a worker has computed pjstay (line 3), it samples it using a Bernoulli distri-
bution to decide whether to stay in its current coalition or not. Note that again we
have opted for a simple model to avoid complex simulations. If the worker decides to
stay, it sends its acceptance to its current coalition (line 5). If it decides to leave, it
notifies its former coalition (line 7) and joins the coalition with the highest reputation
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(line 8). In any case, it sends a rejection to any other coalition requests (line 9).
Finally, if the task is not assigned to the coalition (the coalition receives a ”reject”,
line 9), the worker is released from the team. In contrast, if the task is assigned (Step
4, Table 5.1), the worker starts performing its subtask until it is completed (Step 5).
At that point, the worker notifies the mediator, receives a reward rwdw > 0 (Step 6)
and it is evaluated by the mediator (Step 7). After this, it is free to perform another
subtask.
5.4 Adaptive virtual organizations
In this section we present our decision making for coalitions and agents to allow
them to adapt in order to keep competitive in a dynamic environment (Step 8, Table
5.1). Thus we present how: i) a coalition may disband; and ii) an agent may start
a new coalition. In Figure 5.3 this mechanism is shown as a stochastic automaton.
Thus each agent has two possible states, either being a mediator or a worker. With
a probability pm→w, a mediator changes its role to worker; and with a probability
pw→m, a worker changes its role to mediator. Since the behavior of an agent in each
state has already been specified (for mediators in Sect. 5.3.1, and for workers in Sect.
5.3.3), we are now able to focus on this policy to change state.
MEDIATOR WORKER
pm!w1 
pm
!w 1 
p
w!
m
pw!m
Figure 5.3: Change of roles modeled as a stochastic automaton.
In the following sections we specify the local stochastic decision making mecha-
nisms for mediators and workers, that allow them to change their roles depending on
their own knowledge.
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5.4.1 Mediator adaptation
In this section, we define how to determine when to make the transition from mediator
to worker as shown in Figure 5.3, i.e., the probability pjm→w. As stated previously, a
mediator is in charge of forming and adapting coalitions to obtain new tasks. The
higher the reputation of a coalition, the more competitive it is (since tasks are assigned
depending on coalition reputation), thus the higher the probability of being awarded
tasks. Since there are sources of failure, it might come a time when a coalition
is not beneficial any longer. To assess this, we specify the local decision making
mechanism by which a mediator decides whether to change its role, and hence disband
the coalition it leads.
To decide whether it pays off to remain as a mediator, we define um as a mediator
utility, which measures the actual utility of being a mediator given the number of
tasks assigned and the rewards obtained by them. We also define u˜w as the estimated
worker utility, which is an estimation of the number of tasks a mediator would have
participated in if it had been a worker. To calculate u˜w, a mediator uses an optimistic
approach, since it considers that every time it is free, it would have been assigned a
subtask if it was a worker.
In order to avoid excessive complexity, we assume that recent past experience is
the most useful indication of future performance. Thus each mediator only calculates
its utilities for a time window ∆t before the current time, in order to discard the
influence of performance in the distant past (since performance changes over time).
Thus, in Equations 5.4 and 5.5 we specify two utility functions for a mediator that
measure how well it performed in the recent past:
um(∆t) = Nt(∆t) · rwdm (5.4)
u˜w(∆t) = Ns(∆t) · rwdw (5.5)
where Nt(∆t) is the number of tasks that a mediator has coordinated during the
last time window; Ns(∆t) is the number subtasks that it could have performed as a
worker during ∆t, considering the optimistic approach mentioned before; and rwdm
and rwdw are the rewards for being a mediator and a worker, respectively.
Once um(∆t) and u˜w(∆t) are calculated, a mediator can determine the ratio to
decide its preferred role. This is useful to decide whether to change or not, since if
the utility of being a worker is higher than the one of being a mediator, then the
probability of becoming worker becomes higher. Equation 5.6 shows the probability
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of a mediator becoming a worker (pjm→w). Once a mediator has computed this prob-
ability, it samples it within a Bernoulli distribution to decide if changing from one
state to the other (Figure 5.3).
pjm→w(∆t) =
u˜w(∆t)
um(∆t)
(5.6)
5.4.2 Worker adaptation
In this section, we define how a worker determines when to make the transition to
mediator shown in Figure 5.3, i.e., the probability pjw→m. We consider that there
are two situations where a worker may benefit from changing its role: i) when it is
not requested to service subtasks (either because it is not performing as it should,
or because there are insufficient tasks); or ii) when it is busy servicing subtasks all
the time. In the first case, a worker should try to become a mediator to obtain
some rewards since it is clearly not succeeding as a worker. In the second case,
since it is busy all the time, it assumes the workload is high, thus it may consider
that by becoming a mediator it could receive higher rewards. Note that even if more
mediators mean more competition, we will see that by using our adaptive mechanism,
if the workload is not high enough, a mediator becomes a worker, avoiding this way
unserved tasks for not having enough workers.
In this case, contrary to the mediator, that can estimate its utility as a worker,
a worker cannot compute its estimated utility as a mediator, since a worker is not
aware of the number tasks that are assigned (a mediator has extra information as it
is between the workers and the contractor). Thus, we define a function where the
probability of changing from worker to mediator (pjw→m) increases both with the time
a worker is idle or busy. In Figure 5.4 we present the basic function used to calculate
pjw→m, which is specified in Equation 5.7.
fib(tp) =

2 · t2p − 150
650
tp ≤ −10 (5.7a)
1
2
t2p
650
−10 < tp (5.7b)
where tp represents a period of time. Negative values of tp represent periods of time
when a worker is idle, while positive values represent busy periods. As we observe in
the figure, workers increase their probability of becoming mediators as they increase
the period of time they are idle or busy. The reason for the different slope is that
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Figure 5.4: Probability of becoming a mediator for workers.
if an agent is idle longer (tp ≤ −10), its probability of becoming a mediator must
be higher than if it is busy for the same period of time (positive values of tp). The
reason for this decision is that while it is busy, it is obtaining benefits, and becoming
a mediator could imply an unnecessary risk.
Besides, each agent applies to this probability a decay factor of 2−wmj , being
wmj the number of times a worker j has tried to become a mediator. We introduce
this decay factor to model that being a mediator implies more effort, since it must
coordinate a coalition. Finally, once a worker has computed the probability pjw→m,
described in Equation 5.8, it samples it using a Bernoulli distribution to decide if
changing from one state to the other (see Figure 5.3).
pjw→m(tp) = 2
−wmj · fib(tp) (5.8)
5.5 Experiments
In previous sections, we provided a decision mechanism that allows agents in a com-
petitive environment to autonomously enact and sustain coalitions. Now, in our ex-
periments we show how, employing our decision mechanism, it is possible to maintain
high levels of customer satisfaction, in terms of percentage of tasks serviced on time.
First, in Section 5.5.2, we analyze the resilience of coalitions to the failure of workers,
i.e., to workers not servicing their subtasks on time. Secondly, in Section 5.5.3 we
focus on how our adaptive mechanism allows coalitions to adapt to dynamic changes
in task load distribution. Before our analysis, we describe our empirical settings.
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5.5.1 Empirical settings
In every experiment, we run ten multi-agent simulations with 225 agents, and we
present the median and the variance. Unless otherwise stated, each task is composed
by eight subtasks, and each subtask is managed by one agent, so eight workers are
necessary to service a task. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all the subtasks
to be serviced require the same skill, so all agents are potentially valid to serve any
subtask. We also assume that all mediators have same capacity, which we fix to one.
Agent behavior. We need to specify some parameters in order to simulate the
behavior of the agents. First, a worker may finish its subtask with a certain delay. To
model this we specify a finalization probability, pjf , different for every agent, which is
the internal probability of a worker j finishing on time.
We also have assumed that continuous interactions improve the collaborative per-
formance. To model this, we define that the probability of a worker finishing on time
depends not only of pjf , but also on the number of times that a worker has collabo-
rated with a coalition (collaboration synergy, CollSynCoa(agj)). In Equation 5.9 we
specify the combined probability as pjF . Once it is calculated, it is sampled with a
Bernoulli distribution to see if the worker has finished on time or not.
pjF = γ · pjf + (1− γ) · CollSynCoa(agj) 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 (5.9)
Thus, as a worker may not finish its subtask on time, we asses the delivery time
for a worker as:
d˜ = (1 + δ) · d (5.10)
where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is a parameter that models an increase of the extra time a worker
needs to finish if it fails to deliver on time.
Moreover, in order to evaluate both agents and coalitions, we must define the
decay functions CoalitionEval and ContractorEval. In this case, we have considered
that coalitions and the contractor use the same decay function EvalC. We have
chosen a linear decrease of reputation with delay (Figure 5.5), which is specified in
Equation 5.11. There might be alternative decay functions, but we have chosen this
one for sake os simplicity; since the definition of a complex reputation mechanism is
out of the scope of this chapter.
EvalC(d, d˜) = 1− (d˜− d) (5.11)
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Figure 5.5: Decay function.
where (d˜− d) is the delay in the task and having d˜ ≥ d.
Finally, we set the factors from Equations 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.9, and 5.10: γ = 0.8,
α1 = α2 = 0.7, β = 0.5; δ = 0.1 and rwdm/rwdw = 2, since being a mediator
has more reward than being a worker. Our results are presented with respect to a
reference value, which is the best value it can be obtained considering the maximum
probability of finishing on time defined in each scenario.
5.5.2 Resilience analysis
In this section, we have two main goals. First, to study the resilience of coalitions de-
pending on workers’ reliability, and the choice of the reputation mechanisms. Second,
to study the capability of coalitions to discriminate unreliable workers. For the sake
of simplicity, now we will consider two binary selections for reliability: an agent j will
be a reliable worker if the probability to finish a task is pjf = 0.9, while for unreliable
workers it will be pjf = 0.1. When we refer to the percentage of reliable workers, we
mean the percentage of those agents overall the agent population; i.e., workers of all
coalitions. Finally, the task workload models the number of incoming tasks.
5.5.2.1 Resilience of coalitions depending on workers reliability
In Figure 5.6, we present how the percentage of tasks serviced on time varies when
we vary the percentage of reliable workers. In the figure, we are only interested
in the results with Full reputation. We observe that: (i) the percentage of tasks
serviced grows as reliable workers grow; (ii) a low percentage of reliable workers
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(∼40%) is enough to achieve more than 80% of tasks serviced on time; and (iii) when
more than 50% of the workers are reliable, more than 90% of tasks are serviced on
time. Therefore, we conclude that our decision making mechanism helps coalitions to
achieve very high resilience: the percentage of tasks serviced on time is high despite
high percentage of unreliable workers.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Percentage of reliable workers
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f t
as
ks
 s
er
vi
ce
d 
on
 ti
m
e
 
 
No reputation
Individual reputation
Coalition reputation
Full reputation
Figure 5.6: Percentage of tasks serviced on time varying the percentage of reliable
workers.
5.5.2.2 Resilience of coalitions depending on reputation mechanism
Also in Figure 5.6, we compare the resilience that results from using individual and
coalition reputation (Full reputation), with respect to: No reputation, which does
not use reputation either for individual selection or for group, but where subtasks are
randomly assigned to agents; Individual reputation, where only agents have reputa-
tion, so mediators form groups using it; and coalition reputation, where we only use
reputation for the coalition, but not for the agents. As expected, we observe that
the results when using no reputation are really poor when the percentage of reliable
workers is not really high. When coalition reputation is used, the results are only im-
proved in approximately a 4% compared to the previous one. This happens because,
if we use coalition reputation without individual reputation, coalitions are not formed
by choosing the best workers. Thus, even if a coalition has good reputation in the
past, it can perform badly in the future. When only individual reputation is used, the
percentage of tasks serviced on time increases 30% when half of the agents are reliable,
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since most competitive agents are chosen. Finally, we observe that adding coalition
reputation to the individual one (full reputation) indeed improves the percentage of
tasks serviced on time when compared to all previous reputation mechanisms. We
observe that when half of the agents are reliable, using full reputation 30% more tasks
are serviced on time than only using individual reputation, and a 70% more when
compared with the other two approaches. This is because in competitive environ-
ments, there is a need to asses not only the most reliable agents, but also the most
reliable coalitions to assign a task.
5.5.2.3 Discriminating unreliable workers
Now we aim at understanding whether coalitions using our full reputation mechanism
are able to discriminate between reliable and unreliable workers. We set 50% of all the
agents in the population to be reliable, while the remaining 50% agents are unreliable.
Moreover, we set the incoming task load so as to keep all the reliable workers busy.
Figure 5.7 shows the evolution of the percentage of reliable and unreliable workers that
are busy. We observe that unreliable workers are promptly discriminated. Conversely,
reliable workers are busy most of the time, because since they fail less, they will obtain
better reputation, and hence they will be chosen first to service subtasks.
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Figure 5.7: Discrimination of unreliable workers.
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5.5.3 Adaptiveness analysis
In this section we analyze the adaptiveness capabilities of our decision mechanism.
Recall from Section 5.4 that our adaptive decision making mechanism is aimed at:
(i) allowing coalitions to disband when there are not competitive any longer; and (ii)
allowing agents to start out new coalitions. We will show that such features lead to
an adaptation of the distribution of coalitions while maintaining a high percentage
of tasks serviced on time. Moreover, in a dynamic environment where the task dis-
tribution and the workload required by each task may vary. Thus, in Section 5.5.3.1
we study how coalitions evolve depending on the initial distribution of coalitions and
on different task workloads. In addition, in Section 5.5.3.2, we analyze how coalitions
adapt when the task workload varies during a simulation.
5.5.3.1 Adaptation to dynamic distributions of tasks
Next, we investigate how the distribution of coalitions adapts when varying: (i) the
initial distribution of coalitions; and (ii) the customers’ incoming task workload. Fig-
ure 5.8a compares the percentage of tasks serviced on time when using our adaptive
mechanism (With adaptation in the figure) with respect to not using it (No adapta-
tion) . Not adapting means that, neither new coalitions can be formed nor coalitions
can be disbanded, thus the distribution of coalitions remains unaltered. Regarding
the non-adaptive mechanism, we depict the evolution for three different initial dis-
tributions (low: 1 coalition, medium: 5 coalitions, high: 10 coalitions). Regarding
the adaptive mechanism, we present the percentage of tasks serviced on time when
our adaptive mechanism starts with low: 1 coalition. Notice that we have also run
experiments considering different initial number of coalitions. However, there are no
significant differences, since our mechanism allows coalitions to adapt to the needs of
the environment.
When agents use the our adaptive mechanism, the percentage of tasks serviced
on time remains stable even when varying the task workload. In fact, we see that
95% of tasks are serviced on time, regardless of the incoming task workload. This is
because our mechanism leads to adapt the distribution of coalitions to different task
workloads. In fact, in Figure 5.8b we show that as we increase the task workload,
the number of coalitions also increases, in order to be able to service all the incoming
tasks. Thus if we start with low: 1 coalition, we see that when task workload is 8,
the number of coalitions increases to 8. On the contrary, if we started with high: 10
coalitions, if the task load is 5, the number of coalitions decreases to 5. Thus our
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Figure 5.8: Comparison without adaptation (No adaptation) with our adaptive mech-
anism (With adaptation).
adaptive mechanism allows that: i) the less competitive coalitions disband when the
incoming load is not sufficiently high, thus there are not unused coalitions; and ii)
any agent may start a new coalition when it considers it may be beneficial, thus tasks
are not unserviced since there are no available coalitions.
Finally, we see that as expected, without the adaptive mechanism, as the task
workload increases the percentage of tasks serviced on time decreases. As the number
of coalitions is fixed, when coalitions reach their capacity, they cannot accept new
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incoming tasks, so these tasks are not serviced. Note that as we increase the number
of initial coalitions, more tasks are serviced with the same incoming load. However,
if the incoming task load is increased, then the behavior is similar to the results
already shown. Furthermore, we have empirically calculated that if we increase load to
more than approximately 30, then the percentage of tasks serviced on time degrades,
regardless of whether it uses our adaptive mechanism, because there are not enough
agents.
5.5.3.2 Adaptation to dynamic changes
Now, we analyze if the decision making of coalitions and agents allows them to adapt
when the incoming task workload changes along time while maintaining a high per-
centage of tasks serviced on time. Figure 5.9 presents a comparison between the re-
sults obtained with (Adaptive) and without our adaptive mechanism (Non-adaptive).
For this experiment, we set the task workload as L = 7. Regarding adaptation, we set
the initial distribution of coalitions so that all task workload can be serviced. Here,
every 500 units of time we change the task workload, to observe its effects on the
percentage of tasks serviced on time. From Time=0 to Time=500 we use a load L.
Then, the load changes as follows: (1) Double workload (L→ 2L); (2) Half workload
(2L→ L); (3) Triple workload (L→ 3L); (4) Reset workload (3L→ L).
We observe that when we use our adaptive mechanism: (i) the percentage of ser-
viced tasks on time remains constant and ∼ 95%, independently of the task workload;
and (ii) the results are independent on the initial L that we choose (L < 30).
Without adaptation, coalitions cannot be disbanded and agents cannot start coali-
tions, thus the distribution of coalitions remains fixed. This causes that when the
incoming workload is higher than L, the percentage of tasks serviced on time de-
creases. Moreover, having a fix number of coalitions also causes that even from
Time=0 to Time=500, the percentage of tasks serviced on time is lower than with
adaptation. This is because if a coalition has a delay, no other is formed, thus there
is no available coalition to service it. Finally, after load changes, even when we set
the load to L again, the percentage of tasks serviced on time does not recover, since
it has degraded.
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we were interested in building a dynamic coalition formation and
adaptation mechanism that could be employed in real scenarios like crowdsourcing,
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Figure 5.9: Percentage of tasks serviced on time over time. Adaptive vs. non-
adaptive.
co-working, etc., where we consider that complex tasks are performed by groups of
agents, that model humans. Thus with the goal of improving the the quality and
quantity of completed tasks, while modeling a realistic scenario, we have introduced
a novel decision-making mechanism that allows agents in a competitive environment
to autonomously enact and sustain coalitions. First, our mechanism allows a coalition:
(i) to assemble the most reliable team of agents to service a certain task based on
agent’s reputation; and (ii) to decide whether the coalition must be sustained or
disbanded because it is not longer beneficial. Second, our mechanism allows agents
to decide whether to continue being part of a coalition, or otherwise join another
coalition. In all this approach, agents’ and coalitions’ reputation mechanisms are a
fundamental key to evaluate individual and group quality, in order to recruit new
members or assign new tasks.
We provide empirical evidence showing that when agents employ our decision
mechanism it is possible for them to maintain high levels of customer satisfaction
(in terms of percentage of services finished on time). First, we show that coalitions
exhibit high resilience: the percentage of tasks serviced on time is high despite a
high percentage of unreliable workers. Even when the percentage of reliable agents
is low (∼ 40%), the percentage of serviced tasks on time is beyond 80%. coalitions
achieve high resilience through the use of a reputation mechanism that facilitates
ratings about individual workers and coalitions as a whole. This mechanism helps
coalitions promptly discriminate between good and bad workers. Second, coalitions
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and agents demonstrate that they successfully adapt to a varying distribution of
customers’ incoming tasks. Thus, we observe that ∼ 95% of tasks are serviced on
time despite significant variations in the incoming distribution of tasks. This occurs
because our decision-making mechanism facilitates that: (i) coalitions disband when
they become non-competitive (particularly in scenarios with low demand of tasks);
and (ii) individual workers detect opportunities to start a new coalition (particularly
in scenarios with high demand of tasks).
As future work we plan to investigate further reputation mechanisms that take
into account not only time delivery, but further task solving dimensions. Moreover,
we also plan to combine cost and reputation to create utility functions able to better
discriminate among coalitions. Finally, we also plan to study the effects of allowing
agents to belong to different coalitions at the same time.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and future work
6.1 Conclusions
In this chapter, we draw some conclusions about the work developed in this disserta-
tion and we show some paths open to future development.
In this thesis we have tackled the problem of maximizing cooperation for self-
interested agents using dynamic coalitions. Since agents are autonomous, this opened
several issues. First, when interacting with others, an agent had to decide if it coop-
erates or not, as well as how long cooperation must be sustained. Moreover, it also
had to decide whom to cooperate with. Finally, it also had to choose if it wanted to
jointly act with other agents or whether changing agents with whom it interacted.
Moreover, all the previous decisions on how and when to cooperate depended on the
conditions and the problem characteristics, since cooperative mechanism may work
better or worse depending on several facts, as the topology or the model of interac-
tion. In order to maximize cooperation, and taking the previous into account, we
have provided decision making mechanisms for: (i) dynamic coalition formation; (ii)
the interaction both among agents and coalitions; and (iii) how agents reconnect, i.e.,
rewire. Our mechanisms have coped with improving cooperation and responded to
different needs in different scenarios.
First, in Chapter 3, we have investigated dynamic coalition formation over static
topologies to improve cooperation. It is important to note that in this chapter, even
if coalitions changed over time, the interaction topology, i.e., how agents were con-
nected to interact, remained static. Thus we provided agents and coalitions with
decision making mechanisms that endowed the emergence of cooperation, where we
used the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) as a game-based interaction. We pro-
posed mechanisms in two different types of coalitions: i) coalitions with leaders; and
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ii) flat coalitions. The main difference between them is that in the former, there is a
leader that dictates the behavior of the coalition, charging taxes for it, while in the
second, all the members of the coalition decide the behavior and share gains. Thus
firstly, we proposed a new distributed, lightweight and efficient coalition emergence
approach using leaders. We have seen that with this mechanism agents maintained
cooperation over time in exchange of some significantly low tax, which is agreed by
the agents themselves (thus increasing their overall profits). However, even if us-
ing coalitions with leaders allowed cooperation to emerge, the use of leaders had
some drawbacks. Firstly, a coalition leader must be paid by the agents belonging
to the coalition. Secondly, a coalition leader imposed its decision on the agents in
the coalition to maximize cooperation, not taking into account valuable information
that agents could use for the benefit of all the members of the coalition. In order
to avoid those drawbacks, we later focused on forming flat coalitions, i.e., coalitions
without leaders. Thus we proposed the use of reinforcement learning together with
flat coalitions in order to achieve cooperation without the need of leaders. In this
part, we have also compared the cooperation between static and dynamic coalitions.
We have observed that the rate of cooperation was higher when dynamic coalitions
were used. The reason for the dynamic coalitional method performing better than
the static coalition is that it better adapts to the dynamics of the game. In fact,
dynamic coalitions are much more flexible structures that emerged and adapted only
among those that have experienced cooperation as rewarding in the past and thus
wanted to continue following this action. Overall, our experiments confirmed that
our mechanisms allowed the emergence of cooperation in static spatial and complex
networks, avoiding the loss of payoff when paying taxes to leaders.
In Chapter 3, we considered that agents interacted in a static topology. However,
in most real-world situations, the topology of the network changes in response to
the state of the network and the other way around, namely the state of the network
changes in response to the topology. In fact, research on games on dynamic topologies
has found empirical evidence showing that partner switching (also known as rewiring)
leads to cooperative behavior [54, 58, 118]. However, even if rewiring and dynamic
coalition formation used independently have proved successful to improve cooperation
in MAS, there has been no previous attempts to investigate the synergistic effects of
using dynamic coalition formation together with rewiring. This is why in Chapter 4
we have presented two cooperation mechanisms to help self-interested agents to es-
tablish sustained and successful cooperation using both dynamic coalition formation
and rewiring. Moreover, even if the IPD was useful to model situations where agents
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had to decide whether to cooperate or to defect, this game may not be enough when
we want to model actual-world scenarios where agents cannot only cooperate or de-
fect, but they own resources. This is why in Chapter 4 we presented two mechanism
that were based on: (1) a game-based interaction model that included the exchange
of resources (either bidirectional or unidirectional); (2) a dynamic coalition formation
mechanism that allowed agents to decide whether to join or leave coalitions (without
the intervention of a leader); and (3) a partner switching (rewiring) strategy based
on experiences acquired in previous interactions to help agents to avoid defective be-
haviors. Overall the chapter, we have experimentally confirmed that our mechanisms
indeed improved cooperation. The benefits of our cooperation mechanisms stem from
the fact that rewiring had a positive effect when coupled with coalition formation.
The reason for this is that since agents were allowed to change their neighbors, they
could choose to wire to agents that provided more benefits and to join bigger coalitions
to be more efficient against non-cooperative behaviors.
Finally, coalitions are not only necessary to improve cooperation and/or perform
more efficiently with respect to the single agents [133], but they are also beneficial
when there are complex tasks that cannot be performed by a single agent. If each of
the agents can individually perform one of the subtasks, but they do not appropriately
group, the task will not be performed, or it will be performed poorly. In fact, this
situation can be found in several scenarios, as international commerce, bidding for
government contracts or continuous auctions, and new Internet-based scenarios, as
crowdsourcing [138]. This is why in Chapter 5 we have built a mechanism that could
be employed in real scenarios as for example crowdsourcing, co-working, etc., where we
consider that complex tasks were performed by groups of agents, that model human
behavior. Thus with the goal of improving the quality and quantity of completed
tasks, while modeling a realistic scenario, we have introduced a novel decision-making
mechanism that allowed agents in a competitive environment to autonomously enact
and sustain coalitions. First, our mechanism allowed a coalition: (i) to assemble the
most reliable team of agents to service a certain task based on agent’s reputation;
and (ii) to decide whether the coalition must be sustained or disbanded because it
is not longer beneficial. Second, our mechanism allowed agents to decide whether
to continue being part of a coalition, or otherwise join another coalition. We have
provided empirical evidence showing that when agents employed our mechanism it
was possible for them to maintain high levels of customer satisfaction (in terms of
percentage of services finished on time). In fact, we showed that with our mechanism:
(i) coalitions exhibited high resilience; and (ii) coalitions and agents demonstrated
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that they successfully adapt to a varying distribution of customers’ incoming tasks
6.2 Future work
Regarding future work, there are several directions we plan to follow in order to
improve our dynamic coalition formation mechanisms.
• We plan to improve our models by developing new mechanisms to cope with
agents that are malicious and/or free-riders, since until now we have assumed
that agents in a coalition are fair to their mates, i.e., they do not lie. This
may not be a good representation of real world, since commonly individuals are
mistrustful.
• In the process of dynamic coalition formation and agents interaction, we have
considered that agents could only belong to one coalition. We have done this
since we considered coalitions as exclusive groups and interacted with each
other, thus the information of one coalition may help other. However, we could
also consider that agents belong to several coalitions. We plan to study its
influence on our mechanisms, as well as develop new ones in order to improve
the resemblance of our mechanisms to reality.
• In our simulations, we have mainly used small-world and scale-free networks,
since they provide realistic models of the topological features found in many na-
ture, social, and technological networks. Moreover, we have not focused on the
effects of rewiring over the networks, but mainly on its effect on the cooperative
rates of the population. Thus we plan to investigate more real-world topolo-
gies, together with in-depth research about the evolution of networks along the
simulations.
• Some of the methods and results presented and discussed here can be employed
in scenarios that involve data networks such as P2P, sensor, and vehicular net-
works. In fact, as future work, we plan to study if our mechanisms are efficient
in improving cooperation in resource sharing among vehicles in a city. Not only
that, but most importantly, there is a lot of research in human computation
nowadays. Now that we have our mechanisms simulated in MAS, we plan to
apply them to humans to study if the results still hold. For this, we plan to
build a simulator in order for humans to interact, endowing us to collect data
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that we will be able to compare with our multi-agent simulations. In fact, we
are interested in verifying if the results when rational agents play still hold when
humans interact.
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Conclusiones y trabajo futuro
Conclusiones
En este cap´ıtulo explicamos las conclusiones del trabajo desarrollado en esta dis-
ertacio´n, adema´s de mostras algunos caminos abiertos para trabajo futuro.
En esta tesis hemos abordado el problema de maximizar cooperacio´n para agentes
auto-interesados usando coaliciones dina´micas. Ya que los agentes son auto´nomos,
esto abre varias cuestiones. Primero, cuando un agente interactu´a con otros, el agente
debe decidir si coopera o no, as´ı como cua´nto debe mantener la cooperacio´n. Adema´s,
tambie´n tiene que decidir con quie´n coopera. Finalmente, un agente debe decidir si
quiere actuar conjuntamente con otros agentes, o si quiere cambiar los agentes con
los que interactu´a. Todas las decisiones previas de co´mo y cuando cooperar dependen
de las condiciones y de las caracter´ısticas del problema, ya que los mecanismos de
cooperacio´n funcionan mejor o peor dependiendo de varios factores, como la topolog´ıa
o el modelo de interaccio´n. Para maximizar la cooperacio´n, teniendo en cuenta lo
dicho previamente, hemos proporcionado mecanismos de decisio´n para: (i) formacio´n
dina´mica de coaliciones; (ii) la interaccio´n entre agentes y entre coaliciones; y (iii)
co´mo los agentes se reconectan. Nuestros mecanismos han mejorado la cooperacio´n
y respondido a diferentes necesidades en diferentes escenarios.
Primero, en el Cap´ıtulo 3, hemos investigado la formacio´n dina´mica de coaliciones
en topolog´ıas esta´ticas para mejorar la cooperacio´n. Es importante darse cuenta
que en este cap´ıtulo, incluso si las coaliciones cambiaban a lo largo del tiempo, la
topolog´ıa de interaccio´n, i.e., co´mo estaban conectados los agentes para interactuar,
permanecio´ esta´tica. As´ı que proporcionamos a los agentes y las coaliciones mecan-
ismos que permitieron la emergencia de cooperacio´n, en escenarios donde usamos
el Dilema del Prisionero Iterado (IPD) como modelo de interaccio´n. Hemos prop-
uesto mecanismos con dos tipos distintos de coaliciones: i) coaliciones con l´ıderes;
y ii) coaliciones planas. La principal diferencia entre estos es que en el primero, el
l´ıder dicta el comportamiento de la coalicio´n, cobrando impuestos por ello, mientras
149
que en el segundo, todos los miembros de la colacio´n deciden el comportamiento y
dividen las ganancias. As´ı que primero hemos propuesto un mecanismo de emer-
gencia de coaliciones eficiente, distribuido y ligero, usando l´ıderes. Hemos visto que
con este mecanismo los agentes manten´ıan la cooperacio´n en el tiempo a cambio de
unos impuestos bajos, que se acordaban entre los propios agentes (incrementando sus
beneficios totales). Sin embargo, incluso si usar coaliciones con l´ıderes permitio´ que
emergiese cooperacio´n, el uso de l´ıderes tiene varios inconvenientes. Primero, una
coalicio´n debe pagarle al l´ıder. Segundo, el l´ıder impone el comportamiento para
toda la coalicio´n, sin tener en cuenta informacio´n u´til que los agentes podr´ıan usar en
beneficio de todos los miembros de la coalicio´n. Para evitar estos inconvenientes, ma´s
tarde nos hemos centrado en formar coaliciones planas, i.e., coaliciones sin l´ıderes.
Hemos propuesto aprendizaje reforzado junto con coaliciones planas para conseguir
cooperacio´n sin necesidad del l´ıderes. En esta parte, tambie´n hemos comparado la
cooperacio´n entre coaliciones esta´ticas y dina´micas. Hemos observado que la tasa de
cooperacio´n era mayor en el segundo caso. La razo´n es que las coaliciones dina´micas
se adaptan mejor a la dinamicidad del juego. De hecho, las coaliciones dina´micas
son estructuras mucho ma´s flexibles que emergen y se adaptan so´lo entre aquellos
agentes que hubiesen experimentado cooperacio´n como algo beneficial en el pasado.
En general, nuestros experimentos han confirmado que nuestros mecanismos permiten
la emergencia de cooperacio´n en redes espaciales y complejas, evitando la pe´rdida de
ganancia por pagar impuestos al l´ıder.
En el Cap´ıtulo 3 consideramos que los agentes interactuaban en una topolog´ıa
esta´tica. Sin embargo, en la mayor parte de situaciones reales, la topolog´ıa de la red
cambia en respuesta al estado de la red, y viceversa. De hecho, la investigacio´n en
juegos con topolog´ıa dina´mica ha encontrado evidencias emp´ıricas mostrando que el
cambios de enlaces (reconexio´n) lleva a comportamiento cooperativo [54, 58, 118]. Sin
embargo, incluso si el cambio de enlaces y la formacio´n dina´mica de coaliciones usados
independientemente han mostrado que mejoran la cooperacio´n en MAS, no ha habido
ningu´n intento previo en investigar los efectos sinerg´ısticos de usar conjuntamente for-
macio´n dina´mica de coaliciones y cambio de enlaces. Por esto, en el Cap´ıtulo 4 hemos
presentado dos mecanismos de cooperacio´n para ayudar a los agentes auto-interesados
a establecer y mantener una cooperacio´n exitosa usando coaliciones dina´micas y cam-
bio de enlaces. Adema´s, incluso si el IPD ha sido u´til para modelar situaciones donde
los agentes ten´ıan que decidir si cooperar o ser desleales, este juego puede no ser sufi-
ciente si queremos modelar escenarios de hoy en d´ıa donde los agentes tambie´n poseen
recursos. Por eso, en el Cap´ıtulo 4 hemos presentado dos mecanismos basados en:
150
(1) un modelo de interaccio´n que incluye el intercambio de recursos (bidireccional o
unidireccional); (2) un mecanismo de formacio´n dina´mica de coaliciones que permite
a los agentes decidir si se unen o dejan coaliciones (sin la intervencio´n del l´ıder); y (3)
una estrategia de cambio de pareja basado en las experiencias previas. En general,
hemos confirmado experimentalmente que nuestros mecanismos s´ı mejoran la coop-
eracio´n. Sus beneficios parten del hecho de que el cambio de enlaces tiene efectos
positivos cuando se combina con la formacio´n de coaliciones. La razo´n es que ya
que los agentes pod´ıan cambiar a sus vecinos, pod´ıan elegir tambie´n conectarse a los
agentes que proveyesen con mayores beneficios y unirse a coaliciones mayores para
ser ma´s efectivos contra comportamientos no cooperativos.
Por u´ltimo, las coaliciones no son so´lo necesarias para mejorar la cooperacio´n
y/o actuar ma´s eficientemente con respecto a agentes independientes [133], pero son
tambie´n beneficiales cuando hay tareas complejas que no pueden ser realizadas por un
u´nico agente. Por esto, en el Cap´ıtulo 5 hemos construido un mecanismo que podr´ıa
ser empleado en escenarios reales, por ejemplo, en ”crowsourcing”, ”coworking”, etc.,
donde consideramos tareas complejas que deben ser realizadas por grupos de agentes.
Entonces, con el objetivo de proporcionar calidad y cantidad de tareas completadas,
mientras que modelamos un escenario realista, hemos introducido un mecanismo de
decisio´n que permite a los agentes en un entorno competitivo a auto´nomamente permi-
tir y mantener coaliciones. Primero, nuestro mecanismo ha permitido a una coalicio´n:
(i) conseguir el equipo ma´s confiable de agentes para servir una determinada tarea,
basa´ndose en la reputacio´n de los agentes; y (ii) decidir si la coalicio´n se debe mantener
o deshacer porque ya no es beneficiosa. Segundo, nuestro mecanismo ha permitido a
los agentes decidir si quieren seguir siendo parte de una coalicio´n, o si quieren unirse
a otra. Hemos proporcionado evidencias emp´ıricas mostrando que cuando los agentes
empleaban nuestro mecanismo, era posible mantener altos niveles de satisfaccio´n del
cliente (en te´rminos de porcentaje de tareas servidas a tiempo). De hecho, hemos
mostrado que con nuestro mecanismo: (i) las coaliciones exhib´ıan alta elasticidad; y
(ii) las coaliciones y los agentes han demostrado que se adaptan exitosamente a una
variacio´n de la distribucio´n de las tareas entrantes.
Trabajo futuro
En cuanto al trabajo futuro, planeamos seguir varias direcciones para mejorar nuestros
mecanismos.
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• Planeamos mejorar nuestros modelos desarrollando nuevos mecanismos para
enfrentarse a agentes que son maliciosos, ya que hasta ahora hemos asumido
que los agentes dentro de la coalicio´n no mienten. Esto puede no ser una
buena representacio´n del mundo real, ya que comu´nmente los individuos no son
confiables.
• En el proceso de formacio´n dina´mica de coaliciones e interaccio´n de los agentes,
hemos considerado que los agentes so´lo pod´ıan pertenecer a una coalicio´n.
Hemos hecho esto ya que hemos considerado a las coaliciones como grupos exclu-
sivos. Sin embargo, podemos considerar tambie´n escenarios donde los agentes
puedan pertenecer a varias coaliciones simulta´neamente. Planeamos estudiar
su influencia en nuestros mecanismos, as´ı como desarrollar nuevos para mejorar
la semejanza de nuestros escenarios a la realidad.
• En nuestras simulaciones, hemos usado ba´sicamente redes ”small-world” y ”scale-
free”. Adema´s, no nos hemos centrado en los efectos de la reconexio´n en las
redes, sino en sus efectos en la cooperacio´n. Planeamos investigar ma´s redes,
as´ı como el efecto de la reconexio´n en la evolucio´n de las mismas.
• Algunos de los me´todos y resultados presentados en esta disertacio´n pueden
ser empleados en escenarios como las redes P2P, sensores, y redes vehiculares.
De hecho, planeamos estudiar si nuestros mecanismos son eficientes en mejorar
la cooperacio´n en el comparto de recursos entre veh´ıculos en una ciudad. No
so´lo eso, pero tambie´n queremos comprobar si nuestros mecanismos para MAS
ser´ıan eficientes cuando son humanos los que interactu´an. Para esto, planeamos
construir un simulador para que personas interactu´en, lo que nos permitira´
conseguir datos para comparar con nuestras simulaciones con agentes. De hecho,
estamos interesados en verificar si los resultados de nuestras simulaciones con
agentes racionales se mantienen cuando los humanos interactu´an.
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